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Introduction
c h a r l e s  a l l e n  w a s  u n l u c k y .   In 1850, he testifi ed for a friend 
in a case that grew out of a road accident. A brougham driven by a man 
named Haynes allegedly ran up against a pony-chaise and caused two 
pounds, eighteen shillings in damage. The owners of the chaise sued for 
damages, and Allen testifi ed that in fact no collision had occurred. Rather 
unconvincingly, he suggested that the damage had been caused by the 
 pony-chaise having been backed into a water tub. The County Court judge 
hearing the case ignored Allen’s testimony, awarded damages to the plain-
tiffs, and committed Allen, still a teenager, on perjury charges. At Allen’s 
trial, the prosecution argued that Allen had lied in order to prevent Haynes, 
apparently a friend, from losing his job. The jury convicted Allen, and, de-
spite his youth, the judge sentenced him to seven years’ transportation.1
Harriet Ricketts fared little better. In 1885, she petitioned for divorce 
from her husband, William, citing his cruelty, adultery, and desertion. Al-
though she was successful before the Divorce Court, Harriet did not re-
ceive a divorce because her case attracted the attention of the Queen’s Proc-
tor, a Victorian offi cial charged with discovering falsity in divorce cases. 
In a separate proceeding, Harriet had to defend herself against William’s 
accusation that she had committed adultery with Silas Beasly. If petitioners 
for divorce had themselves committed adultery, their petitions were auto-
matically rejected. Harriet responded that since their separation, William 
had repeatedly sought her out and verbally abused her at her workplace. 
In order to hide from him, she claimed to be married to Beasly when she 
gave a statement to the police about an unrelated traffi c accident. Harriet 
denied any relationship with Beasly and contended that she used his name 
only because she was afraid her husband would discover her whereabouts. 
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Her word was not deemed sound enough to outweigh the Queen’s Proc-
tor’s charges. The court denied her divorce petition, leaving her married 
to William.2
Charles’s and Harriet’s ill luck was a matter of bad historical timing. 
Had they been caught lying in court half a century earlier or later, they 
likely would have gone unpunished. Late eighteenth- and early nineteenth-
century courts did little to prosecute perjury, even though judges regu-
larly complained about its prevalence in their courtrooms.3 Similarly, by 
the end of the nineteenth century, an indifference to perjury had returned, 
and prosecution of it was effectively restricted to a narrow range of cases. 
By 1898, the Home Offi ce described perjury by criminal defendants as a 
“not very serious matter.”4 But courts in the mid-nineteenth century ap-
proached the question of truth-telling with unprecedented seriousness and 
adopted an array of innovative strategies to guarantee veracity in trials. 
Both Charles and Harriet had the misfortune to testify in this unusual era 
of experimentation.
This book explores the novel strategies for the production of truth 
implemented in law courts during this period. Mid-nineteenth-century ju-
rists refused to content themselves with the “incoherence” of earlier trial 
practice, which largely sought to avoid the problem of mendacity by pro-
hibiting those witnesses thought most likely to lie from testifying and plac-
ing those who did testify under oaths considered to bind their  consciences.5 
Instead, these Victorian jurists responded to parliamentary reforms that al-
lowed the participation of an ever-growing number of witnesses by adopt-
ing new ways of controlling the veracity of testimony.
Initially, they attempted to deal with the problem of perjury by re-
course to the criminal justice system. A brief period of vigorous prosecu-
tion of suspected perjurers like Charles Allen was then followed by a re-
trenchment and a turn to the legal profession as the best defense against 
perjury. Cross-examination, initially reviled for the way in which it seemed 
to depend on competitive word-twisting rather than a serious concern for 
the truth, came to supersede perjury prosecutions as the primary means 
of guaranteeing witness veracity; its triumph owed much to the way in 
which barristers successfully redefi ned it as a respectable forensic tech-
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nique, characterized by gentlemanly restraint and subject to professional 
norms. The growing confi dence in cross-examination that accompanied 
the steady rise of the legal profession’s prestige helped set the stage for the 
ultimate lifting of the last major testimonial restriction in the 1898 Criminal 
Evidence Act, which allowed criminal defendants to testify. This last step, 
which itself emerged from a set of complicated factors, some legislative, 
some more broadly social, indicates just how reconciled Victorians eventu-
ally became to the possibility of witness deceit.
Nineteenth-century innovation in this area was even more pro-
nounced outside of the traditional common-law courts. In new judicial 
contexts, such as courts in the colonies or the newly created Divorce Court 
in London, the pursuit of truth could take extreme forms. Perjury in British 
India, for instance, was punished by tattooing the sentence “I am a per-
jurer” on the offender’s forehead, a practice thought to translate the British 
concern with veracity into indigenous terms. And as we saw with Harriet, 
an inquisitorial Queen’s Proctor was grafted onto the common-law system 
in the Divorce Court. Both of these examples are notable for the willingness 
they reveal among jurists to break radically with established precedent. 
Innovation, here, was a telling mark of anxiety in the face of relations of 
 power—man and woman, state and subject, colonizer and colonized—
fraught with contradictions and awkward confl icts between the clear prin-
ciples of the law and the messy realities of particular social interactions. 
It is worth noting, for instance, how ambivalent even the Queen’s Proctor 
himself felt about forcing estranged couples to stay married, and how few 
judges in India had the stomach to order actual perjurers tattooed, even as 
they professed to accept the validity of the sanction.
Given these profound contradictions and ambivalences, it perhaps 
comes as no surprise that many of these attempts to curb perjury failed. 
Their failure, however, is itself an important chapter in the history of the 
common-law trial. The various experiments discussed in this book marked 
the outer boundaries of innovation in trial practice. As such, they reveal 
the extent to which the modern common-law trial is a product both of the 
compromises Victorian reformers struck and of the lessons they learned 
from failed experiments. The Victorian trial, therefore, should be seen as a 
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product of contingent institutional solutions shaped not only by the inter-
nal dynamics of the law, but also by practical exigencies and contemporary 
attitudes. To this end, where necessary, my analysis ranges somewhat more 
widely than is typical of most works of legal history, considering newspaper 
accounts of cases, novels, and works of psychology, among other things; 
my goal in doing so is to reveal the complex connections between the law 
and the historical context in which it was taking shape. The law during the 
Victorian period, as we will see in the chapters that follow, was not a sepa-
rate world developing in isolation from the rest of society, but it was also 
not a simple refl ection of broader cultural trends; instead, it was to some 
degree both things, often in tension with one another.
Constructing Sincerity
The Victorians, as many scholars have noted—and as Oscar Wilde 
satirically observed— deeply valued earnestness. Samuel Smiles, author of 
best-selling advice manuals such as Self-Help and the most famous voice 
of Victorian earnestness, placed sincerity at the top of the list of virtues: 
“loyal adherence to veracity,” he wrote, was the most prominent aspect 
of character.6 But this earnestness, while universally recognized as impor-
tant, is nonetheless little understood by historians. More than fi fty years 
ago, Walter Houghton noted both the centrality of earnestness to Victo-
rian culture and the paucity of scholarly research on the topic: “The one 
thing . . . which every schoolboy knows about the Victorians is that they 
were earnest. But what is meant and why they were is less easy to say.”7 
For Houghton, Victorian earnestness was primarily a product of the Evan-
gelical movement in the Church of England, and indeed Evangelicalism 
provided a kind of unstated moral baseline that shaped both the arguments 
legal reformers made and their sense of which problems were most ur-
gent. Outside of Evangelicalism, many other nineteenth-century thinkers 
came to stress the importance of earnestness and sincerity, including John 
Henry Newman, Thomas Arnold, and Thomas Carlyle.8 This emphasis 
on earnestness was a backlash against what many of these writers saw as 
 eighteenth-century complacency—against the frivolity and inconsequenti-
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ality of “old leisure” and against the easy assumptions of what the Evangeli-
cals attacked as “nominal religion.”9 Sincerity had a strong moral aspect: 
truth was often most highly valued as a sign of good character, rather than 
as an end in itself.10 This conception was particularly marked in discus-
sions of India, which made honesty into a veritable cornerstone of British 
national identity, despite what we will see were quite pronounced anxieties 
about metropolitan truthfulness in such matters as poaching, divorce, and 
sexual scandal.
As this contradiction between colonial self-image and pervasive 
doubt indicates, Victorian attitudes toward lying were more complex than 
they might seem at fi rst glance.11 This complexity was particularly clear in 
the courtroom. Lying in the courts was among the least ambiguous of trans-
gressions: it violated the state’s law, the religious imperative of the oath, and 
cultural strictures against dishonesty. Yet even in the context of juridical 
deceit, Victorians found ambiguities. Although Evangelicalism provided 
a clear statement of the culpability of all lies, Victorians still sought a more 
complicated relationship with truth-telling. Determining which sorts of 
lies were actually criminal in nature, and which could be dismissed as ex-
pected, albeit regrettable, deceit on the part of women and non-English and 
lower-class individuals, was an evolving project throughout the nineteenth 
century. Similarly, judges and juries vacillated in their evaluations of the 
underlying motives prompting deceit. Both the identity of the liar and the 
type of lie mattered. Such qualifi cations became increasingly important as 
the Victorian entente with lying—the tacit acceptance of a wide variety 
of courtroom lies— expanded over the course of the century. These ac-
commodations, however—at least when viewed from the jurist’s perspec-
tive—were not signs of a willingness to accept moral ambiguity or playful, 
Wildean irony.12 Instead, they were conservative in nature and tended to 
reinscribe social and sexual boundaries, for instance, by redefi ning perjury 
as a lower-class offense or providing respectable defendants an opportunity 
to defend themselves against scandalous accusations.
This book, therefore, paints a fuller picture of Victorian earnestness 
by shifting the focus to the social sphere of the courtroom and the legal 
system. Victorian earnestness, it argues, was negotiated and manufactured 
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in the courtroom as much as it was in the catechism. Truth-telling in the 
courts was an active area of concern, and its boundaries were constantly 
disputed and redrawn. The courts participated in the nineteenth-century 
process of accommodating sweeping religious interdictions to the complex 
reality of social interaction. At the same time, the courts also provided lead-
ership in the rhetorical condemnation of falsity in all its forms, even when 
the activist Evangelical beliefs underlying the condemnation had faded 
from public view in other contexts. Looking at the Victorian experiments 
with producing juridical truth, then, supplies a dual perspective: courts 
refl ected social beliefs in their determination of the relative culpability of 
lies and liars while at the same time creating an internally consistent institu-
tional backdrop for those beliefs.
The Law’s Muscular Moralism
Cultural anxieties about sincerity emerged at a time when the legal 
system was increasingly attentive to the question of truth-telling. Several 
developments brought the issue of lying in the courtroom to the fore, includ-
ing increased public interest in trial narratives and controversies regarding 
the role of defense counsel. Victorian experimentation with techniques for 
eliciting the truth in the courtroom therefore depended on the coincidence 
of a pervasive extralegal reverence for sincerity, changes in trial practice, 
and the law’s newfound “muscular moralism.” Just as muscular Christi-
anity became a Victorian ideal, active enforcement of moral duties in the 
courtroom also became an important ambition for legal reformers.13
To understand how these factors came together, it is important to 
remember that the early nineteenth century saw a shift in the public face of 
the law, which was refl ected in newspaper accounts of real trials and liter-
ary accounts of fi ctional ones. With the reduction of the number of hanging 
offenses and the movement of the site of execution out of the public eye, 
the public’s main exposure to the legal system now came from reports of 
trials rather than from the spectacle of the hanging tree. Newspapers and 
the novel replaced the older genre of criminal broadsheets and biography.14 
At the same time, procedural changes, including the lengthening of previ-
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ously lightning-fast criminal trials and increased participation by counsel, 
restructured the trial as a competition between multiple narratives.15 The 
result of these changes was to inculcate new habits of reading for both fi c-
tional and real trial narratives. Popular accounts of real trials and the grow-
ing genre of “Newgate” novels, which centered on the trial as the climactic 
moment in a fi ctional criminal biography, invited audiences to judge the 
truthfulness of competing narratives.16 Assessing credibility became both a 
public issue and a popular pastime.
Other changes in the law also served to heighten concern about truth 
in the courtroom. The 1836 Prisoners’ Counsel Act allowed counsel to ad-
dress the jury directly and make opening statements. This expanded role 
that barristers thus played triggered fears that they would abuse their role 
and use their command of rhetoric to deceive. Albany Fonblanque, a jour-
nalist for the radical weekly the Examiner, was among the most strident 
critics of the new law.17 Fonblanque saw the ethics of advocacy as at best 
indifferent to the discovery of truth and often actively opposed to it: “we 
have been told, on high authority,” he wrote, “that the advocate belongs, 
body and soul, to his client; that he is bound to make truth appear untruth, 
and untruth appear truth.”18 In this case, the barrister’s growing role in the 
construction of narrative in the courtroom threatened to undermine the 
very cause of truth that lawmakers sought to advance, a problem it would 
take commentators and jurists the rest of the century to resolve— or at least 
to accept as unresolvable.
The mid-Victorian period also saw a dramatically increased willing-
ness to use the courts to extend legal discipline to moral issues previously 
thought to be outside the scope of the law.19 W. L. Burn fi rst pointed to 
the mid-Victorian phenomenon of “increased readiness on the part of the 
State to apply sanctions against certain errant types of ‘individual.’ ”20 Mar-
tin Wiener explores one such expansion: the Victorian campaign against 
violence directed at women. In prosecuting wife-beaters, rapists, and 
 murderers, Victorians used the state’s power to promote and impose re-
ligiously derived ideals of self-discipline, orderliness, and nonviolence.21 
The imperial context provided additional motivation for these efforts. If 
the British were to justify their imperial dominion through a discourse of 
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pacifi cation and civilization, it behooved them to be exemplars of nonvio-
lence at home.22
This judicial activity against masculine violence was part of a larger 
trend that Wiener has chronicled extensively. Law reform served to pro-
mote a program of moral reform.23 In particular, it seemed to bolster no-
tions of personal responsibility: “A crucial supposition underlying early 
Victorian law reform,” Wiener writes, “was that the most urgent need was 
to make people self-governing and that the best way to do so was to hold 
them sternly and unblinkingly responsible for the consequences of their 
actions.”24 Legal prohibitions, Victorian jurists believed, should track 
moral distinctions precisely in order to form the public character.25 Re-
formers—many of whom were motivated by religious concerns—thereby 
showed a surprising willingness to use state power to enforce the dictates 
of the conscience.
A similar optimism about the state’s ability to discriminate between 
truth-telling and deceit, and innocent debtors and criminals, was appar-
ent in the bankruptcy reforms of the same period.26 Legislation in 1849 
instituted a three-tiered system designed to differentiate between those 
who were unfortunate victims of circumstances beyond their control, those 
who were improvident, and those who were dishonest. Bankrupts deemed 
to be dishonest received third-class certifi cates in order to alert any future 
business associates to their history.27 Markham Lester attributes this fer-
vor for moral distinctions to the infl uence of Evangelicalism, noting that 
the 1849 act established a system by which distinctions could be made be-
tween moral and immoral businessmen. Law reformers were able to draw 
on Evangelical sentiment in legislation that also satisfi ed utilitarian goals.28 
This recourse to Evangelical ideas was combined, moreover, with an in-
creased confi dence in the fact-fi nding capacities of tribunals.
The attempts to bring the power of the state to bear upon false testi-
mony described here, particularly in its early stages, refl ected many of the 
same concerns. The infl uence of Evangelical ideas about the culpability of 
all lies—great and small—and the importance of punishment is clearly vis-
ible in these various attempts to resolve the problem of deceitful testimony. 
As with bankruptcy, however, mid-nineteenth-century law reformers were 
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not content to leave the deterrence and punishment of the violation of a 
judicial oath to an individual’s conscience; instead, they sought to enlist 
the state—through vigorous prosecution of perjury—in the enforcement 
of a moralized law. The legal innovations undertaken in India and with the 
Queen’s Proctor in England show a similar conception of law as a means 
of inculcating moral norms. With the failure of these experiments, and the 
comparative success of cross-examination, reformers turned to other strat-
egies, setting the stage for the emergence of present-day trial practice.
Engines of Truth
The title of this book is borrowed, with a twist, from one of the 
most famous phrases in American jurisprudence. Writing in 1904, North-
western University Law School dean John Henry Wigmore declared that 
cross-examination was “beyond any doubt the greatest legal engine ever 
invented for the discovery of truth.” Cross-examination was, to Wigmore’s 
mind, even more important than trial by jury and represented Anglo-
American law’s “great and permanent contribution” to trial procedure.29 
It was a characteristic Wigmore declaration. William Twining notes that 
he was “apparently untroubled by doubt or the elusiveness of reality” and 
therefore “said what he had to say clearly, systematically and forcefully.”30 
Wigmore’s reputation as a scholar and the emphatic nature of his language 
contributed to its importance and longevity in U.S. law. His description 
of cross-examination as the “greatest legal engine” for truth continued to 
appear in Supreme Court analyses of cross-examination throughout the 
twentieth century.31
Wigmore’s uncritical enthusiasm for cross-examination reveals the 
close connections between British legal thought of the nineteenth century 
and contemporary American evidence law. Born in 1863 and well-schooled 
in nineteenth-century British legal scholarship, Wigmore was affection-
ately referred to by colleagues as “the last mid-Victorian.”32 Trained by 
James Bradley Thayer at the Harvard Law School, Wigmore was famil-
iar with English commentators on the law of evidence, including Thomas 
Starkie and Jeremy Bentham. In his Treatise, Wigmore provided  extensive 
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 quotations from both Bentham and Starkie, including Starkie’s 1824 de-
scription of cross-examination as “one of the principal tests which the law 
has devised for the ascertainment of truth.”33 Wigmore, therefore, pro-
vides a bridge between the period of this study and contemporary U.S. 
law as well as a parallel example of the progression from viewing cross-
 examination as one test among several to seeing it as “the greatest” test. 
The evolution from Starkie’s 1824 statement to Wigmore’s 1904 one also 
refl ects a key theme of this book: the story of the burgeoning importance of 
cross-examination.
But this is not just a story of deepening emphasis on a single test 
for truth. The twist in the title—“engines” of truth rather than a single 
engine—represents one of this book’s major points. During the Victorian 
era, there was a period of experimentation with a variety of engines for 
the production of truth. Cross-examination may have won out in the end, 
but it was not the only candidate under consideration. For Victorians, 
learning to live with the lie involved an evolution from religious and statist 
to professional solutions to the moral problem of deceit. Early and mid-
Victorian reformers turned to the state to police perjury in England, while 
searching for a religious sanction against perjury in India; but by the end 
of the century, responsibility for detecting lies rested largely with the legal 
profession—a power that its members zealously guarded against infringe-
ments by the government in the person of the judge. Somewhat paradoxi-
cally, as we have seen, the Victorian period also saw an episode of relying 
on a continental-style inquisitorial judge to police perjury in the Divorce 
Court. In short, many “engines” were being experimented with during the 
nineteenth century, and various methods of managing mendacity in the 
courtroom helped to develop a clearer sense of the complex interaction of 
law and practice that shaped the Victorian legal system.
The fi rst part of this book is devoted to experiments made to ensure 
or police veracity within the context of the common-law trial. Chapter 1 
investigates the midcentury turn to perjury prosecutions as the main guar-
antor of testimonial veracity and the prosecution of perjurers over the ensu-
ing decades, revealing how a ubiquitous offense came to be thought of as 
a lower-class crime and how prosecution came to be limited to offenders 
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in a narrow range of cases. The chapter surveys perjury prosecutions in 
England and Wales from 1835 through 1900, using a systematic sampling of 
otherwise unrecorded accounts of trials in local newspapers to determine 
what types of lies and what types of liars were punished. It also looks at the 
law reformers’ high hopes for perjury prosecutions and the institutional 
limitations that ultimately dashed those hopes, transforming perjury pros-
ecution into a marginal phenomenon. Chapter 2 looks at the steady aug-
mentation of the barrister’s role as guarantor of accuracy. Developments in 
the law of evidence, shifts in power between barristers and trial judges, and 
the growing importance of cross-examination all contributed to this pro-
cess. This chapter follows the rise of cross-examination by investigating 
the controversies regarding its role and nature that periodically erupted in 
the popular and legal presses. By the end of the century, cross-examination 
had assumed its contemporary place as the main protection against tes-
timonial duplicity, a change driven in large part by the professional self-
interest of the bar.
The second part of this book looks at experimentation outside the 
boundaries of the traditional common-law trial in two contexts in which it 
was thought that witnesses would inevitably lie. Chapter 3 explores the fi rst 
context—the colonial courts of British India, where British administrators 
wrestled with their suspicions that they had no ability to discriminate be-
tween false and true testimony. Here our story backtracks chronologically 
to colonial practice in the early nineteenth century and continues through 
the aftermath of the Indian Rebellion of 1857–58 (also called the Indian 
Mutiny or Sepoy Mutiny). British administrators went through a variety 
of expedients, including tattooing on the forehead of the guilty, in a vain 
attempt to elicit popular indignation against lying. The extensive colonial 
records preserved in the India Offi ce Library provide the source material 
for this chapter. Chapter 4 turns to a second context in which lying was 
thought to be inevitable: the new Divorce Court. Concerns about perjury 
regarding matters as delicate as adultery prompted the reinvention of the 
Queen’s Proctor’s role in 1860. Individuals found upon investigation to 
have lied, like the unfortunate Harriet Ricketts, would be denied their di-
vorces. This chapter relies on the records kept by the Queen’s Proctor’s 
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offi ce during its fi rst twenty-fi ve years, revealing the ways in which cases 
were selected for scrutiny. It also suggests some reasons for the institution’s 
ultimate failure, which derived both from moral scruples about the double 
standard in divorce law and from confl icts generated by the incompatibility 
of inquisitorial and common-law models.
Chapter 5 draws the two parts of the book together by looking at the 
passage of the Criminal Evidence Act of 1898, which allowed defendants 
in criminal cases to testify. The gap of nearly fi fty years between its passage 
and that of the Evidence Amendment Act of 1851 allowing parties in civil 
cases to testify was, I argue, in large part a byproduct of the reform and 
experimentation that characterized the Victorian legal system’s approach 
to the possibility of witness deceit. As such, it brings the process of change 
charted in the previous four chapters to a close. This fi nal step in the elimi-
nation of witness exclusions marked the triumph of cross-examination as 
the guarantor of veracity in the courtroom, opting for a single engine of 
truth over multiple ones. Like the various experiments described in the 
preceding chapters, however, the history of the Criminal Evidence Act 
also provides an opportunity to investigate the intersection of social fac-
tors and legal reform. Accepting the idea that allowing defendants to testify 
would do something other than open a Pandora’s box of rampant perjury 
required a set of counterexamples for reformers to fi nd compelling. These 
came from a few highly publicized cases in which respectable men were 
accused of crimes so scandalous that the norms of gentlemanly fair play 
demanded the defendant be given a chance to respond—and created a situ-
ation in which legislators and legal professionals could imagine themselves 
in the place of those accused. The desire of respectable jurists to protect 
the rights of respectability, therefore, trumped the previously dominant 
concern that lower-status, uneducated defendants might be tricked into 
false self-incrimination, preparing the ground for the last major step in the 
elimination of the old exclusionary system of evidence.
We know much less about the Victorian trial than we do about other 
facets of Victorian life, a lacuna this research seeks to fi ll. Earlier periods, 
in contrast, have been more thoroughly studied. John Langbein’s work has 
demonstrated the epochal importance of the “lawyerization” of the crimi-
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nal trial, as rules of evidence and increased participation by counsel trans-
formed the “accused speaks” trial of the seventeenth and early eighteenth 
centuries.34 Allyson May, David Cairns, and Thomas Gallanis have ana-
lyzed the evolution of the barrister’s role in the late eighteenth and early 
nineteenth centuries.35 Christopher Allen has explored the factors under-
lying reforms in the law of evidence during the nineteenth century, with 
particular attention to the effect of ideas other than Benthamite utilitarian 
philosophy.36 With the exception of Allen’s work, however, most of these 
stories conclude in the 1830s, with the passage of the Prisoners’ Counsel 
Act, or the 1850s, when major changes in the law of evidence in civil cases 
were made. The recently completed nineteenth-century volumes of The 
Oxford History of the Law of England add considerably to our understand-
ing of the period, but the monograph literature is still less well-developed 
than it is for the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries.37
What happened during the second half of the nineteenth century, 
both in the role of counsel and in the law of evidence, has not yet been com-
prehensively studied. This book, therefore, contributes to the history of 
the trial by exploring the process of restructuring and accommodation that 
followed these midcentury changes. Reforms driven by theory must be en-
acted in practice, and it is in practice that they take on their ultimate shape, 
under pressure not only from the internal dynamics of the law, but also 
from such factors as ideas about morality, assumptions about the nature of 
respectability, ideas of what makes a “good story,” notions of civility, and 
so on. This story of theory meeting practice is crucial to our understanding 
of the development of the common-law trial, the history of the legal profes-
sion, and the history of the Victorian period as a whole.
One caveat is in order, however. Many of the historical processes de-
scribed here have roots that reach back into the eighteenth century and ear-
lier. Assessment of credibility, for example, was a topic of concern for Geof-
frey Gilbert in his evidence treatise written as early as 1726.38 Similarly, the 
rise of the barrister, and the consequent limitation of the judge’s powers in 
the courtroom, dates back to at least the mid-eighteenth century. Neverthe-
less, a combination of factors accelerated these changes in the nineteenth 
century. As we have seen, the scope of potential credibility confl icts was 
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greatly expanded by changes in the law of evidence at the same time that 
increased cultural sensitivity to sincerity made the problem appear more 
critical. Barristers, likewise, continued to see their courtroom roles evolve 
during the 1860s and beyond, as jurists and the public wrestled with the 
question of the proper scope of cross-examination. While many elements 
of the modern trial were already in place by the early nineteenth century, 
then, the succeeding decades were a time of adaptation and continued 
change that played an important role both in determining the outlines of 
the common-law trial and in the history of the legal profession.
Legal history has been slow to adopt trends within the broader his-
torical community. The story of experimentation with truth that I tell here 
attempts to remedy this isolation by relating the history of the trial both to 
British colonial history and to metropolitan Victorian culture. Historians 
of modern Britain have increasingly recognized the “imperative of placing 
colony and metropole in one analytic frame,”39 but legal historians have 
only just begun the process of drawing connections between British expe-
riences abroad and changes at home.40 By including the use of the rhetoric 
of empire at home and the experience of British courts in India, this book 
attempts to relate the two histories and point out previously unsuspected 
connections. Similarly, it seeks to expand the cultural context for changes 
of the common-law trial beyond the customary references to utilitarian phi-
losophy.41 I argue that the nineteenth-century changes in the common-law 
trial need to be understood within the context of evangelically infl ected and 
largely middle-class ideas about the importance of sincerity and account-
ability. The evolution of the trial both reinforced and drew upon contempo-
rary beliefs and practices. Law does not exist in a vacuum, however much 
jurists may sometimes wish the contrary. A full historical understanding 
of the modern trial must acknowledge its embeddedness in a larger social, 
cultural, and political context and the complex, sometime elusive ways that 
external forces shape the seemingly hermetic world of the law.
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chapter  one
The Rise and Fall of Perjury Prosecutions
a s  r e c e n t l y  a s  1 6 0  y e a r s  a g o ,   most common-law trials 
were conducted without the benefi t of testimony from those who were 
most likely to know the facts of the matter: the parties, their spouses, and 
all witnesses who had any pecuniary interest in the question, no matter how 
slight. Fear of perjury had provided one of the principal rationales for this 
system of disqualifi cation; it was not only thought to protect excluded wit-
nesses by denying them the opportunity to commit perjury— considered 
both a temporal crime and a spiritual sin—but also to guard the legal sys-
tem against testimony considered most likely to be false. The abolition of 
these disqualifi cations began in England and Wales in the 1840s and 1850s, 
and contemporaries saw the change as nothing short of revolutionary.1 Like 
most revolutions, however, the practical consequences of this one were 
unexpected. This chapter explores these consequences by describing the 
ways in which the English legal system attempted to guard against deceit in 
the courtroom after the reforms.
During the course of debate, reformers had supported prosecution of 
perjurers as an alternative to disqualifi cation, and after the 1851 Evidence 
Amendment Act allowing parties to testify in civil cases passed, this sug-
gestion began to affect trial practice.2 As this chapter shows with a system-
atic sampling of perjury cases in civil courts between 1835 and 1900, the 
number of prosecutions rose dramatically at midcentury, so much so that 
judges worried whether perjury prosecutions would become the inevitable 
sequel to virtually every trial. Where prosecutions had formerly been ex-
tremely infrequent, they were now a regular feature of assizes throughout 
England and Wales. This surge was part of a search for alternative means of 
regulating witnesses in the absence of a system of disqualifi cation.
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Perjury’s prominence was fairly short-lived. By the 1870s, perjury 
prosecutions had leveled off overall and had declined in civil cases. The 
pages that follow chart this rise and fall, tracing the crime’s curious prog-
ress from fulcrum of anxieties about testimony, to viable weapon against 
forensic deceit, and fi nally to odd and infrequently employed appendix to 
the criminal law. I argue that perjury’s return to comparative obscurity was 
contingent on a number of problems—including the slow development of 
criminal appeals, the lack of a public prosecutor, and the continued dis-
qualifi cation of criminal defendants. The decline of perjury also depended 
on the development of norms of prosecution that increasingly restricted 
perjury cases to a narrow range of offenses involving primarily lower-class 
defendants. By the end of the century, these norms had become so en-
trenched that even dramatic changes, such as the creation of a public pros-
ecutor or the admission of sworn testimony from criminal defendants, did 
little to alter the increasingly marginal role of perjury prosecutions.
Perjury has often been neglected in the scholarly literature, but its 
history can provide a critical perspective on the dynamics of the modern 
trial.3 Understanding what happened to the use of perjury prosecutions as 
a regular method for enforcing truthfulness, for example, can help account 
for the current importance accorded to cross-examination. As we will see 
in the course of this chapter, cross-examination’s predominance was not 
always unrivaled. At the time of the reforms abolishing disqualifi cation for 
interest, perjury prosecutions and cross-examination were both presented 
as guarantors of veracity. Cross-examination, as chapter 2 investigates in 
more detail, steadily grew in signifi cance as perjury prosecutions became 
increasingly marginal. In addition to setting the stage for the next chapter, 
the nineteenth-century history of perjury also allows us to see how this of-
fense came to assume such a peculiar place in Anglo-American criminal 
jurisprudence: often thought to be prevalent, it is nonetheless rarely pros-
ecuted. The pages that follow show that selective prosecution of perjury 
cases is by no means a new phenomenon. Measures to encourage more sys-
tematic punishment of offenders have long been met with suspicion by both 
bench and bar, for reasons that these failed nineteenth-century attempts to 
use perjury prosecutions as a lie detector help us understand more clearly.
Y6746.indb   18 7/2/15   2:40:29 PM
The Rise and Fall of Perjury Prosecutions 19
Perjury and the Reform of the Law of Evidence
In the early nineteenth century, there was wide-ranging support for 
reforms of the law of evidence that would remove the traditional disquali-
fi cations. The most radical program for evidence reform was set out by 
Jeremy Bentham in Rationale of Judicial Evidence. Bentham opposed all 
exclusionary rules and sought an inclusionary system of “natural proce-
dure,” in which all evidence would be admitted, subject to examination 
and commonsense evaluation. At the same time, he remained acutely 
aware of the need to ensure veracity in the courtroom. Using the terminol-
ogy developed throughout his jurisprudence, he argued that the sanctions 
which prevented perjury included the physical sanction (lying produced a 
revulsion that was a physical pain), the moral or popular sanction (social 
disapprobation of lying and liars), the political or legal sanction (criminal 
punishments), and the religious sanction (the oath). For Bentham, none 
of these sanctions was currently effective. He listed a series of sanctions 
that could be used, including the oath or other form of ceremony, infamy, 
interrogation, orality, notation (recording), publicity, counterevidence, 
and investigation. But in his view, “At the head of the factitious securities 
for the trustworthiness of testimony, punishment, punishment by appoint-
ment of law, must stand without dispute.” The criminal sanction, however, 
needed to be recast in order to be made effective. To begin with, Bentham 
insisted that perjury should be renamed mendacity, to refl ect its indepen-
dence from the oath. He also suggested a set of principles: fi rst, that pun-
ishment should be applied in proportion to the extent of mischief caused 
by the deceit; second, that the punishment should be suffi cient to achieve 
its ends without reliance on either popular or religious sanctions; and third, 
that punishment should extend to all false statements in a judicial context, 
including declarations and affi davits.4
Reform of the system of disqualifi cation came piecemeal, however. 
The fi rst two steps toward achieving Bentham’s goal of dismantling the sys-
tem of incompetence from interest took place in the 1840s. First, in 1843, 
Lord Denman’s Evidence Act, which allowed nonparty interested wit-
nesses to testify, was passed after an abortive attempt the previous year.5 
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Three years later, there was another decisive moment in the evolving Victo-
rian rapprochement with the threat of perjury in civil trials. In 1846, after a 
long battle, the County Courts Act passed, establishing a system of County 
Courts in which parties, as well as nonparty interested witnesses, would be 
allowed to testify.6 The passage of these two acts did not mean that concern 
about perjury had been vanquished by the mid-1840s. On the contrary, as 
reformers attempted to extend the reform to parties themselves, opponents 
began to invoke the threat of perjury more frequently. The prominence of 
this critique is refl ected by the energy devoted to refuting it. Lord Henry 
Brougham, for example, began his discussion of the evidence reforms by 
moving straight to what he called “the main ground of the objection”—the 
problem of perjury.7 Brougham went on to argue against the fear of perjury 
for three reasons. First, prohibiting testimony by parties merely prompted 
the silenced parties to suborn perjury from others—such as friends, rela-
tives, and employees. Nonparty witnesses, for their part, would be more 
likely to commit perjury because of the popular idea that perjury on behalf 
of another was less culpable than perjury prompted by self-interest. Sec-
ond, perjury by a party would be easier to detect than perjury by a non-
party witness, because a party witness would be expected to give a longer 
and more complete rendition of events, which would be more vulnerable 
to cross-examination. Third, not allowing parties to testify would neces-
sitate testimony by a greater number of witnesses and therefore create a 
correspondingly greater risk of perjury: “The chances of perjury are in-
creased with the total number of witnesses.”8 Brougham also contrasted 
the extreme solicitude manifested in the common-law courts with the rela-
tive indifference to perjury elsewhere in the English legal system, including 
Chancery suits.
To advance his case, Brougham drew on responses to a survey of 
the County Court judges regarding their assessment of the threat of party-
witness perjury.9 After citing statements from a number of judges who 
minimized the danger of perjury, Brougham summarized: “It is admitted 
then—it is a fact in the cause and beyond all dispute—that in the County 
Courts the principle has worked well; that without such evidence thou-
sands, many hundreds of thousands, of causes could not have been tried; 
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that no encouragement has been given by it to perjury.”10 Brougham might 
charitably be said to have been acting more as an advocate than as an an-
alyst. If one returns to the County Court judges’ reports, one fi nds that 
they coupled support for ending testimonial disqualifi cation with rueful 
acknowledgment of widespread perjury in the County Courts. One of the 
judges queried, for example, responded, “That the amount of perjury in 
the County Courts is very great cannot, I fear, be doubted.”11
Brougham optimistically offered a prediction that perjury in the 
higher courts would be even less of a threat than in the County Courts 
because the parties “are more likely to be of a high station” and the judges 
more intimidating.12 In the House of Commons, Attorney General Al-
exander Cockburn led debate in the same direction Brougham had. He 
stressed that excluding party testimony scarcely excluded perjury as long 
as unscrupulous parties suborned others to perjure themselves. He echoed 
Brougham’s interpretation of the results from the County Court survey.13 
Interestingly, the response of members of Parliament to both Brougham 
and the Attorney General concentrated almost exclusively on whether 
to preserve an exclusion for spousal testimony, rather than the threat of 
perjury.14 Once the reformers compromised by allowing for exclusion of 
spousal testimony, the Evidence Amendment bill quickly passed through 
Parliament.
One facet of the 1851 reform that legal historians have little noticed 
was the almost simultaneous passage of Lord Campbell’s Administration 
of Criminal Justice Improvement Act.15 In fact, the two bills proceeded al-
most in tandem through Parliament, often being debated immediately after 
one another. Campbell himself, although a supporter of Lord Denman’s 
act, had reservations about allowing party testimony; the act, he argued 
did not provide adequate protections against deception.16 Campbell’s 1851 
bill responded in part to the limitation under the Georgian Perjury Act that 
restricted the power to commit suspected perjurers to judges on the high 
courts. It also provided for a system whereby private prosecutors could 
be compensated for their expenses, as long as they received a certifi cate 
from a judge.17 The bench felt this need keenly, so much so that Campbell 
told Parliament on its passage through the House of Lords that “the judges 
Y6746.indb   21 7/2/15   2:40:29 PM
22 From Crime to Cross-examination
were so anxious to carry the measure into effect, that they had met for the 
purpose of taking the necessary preliminary steps.”18 In the House of Com-
mons, the need for “rendering more easy and certain prosecutions” for per-
jury was attributed to the growing frequency of perjury “in part owing to 
the facilities of late years provided for the recovery of small debts,” that is, 
the County Courts.19
Viewing the two bills together changes our interpretation of the role 
of the perjury argument in the 1851 reforms. Rather than discounting the 
risk of perjury, reformers, driven in large part by the reservations of luke-
warm innovators like Campbell, emphasized strengthening provisions for 
enforcing perjury laws as they expanded testimony. But Campbell’s act 
tended to be overshadowed by the dramatic extension of competency to 
parties. As the Times plaintively informed its readership shortly after the 
act’s passage: “It is not generally known that there is an act in force called 
Lord Campbell’s Act, under which all courts can order an indictment for 
perjury, including the Courts of Bankruptcy and Insolvency and County 
Courts. It is important that this provision should be known, now that par-
ties and their wives can be examined in civil causes.”20 When these two acts 
are considered together, the reformers’ project in 1851 comes to seem closer 
to Bentham’s original conception of a reformed evidence system, encom-
passing both inclusion and punishment, than examination of the Evidence 
Amendment Act alone would suggest.
How this new system was to work in practice, however, remained 
to be seen. Edward Cox, a legal journalist and supporter of the reform, 
saluted the 1851 abolition of party-witness disqualifi cation as “the great-
est measure of law reform that has been effected in my memory.”21 Samuel 
Warren, a previous critic of the measure, was even more effusive: “this Act 
has thrown a sudden and vivid fl ood of light upon the whole administration 
of justice. . . . It is operating a silent but vast & rapid alteration and ame-
lioration of our whole system of jurisprudence & is almost as great an Act 
as has ever found its way into the Statute book.”22 Amidst this celebration, 
however, there were also surprises. While the passage of Campbell’s act in-
dicates that the reformers foresaw more frequent prosecutions for perjury, 
it is unclear whether they understood just how much more frequent those 
Y6746.indb   22 7/2/15   2:40:29 PM
The Rise and Fall of Perjury Prosecutions 23
prosecutions would be. In earlier parliamentary debates, Lord Brougham 
had concluded, albeit on the basis of a highly selective reading of the evi-
dence, that no encouragement at all had been given to perjury by allowing 
parties to testify in County Courts. But rather than the trouble-free pros-
pect described by Brougham, perjury was suddenly discovered on a daily 
basis in late 1851 and 1852. As Charles Phillips, an Irish barrister and confi -
dante of Brougham, described the situation in a letter in late 1851:
The evidence bill is in full activity and Newgate is becoming 
populous. It is becoming a system now where Plff & Defn are 
examined politely to detain them till the verdict and then im-
mediately to bag one or the other, as the case may be! Scarcely a 
nisi prius day passes without a victim. Tom Platt brought down 
a plaintiff yesterday. This may be all right & in perfect good 
faith too—but if this is the result of so short an experience in 
the superior courts what are we to say to the certifi cates of all 
but one of the County Court men that in their experience the 
examination of the parties did not induce perjury? Martin & 
Erle & Platt must have been very unlucky in three weeks or the 
C.C. judges extremely fortunate in three years.23
Phillips’s comments were echoed by John Singleton Copley, Lord Lynd-
hurst: “The Evidence Bill has now come into operation. Two indictments 
for perjury have been already directed by the Court, the Plaintiff is contra-
dicted by the defendant, and the evidence of the Defendant is supported 
by another witness. The jury fi nds for the Defendant, upon this the judge 
orders a prosecution.”24
Law reformers saw the enthusiasm of the judges for perjury prosecu-
tions as another tactic for sabotaging the Evidence Act. One supporter of 
the act wrote in the Law Review, “the language of the Act being too clear and 
unambiguous to admit of repeal by way of construction, the next device re-
sorted to was, to get up a reign of terror which might deter parties from hav-
ing recourse to its provisions.” The author tartly observed, “Judges, who 
had been in the habit of observing for years those fl at gross  contradictions 
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so constantly found between the testimony of witnesses  apparently indif-
ferent . . . were suddenly seized with horror and indignation when they 
found the same discrepancies existing between the statements of plaintiff 
and defendant.” The Law Review author described a procedure identical 
to that detailed by Phillips: judges would detain both parties until the ver-
dict was delivered, then immediately commit the losing party for perjury. 
This sudden mania for perjury prosecutions was explained by the author 
as a demonstration of “how completely the Judge abandoned the discre-
tion he ought to have exercised.”25 The enthusiasm for perjury prosecu-
tions was not limited to high court judges, however: County Court judges 
in particular also contributed to the upswing in the number of cases.
While reformers contemplated more active enforcement of the laws 
against perjury, perjury prosecutions were not the sole guarantor of ve-
racity in the new testimonial system. Where previously the oath and tes-
timonial incompetencies were thought to protect accuracy in the judicial 
process, now the burden was placed on a combination of the oath, cross-
examination, and perjury prosecutions. One way to think of the postreform 
development of trial practice in the nineteenth century, therefore, is to see 
it as a period when the weight allocated to each of these guarantors shifted. 
The oath continued its decline; perjury prosecutions enjoyed a period of 
relative prominence in the aftermath of reform and then subsided in impor-
tance. This was followed by a shift to cross-examination as the main guar-
antor of veracity in the courtroom, a development we explore at greater 
length in the next chapter.
Increasingly, cross-examination came to dominate the reformers’ ar-
guments about safeguards against perjury. As the Times reported, Brougham 
himself informed the House of Commons in 1858 that “he trusted so much 
to the power of cross-examination by the counsel for the prosecution that 
he had no fear of the march of justice being impeded by the talents of the 
criminal.”26 Into the 1860s and 1870s, this idea was increasingly picked up 
by barristers. Frank Safford, speaking about cross-examination, noted that 
“upon it, rather than the effi ciency of the ceremony of an oath, depend to 
a great extent the verdict of juries.”27 By advocating cross-examination as 
the main safeguard of veracity, barristers could advance their own profes-
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sional interests as well, as they came to embrace cross-examination as their 
defi ning professional “art.”
Before cross-examination triumphed defi nitively, however, perjury 
prosecutions struck reformers as a powerful means of enforcing veracity 
in the courts. We now turn to the dramatic growth in perjury prosecutions 
that followed the reforms of the 1840s and 1850s and suggest reasons why 
such prosecutions came to be relegated to a peripheral role by the late Vic-
torian period.
Overview of Perjury Prosecutions
Parliamentary statistics reveal an initial surge, followed by a leveling 
off over time of the absolute number of perjury prosecutions. One of the 
immediate consequences of the 1851 reform was a dramatic spike in the 
number of perjury prosecutions and convictions in 1852, both of which 
tripled from two years earlier (see Figure 1).
Moreover, the 1850 fi gure already represented an increase from tradi-
tional levels as a consequence of the establishment of the County Courts in 
1847. While still not a widely prosecuted crime, perjury had gone from be-
ing a comparative anomaly, with approximately ten to twenty convictions 
per year, to a regular feature of the assize docket, with each assize town 
likely to have at least one case yearly. There is a decline in the early 1860s, 
perhaps as a result of legislation adopted to make vexatious suits more dif-
fi cult to bring; a slight increase in the 1870s; and a fairly steady absolute 
number of prosecutions for the remainder of the century.
Parliamentary statistics also reveal another signifi cant trend. Over 
time, the length of incarceration assigned to convicted perjurers decreased 
markedly. As Figure 2 demonstrates, the maximum penalty of seven years’ 
transportation or imprisonment was rarely employed by the end of the cen-
tury, while the minimum sentence of less than three months’ imprisonment, 
nearly unheard of during the early Victorian period, came to dominate 
punishment. This comports with a general trend during the late Victorian 
period of decreasing sentences in criminal cases. As Martin Wiener ob-
serves, after the early 1870s, “one index of a lower emotional temperature 
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Figure 1. Perjury prosecutions and their results. Sources: House of Commons, 
“Number of Criminal Offenders in England and Wales,” Parliamentary Papers, 
1836, XLI, 11; 1841, XVIII, 255; 1846, XXXIV, 1; 1851, XLVI, 23; 1852–53, LXXXI, 
1; 1856, XLIX, 1; “Judicial Statistics of England and Wales,” Parliamentary Papers, 
1861, LX, 477; 1866, LXVIII, 485; 1871, LXIV, 1; 1876, LXXIX, 1; 1881, XCV, 1; 
1886, LXXII, 1; 1890–91, XCIII, 1; 1897, C, 1.
[regarding crime] was the gradual mitigation of sentences. The average 
length of sentences fell, and fi nes replaced many short jail sentences.”28
These parliamentary fi gures have been supplemented by examina-
tion of case records—in both published law reports and local newspapers. 
Case records offer a sense of what types of individuals were being pros-
ecuted, and in what sorts of underlying cases, without which it would be 
impossible to gauge the typicality of any case examined in detail. They 
also point to changing trends in prosecution over time, although they fall 
short of demonstrating them defi nitively. This chapter’s conclusions are 
based on a systematic examination of case records of perjury prosecutions 
in England and Wales, sampling every fi fth year from 1835 to 1900, with 
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the addition of 1852, the year after parties were allowed to testify in civil 
proceedings. Because there are no offi cial records, and few of these cases 
made it into the law reports, this chapter supplements the rare published 
law report with accounts drawn from newspapers in each assize county. Lo-
cal papers were far more likely to present close-to-verbatim reports of trials 
and to include charges and summations by the judge, as well as popular 
reaction to the case.
An examination of perjury prosecutions during the prereform years, 
1835– 45, reveals that the earlier cases are noticeably distinct in two ways. 
First, perjury prosecutions arising from civil cases were very unlikely to 
result in a conviction. The low percentage of convictions in civil cases sug-
gests that prosecutions may have been motivated more by revenge or a de-
sire to use litigation to inconvenience the opposing party in civil litigation. 
Anecdotal evidence tends to confi rm this.29 Second, police informers and 
alibi conspirators were prominent among those convicted of perjury com-
mitted in criminal cases. Charles Mumford and John Brown, for example, 
were both convicted for their roles as informers in two separate licensing 
Figure 2. Decline in the length of punishment (in months). Sources: See Figure 1 
caption.
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cases in 1835.30 Licensing offenses were a particular topic of suspicion 
because they were easily developed in order to extort money from help-
less publicans. So widespread was this problem that London’s victuallers 
banded together to bring perjury prosecutions against informers.31 Just as 
informers threatened to undermine criminal justice, so too did organized 
attempts to evade prosecution, which were similarly singled out for convic-
tion. Joseph Allison Sr., Joseph Allison Jr., and Hannah Ostle, for example, 
received sentences of seven years’ transportation for their roles in orches-
trating an alibi in a murder case.32
One rough postreform trend that can be discerned is an immediate 
increase in the percentage of perjury prosecutions deriving from civil cases, 
which subsided by the end of the 1850s. In the late 1840s, the number and 
composition of perjury cases began to change. The County Courts had 
allowed party testimony on oath beginning in 1847. The early 1850s saw 
a marked upswing in the total number of perjury cases. As in 1850, per-
jury prosecutions arising from civil cases continued to make up a signifi -
cant percentage. After the mid-1850s the composition of the perjury cases 
shifted again, with a decline in the number of perjury prosecutions growing 
out of civil cases.
In the 1860s and later, a narrowing of the types of causes likely to give 
rise to perjury prosecutions occurred. Among the cases that continued to 
generate perjury prosecutions, three were particularly common: affi liation, 
game law, and licensing cases. Sociologists have argued that some forms of 
lying respond to disparities in power and constitute a type of resistance by 
subordinates.33 The Victorian experience, with perjury cases increasingly 
restricted to a narrow range of underlying types of cases, seems to con-
fi rm this insight. These cases were among the types of Victorian legal pro-
ceedings most likely to have generated popular resentment. It is not clear, 
however, whether the predominance of these types of cases in generating 
perjury prosecutions refl ects anything more than their simple numerical 
predominance as a percentage of all cases heard. But it would seem that 
judges and prosecutors were reacting to a perceived challenge to the law, 
manifested in “bold-faced” or brazen defi ance of the court through obvious 
lying.
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The laws of bastardy had been substantially revised under the new 
Poor Laws of 1834, in part to lessen the threat of false accusations.34 As 
one modern scholar notes: “the [old] system was an incitement to perjury. 
Loose women would swear not to the real father of the child, but to the 
wealthiest man against whom the charge would stick.”35 The revised sys-
tem, however, led to additional dissatisfaction by too tightly restricting a 
woman’s ability to fi liate a child and by denying her the child support paid 
by the father. Finally, in 1844, another revision passed that provided for a 
procedure whereby a woman could apply for an affi liation hearing before 
the magistrates.36 She was required to provide some corroborative evidence 
of paternity; the alleged father, meanwhile, could defend himself before the 
magistrates on oath.37 As the Law Times noted during the debate on party 
testimony, affi liation suits were one of the few types of actions in which the 
defendant could testify under oath.38 This apparent anomaly was justifi ed 
because the proceedings were offi cially considered civil in nature.39 Affi lia-
tion proceedings were numerous: in 1848, the Law Times pointed out that 
there were more than thirty thousand per year.40 By the end of the century, 
perjury in bastardy cases was widely noted. The Law Times acknowledged 
in 1895 that “more prosecutions for perjury arise in connection with bas-
tardy proceedings, than out of any other class of disputes.”41
The crime of poaching, although historians may be more familiar 
with the controversies surrounding it in the eighteenth century, remained 
an area of contention in English society well into the nineteenth.42 Poaching 
constituted a signifi cant part of the docket of rural magistrates; in Suffolk, 
for example, as many as one in four convictions was for offenses against the 
game laws. Game offenses occurred in waves: in the late 1840s and early 
1850s, the late 1850s, the late 1860s, and several other periods.43 High lev-
els of game offense convictions tended to precede periods of agricultural 
unrest. With the exception of the early 1850s, however, prosecutions for 
perjury growing out of game law cases do not coincide with the general 
trends in game law convictions. This may be because perjury cases could 
follow up to several years after the original conviction. In general, however, 
the disparity is probably attributable to the small absolute number of per-
jury cases in comparison with the thousands of game law cases heard each 
Y6746.indb   29 7/2/15   2:40:30 PM
30 From Crime to Cross-examination
year. Nonetheless, some of these perjury cases took on a Robin Hoodesque 
fl avor of popular rebellion. In one case, a judge described Devon Forest as 
a well-known “alibi resort.”44
Like game law offenses, many of the perjury prosecutions growing 
out of licensing laws were characterized by popular resentment against of-
fi cial interference.45 Perjury cases growing out of licensing laws tended to 
fall into two types. The fi rst, as mentioned above, saw informers punished 
for their roles in enforcing such laws, at times corruptly. The second type 
involved defense witnesses who sought to protect publicans accused of 
selling alcohol outside of the regulated hours or allowing gaming in their 
establishments. Licensing cases also resembled affi liation cases in that, af-
ter 1872, the law allowed defendants to give testimony under oath. Reform-
ers debating the extension of competency to all defendants referred to the 
experience of these types of cases, noting, “it was unfortunately true that 
there was a great deal of perjury, but the offence of perjury was not confi ned 
to those who were defendants in cases under the Intoxicating Liquors Acts 
and affi liation cases.”46
This concentration on a limited range of offenses had consequences 
for both the level of court generating the cases and the class status of defen-
dants in most perjury cases. The bias toward lower courts was overwhelm-
ing. Few perjury cases came from the assizes or the high courts after 1860. 
In an 1865 case, Baron Arthur Channell noted that perjury cases seemed 
to come exclusively from the lower courts. Perjury, he commented while 
sentencing a defendant for lying before local magistrates, “had fearfully in-
creased in this country of late years, but it was seldom that charges for that 
crime came from the higher courts.”47 This selection of cases had the effect 
of distancing the judges hearing perjury cases at the assizes from those who 
often referred the cases from the County Courts and petty sessions.
The focus on affi liation, poaching, and licensing questions also re-
sulted in a pronounced correlation between class status and perjury pros-
ecutions. Participants—prosecutors, defendants, and witnesses—in these 
cases were not necessarily lower class, but in practice, middle- and upper-
class involvement was vanishingly rare. Respectable perjurers had always 
been rare birds, but by the end of the century they were effectively extinct. 
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While it is diffi cult to determine the class status of criminal defendants from 
newspaper accounts, it is possible to identify a number of respectable de-
fendants from either their occupation, when it was given, or from the news-
paper’s own description of them as “respectable” or “respectable-looking.” 
Inevitably, this method is both overinclusive, in that it counts lower-class 
defendants who merely appeared respectable, and underinclusive, in that 
it misses respectable defendants who were not described in the newspaper 
accounts, as was true for many brief reports of cases in which no true bill 
was found or in which no one appeared for the prosecution. Even with 
these limitations, the paucity of respectable defendants is striking nonethe-
less, as is the decline in their numbers over the course of the century. Nearly 
10 percent of defendants were described as “respectable” in 1852; this was 
the highest total of any year. In 1870 there was only one respectable defen-
dant, and in 1895 there were none.
This de facto limitation of perjury to lower-class offenders did not re-
fl ect a desire to overlook middle- and upper-class deceit. On the contrary, 
one of the reasons behind this shift was the development of alternative in-
stitutions to ensure veracity without recourse to perjury prosecutions. In 
both bankruptcy and divorce cases, two topics of keen interest to middle- 
and upper-class Victorians, liars were subject to new forms of control. In 
bankruptcy, new laws penalized fraudulent insolvents under a simpler pro-
cedure that made conviction and punishment more certain than in perjury 
prosecutions.48 In the newly created Divorce Court, meanwhile, as we will 
see in chapter 4, the offi ce of the Queen’s Proctor was charged with ferret-
ing out suspected cases of collusion. When collusion was proved, however, 
the sanction was that the sought-after divorce was denied, and as a result, 
liars in the Divorce Court rarely faced perjury prosecutions.
A fi nal pattern does not change much over time, but is striking none-
theless. While contemporaries remarked on the diffi culty of obtaining con-
victions in perjury prosecutions, examination of the case records reveals 
that the most signifi cant obstacle to conviction was not lenient juries in-
tent on acquittals, but rather the judge himself. Directed verdicts are con-
cealed in the parliamentary statistics, which simply count them as acquit-
tals. Newspaper accounts, moreover, probably also undercounted directed 
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 verdicts, because reporters were likely to describe them as acquittals. But 
even with this limitation, the number of recorded cases of directed verdicts 
in the newspaper accounts is striking. In 1852, the peak year for this as 
for all perjury statistics, judges directed verdicts in nearly 25 percent of 
all cases. In some of these cases, the judge was responding to an objection 
raised by defense counsel, but in many of them, the judge acted to stop a 
case by directing a verdict before the prosecution had rested. A perjury 
defendant, therefore, was more likely to encounter leniency from the judge 
than from the jury.
Limitations on the Prosecution of Perjury
A number of different factors led Victorians to prefer the selective 
and infrequent prosecution of perjury under the existing law to any more 
easily employed and reliably enforced alternatives. Problems specifi c to the 
Victorian period prevented systematic prosecution of perjury, including 
incomplete reforms in other areas of the law, such as criminal appeals and 
testimony by defendants, and the limitations of private prosecution. Limi-
tations such as these, in turn, encouraged judges to minimize the problem 
of perjury by avoiding prosecutions.
Once the fear of encouraging perjury was overcome and the reforms 
in the law of evidence passed, reformers were content to discount evidence 
that perjury had increased. John Pitt Taylor, a prominent law reformer and 
author of the Evidence Amendment Act of 1851, showed a typical noncha-
lance toward the threat of perjury in an 1861 address to the Law Amendment 
Society: “Some plaintiffs and defendants have of course committed perjury 
and possibly that crime may have increased to a slight degree; but assuming 
such to be the case, the evil arising from the increase cannot be regarded as 
very alarming, since only thirty-fi ve persons were convicted of perjury last 
year; and it really sinks into insignifi cance when contrasted with the ben-
efi ts that have resulted to the cause of truth.”49 Such statements were more 
than a little disingenuous, given law reformers’ eagerness to avoid evidence 
that perjury had in fact increased. Seven years later Pitt Taylor, in his capac-
ity as judge of the Lambeth County Court, dodged a request to commit a 
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suspected perjurer for trial. According to the Solicitors’ Journal, “Mr. Tay-
lor said he was very chary of exercising that power, for he had observed 
that where such prosecutions had been ordered the delinquents generally 
escaped through the ineffi ciency of the prosecution in laying the evidence 
before a jury.”50 Pitt Taylor never publicly acknowledged the contradiction 
between his dismissal of the threat of perjury on the basis of conviction 
statistics and his pragmatic recognition as a sitting judge that such fi gures 
were artifi cially low because of the limitations of private prosecutions.
Explaining the reformers’ behavior is fairly simple: they had bigger 
fi sh to fry. In particular, their desire to press on for the right of the criminal 
defendant to testify under oath gave them little motivation to explore the 
shortcomings of existing measures to combat perjury. By using low con-
viction rates in perjury cases as an indicator of the success of evidence re-
forms, however, the reformers effectively blinded themselves to problems 
in the enforcement of perjury laws. Instead of asking how the undeniably 
widespread deceit practiced in courts could be ameliorated, they commit-
ted themselves to a policy of denial.
Reformers sought to change both the continuing prohibition prevent-
ing criminal defendants from testifying on oath and the absence of a crimi-
nal appeals structure. Despite legislative proposals dating back to 1844, a 
criminal court of appeals was not created in England until 1907. Similarly, 
despite legislative initiatives from the 1850s on, defendants could not tes-
tify on oath until 1898.51 Perjury prosecutions were inextricably linked to 
both problems and came to be eclipsed by them. Their conjunction cre-
ated an opportunity to use perjury prosecutions as a crude substitute for 
criminal appeals.
In civil cases, perjury had long been held to be grounds for a new 
trial.52 Yet in criminal cases, there was no such assumption. Nonetheless, 
individuals continued to pursue perjury cases in the hopes of strengthen-
ing their appeals to the Home Secretary. Prosecution for perjury was left 
mainly to private individuals, who often employed their power to take re-
venge on the other side after losing a case. The main advantage of a perjury 
indictment to a private prosecutor seeking revenge was that it effectively 
silenced the opposing party by making that party a new defendant who, 
Y6746.indb   33 7/2/15   2:40:30 PM
34 From Crime to Cross-examination
under the rules of criminal evidence, was prohibited from testifying.53 As 
the Law Times complained, recent cases “afford further illustrations of the 
growing practice by which the defeated party in any proceeding, whether 
civil or criminal, attempts to obtain a new trial under advantageous circum-
stances, by indicting his successful adversary for perjury.”54
In the early 1860s, two dramatic cases made the problem abundantly 
clear. First, 1860 saw the lurid Hatch case. The Reverend Henry Hatch, 
a country vicar and part-time schoolmaster, was convicted of indecent as-
sault after one of his pupils, an eleven-year-old girl named Eugenia Plum-
mer, accused him of fondling her at school. Desperate to salvage his reputa-
tion, Hatch responded by prosecuting Plummer for perjury. She was then 
convicted herself, although immediately after her sentencing she received 
a pardon from Queen Victoria.55 The Hatch case left a deep impression 
on peoples’ thinking about perjury and testimony by criminal defendants, 
particularly when a respectable defendant’s reputation and livelihood de-
pended on the testimony of a young girl. Then, in an 1865 disputed will 
case between Jean Lafourcade and Louise Valentin (both were French na-
tionals, but the case was heard in England because the inherited shares in 
question were located in London), fi rst Lafourcade and then Valentin were 
charged with and convicted of perjury. The Law Times commented, “she 
has been convicted, and now we have the extraordinary spectacle of two 
persons convicted and punished for perjury in a transaction in which it is 
quite certain that both cannot be guilty.”56
While the Lafourcade and Hatch cases were distinctive for the notori-
ety and the amount of attention they generated, they revealed a widespread 
problem. Because no court of appeals existed for criminal cases in England 
until the twentieth century, convicted defendants sought to demonstrate 
the invalidity of their convictions by other means, including prosecutions 
for perjury. In the absence of a formal appeal process, the temptation was 
strong to overturn verdicts by discrediting the testimony of prosecutors. 
The trial of Edward Neville in 1852, for example, demonstrated the hazards 
faced by prosecution witnesses. Neville, barely a teenager, had testifi ed 
for the prosecution in an arson case that resulted in four men being trans-
ported. The convicts’ relatives sought to lay the groundwork for a clemency 
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request by persuading the witnesses against them to change their stories. 
Several of the witnesses did so, and the main prosecutor left the country, 
leaving Neville the sole hold-out. Neville was then prosecuted by the rela-
tives for perjury and narrowly escaped conviction largely on the basis of his 
counsel’s eloquence.57
As we will see in chapter 5, the Hatch case became a symbol of the 
need for a criminal appeal and the need to allow prisoners to testify on 
oath.58 Yet, decades after the Hatch case, the problem still persisted. In 
1881, one correspondent wrote to the Solicitors’ Journal complaining, “It 
is surprising that attention has not been called to the astonishing nature 
of the proceedings which attend the prosecutions for perjury which so 
frequently follow some notorious case at the Central Criminal Court or 
assizes.”59 J. R. Hall went on to describe the process: “An appeal is made 
to the Home Secretary to review the sentence, and release a man from the 
horrors of perhaps undeserved slavery in penal servitude. What does the 
Home Secretary do? He cannot direct a new trial, and he declines to take 
on himself the reversal of the sentence in the confl ict of evidence, but he of-
fers, if the principal witnesses for the prosecution are convicted of perjury, 
to advise the Crown to grant a free pardon.”60 Not much had changed since 
Neville’s experience nearly thirty years earlier.
The slow development of a public offi ce responsible for overseeing 
prosecutions, like the delays in establishing a court of appeals, signifi cantly 
affected the development of prosecutions for perjury.61 Legislation estab-
lishing the offi ce of a Public Prosecutor was not passed until 1879, even 
though a similar measure had been proposed as early as 1854. In 1884, the 
offi ce of the Director of Public Prosecutions was formally put under the 
control of the Treasury Solicitor, which had previously been responsible 
for prosecuting its cases.62 Until then, however, abuses by private prosecu-
tors had led to the imposition of limitations on perjury prosecutions, rather 
than efforts for more effective prosecution.
The limitations of private prosecution led both to overenforcement of 
dubious cases and to underenforcement of possibly meritorious cases. As 
one barrister described the situation in 1855, private prosecution was re-
sponsible for a litany of evils: “escape of criminals for want of  prosecution; 
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deliberate mismanagement of prosecutions; improper compromise and 
abandonment of prosecutions; the securing of prosecutions by ‘low attor-
neys’; . . . the high cost of private prosecutions; and the failure properly to 
instruct grand juries.”63 Perjury prosecutions motivated by revenge or the 
desire to inconvenience an opponent could be added to that list. Perjury 
prosecutions, in particular, were also singled out by the Attorney Gen-
eral as too frequently settled by the parties in exchange for compensation, 
rather than proceeding to adjudication.64
Private prosecutors’ ability to abuse the grand jury system was a fre-
quent topic of complaint by judges. In Thomas Hewlett’s case, at the Som-
ersetshire Assizes in 1852, the judge complained that “this case afforded an 
example of the injustice which may be infl icted by means of the grand jury 
system.”65 Hewlett had sued a relative for recovery of a debt of six pounds 
in June 1851. The suit clearly arose out of a family feud; the newspaper 
noted that “it also appeared that the prosecutor and prisoner had been 
on bad terms, and that they had quarreled and fought since the [County 
Court] trial took place,” and that the prosecutor was jealous of the pris-
oner.66 Some nine months after the original trial, the prosecutor preferred 
a bill against the grand jury, following the fi ght between the two. After hear-
ing this testimony, the judge directed the jury to acquit.67
Hewlett’s experiences were not unusual. A large number of perjury 
prosecutions appear to have been motivated by spite or revenge, or even 
blatant extortion. As the Law Times put it, “Private prosecutions are, it 
is feared, sometimes conducted with extreme acrimony, this usually oc-
curring in cases where the prosecution is, in fact, secretly aimed at gaining 
some personal object, and is not solely dictated by a desire for the attain-
ment of public justice.”68 Some of these disputes had a bewildering com-
plexity, with suit and countersuit and successive prosecutions for perjury. 
Judges occasionally argued for the dismissal of perjury cases that were 
clearly vindictive, or when the prosecution had been brought in order to 
extort money from a wealthy defendant.69
In response to these problems, and to a prominent case in which a so-
licitor was charged with perjury by a disgruntled client, Parliament passed 
the Vexatious Indictments Act of 1859, which applied to prosecutions for 
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perjury, conspiracy, indecent assault, and other selected misdemeanors.70 
This act prevented presentments to the grand jury unless the accused had 
been committed for trial or the prosecution had been preferred with the 
direction of a judge of the superior courts, or if the prosecutor had been 
bound over to prosecute. Prosecutors willing to forgo the twenty pounds’ 
bond put up to ensure their attendance, however, could still abuse the pro-
cess. Although the act may have been limited in its ability to stop vexatious 
prosecutions by those who were truly determined to harass their oppo-
nents, it does refl ect a suspicion on the part of the government and judges 
toward perjury prosecutions that would persist well past 1859.
Judges, in turn, played a crucial role in shaping the contours of per-
jury prosecutions. Because of their legal complexity, perjury cases were 
tried only at the assizes, even though they were technically considered mis-
demeanors. This meant that all of the judges hearing perjury cases were 
superior court judges from London on circuit, rather than local magistrates 
and justices of the peace who heard cases at quarter sessions. One conse-
quence of this limitation is that the judges who heard perjury cases were 
distanced from the judges who committed perjury defendants for trial. 
Most perjury cases were based on testimony before County Court judges 
or local magistrates. Perhaps because of this distance, the judges who heard 
perjury cases at the assizes were often surprisingly cavalier about the pros-
pect of convicting perjurers, despite their frequent protestations of the dan-
ger posed by perjury.
Judges had tremendous infl uence over most perjury proceedings. 
Case records frequently record the judge telling the grand jury whether 
he thought a true bill should be granted in a perjury case, or interrupting 
the testimony during a trial to ask the jury whether they had heard enough 
and directing an acquittal.71 Juries also used their power to interrupt the 
presentation of cases, although less frequently, and would tell the judge 
unbidden that they had heard enough and were ready to acquit. Occasions 
in which the jury openly defi ed the judge are recorded, but they are rare.72
Judges at times used this power to impose ordering systems on per-
jury cases that had no basis in the law. In addition to expansive and highly 
variable use of motive and the two witness rule, judges also redefi ned 
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 perjury in original ways. One leading practitioner of redefi nition was none 
other than Justice James Fitzjames Stephen. In his published writing, Ste-
phen had taken a particularly hard line on perjury:
Perjury is one of the few crimes for which the punishment ap-
pointed by law appears in many cases totally inadequate. It may 
be the instrument of the foulest kinds of murder and robbery, or 
the means of infl icting loss of liberty, character, and property in 
any degree, and yet the utmost penalty that can be infl icted is 
four years’ penal servitude. It would not be too severe to provide 
that perjury, with intent to procure the conviction of any person 
(guilty or not) for any crime should be punishable for life. The 
offence, no doubt, is a rare one, but circumstances might arise in 
which no punishment short of death could be too severe.73
It comes as something of a shock, therefore, to read case after case in which 
Stephen cajoles and berates the jury into acquitting perjury defendants.74 
There was a method to his madness, however. Stephen wanted to reserve 
the criminal sanction of perjury for cases of criminal inculpation; the rest 
he was willing to dismiss as “hard swearing.” As he told one jury, “there 
was considerable difference between what was called hard swearing by a 
partisan and deliberate perjury.”75
Other judges attempted to introduce a similar modifi cation in the law 
under the rubric of “degrees” of perjury. Justice James Hannen made such 
an appeal on behalf of George Drake:
Of course the crime of perjury is one which is various in its 
depth—from the lowest to the highest degree. It has been my 
lot on one occasion to try a policeman on the charge of endeav-
ouring to fi x upon an innocent man the charge of having mur-
dered an individual who had undoubtedly come to his death by 
the negligent act of the policeman. The amount of criminality 
in that case could hardly be exceeded; it approached in char-
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acter murder itself. Probably the present case may be taken as 
standing very near the opposite pole. It is a case in which a man 
is alleged to have stated falsely that someone bearing a certain 
name had not been in a public-house on a certain evening.76
But the attempt to distinguish perjury by degrees was by no means a uni-
form trend. Ten years after Hannen’s charge, in an era of increasing le-
niency, Justice Robert Lush angrily rejected the idea that different levels 
of culpability should play into an assessment of guilt: “The prisoner had 
committed perjury in order to save a friend from being punished. People 
seemed to think this a very light matter now-a-days, but they were very 
much mistaken—it was really a very serious offence against the law.”77
Why were judges so willing to direct acquittals in perjury prosecu-
tions? Part of the answer appears to have been the superior court judges’ 
desire to discipline the lower courts. Judges used directed verdicts to draw 
attention to what they saw as fl aws in lower court practice, ranging from 
incomprehension of the requirements of the law of perjury to inadequate 
documentation and incorrect courtroom conduct. In 1895, for example, 
Justice Alfred Wills excoriated the conduct of a County Court judge, say-
ing, as a local paper reported, that “no policeman would have been allowed 
to cross-examine in that way. He [Wills] hoped the learned judge of the 
County Court would take what he had said in a friendly spirit, that it was 
wise to allow someone else to step in in such matters.”78 Judges in the 
County Courts, meanwhile, protested the dismissive treatment. W. T. S. 
Daniel, judge of the Derby County Court, blamed the higher court judges 
for the increase of perjury in the County Courts, saying, “the judges of 
the superior Courts discourage all prosecutions for perjury in the inferior 
Courts, and as this fact is well known, the offence can be (and often is) com-
mitted with absolute immunity.”79
One suspects that an unacknowledged motivation was that the su-
perior court judges did not want to be overwhelmed by perjury cases. In 
1855, at the March assizes in York, Sir Cresswell Cresswell confronted six 
indictments for perjury. The 1852 Leicester Assizes offered fi ve different 
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cases of perjury from affi liation suits alone. Nor were these numbers just for 
the height of perjury prosecutions in the early 1850s; in 1865 there were six 
cases of perjury at one assize, fi ve of which stemmed from affi liation cases.80 
For busy central court judges eager to fi nish their assize circuits and return 
to London, the temptation to deal summarily with perjury cases must have 
been strong.
Finally, judges could also limit systematic prosecution through their 
refusal to commit offenders for trial. Director of Public Prosecutions Au-
gustus Stephenson criticized the judges for this in 1894, attributing “no 
small part of the evil to the omission of judges to exercise the summary 
power of committal which was conferred upon them in 1851.”81 The Law 
Journal earlier explained that “the real reason why the statutory procedure 
is not more frequently resorted to is the dislike of the judges to try cases of 
perjury without the assistance of the deposition, with which they would be 
furnished if the charge were preferred in the ordinary way.”82 Whatever the 
cause, refusal to commit must have been widespread in order to explain 
the almost complete absence of prosecutions for perjury arising from cases 
heard in the higher courts.
These problems limiting prosecutions for perjury, including unre-
liable private prosecutions and the interaction of the absence of formal 
criminal appeals and prohibitions on testimony by criminal defendants, 
undoubtedly infl uenced both judges and law reformers. These individuals, 
as a result, exhibited a striking hesitancy in dealing with the problem of 
perjury. Under such conditions, it is unsurprising that selective prosecu-
tion emerged. Given the signifi cant problems involved in mounting a per-
jury prosecution, only the most egregious cases were likely to be pursued.
Perjury, the Public Prosecutor, and the Criminal Evidence Act
Toward the end of the nineteenth century, two important changes 
restructured the institutional context within which perjury prosecutions 
occurred: fi rst, the establishment of a public offi cial responsible for over-
seeing prosecutions, and second, the extension to criminal defendants of 
the right to testify under oath. The norms of selective prosecution, and 
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the concomitant unwillingness of judges to actively prosecute perjury, per-
sisted almost entirely unchanged despite these signifi cant transformations.
The Board of Trade assumed control over government prosecutions 
in a merger of the Director of Public Prosecutions and the Treasury Solici-
tor in 1884, shortly after the offi ce was established in 1879. The Board of 
Trade included perjury among its priorities, albeit in a position distinctly 
subordinate to the enforcement of bankruptcy law violations. While the Di-
rector had little discretion to turn down bankruptcy cases, he could and 
frequently did refuse to prosecute perjury cases referred to him. As a result, 
demands for the Director to bring perjury cases always exceeded the num-
ber of cases brought. The Director received as many as eighty applications 
per year, while never bringing more than forty cases (Figures 3 and 4). In 
Figure 3. Interventions in perjury cases by the Director of Public Prosecutions. 
“Applications” are cases referred to the Director for possible prosecution; “cases” 
are those actually prosecuted by the Director. Both can include more than one 
defendant per case, but the conviction fi gure refers to individual defendants. As 
a result, this fi gure overstates the Director’s ratio of success. For a clearer indica-
tion of that ratio, see Figure 4. Sources: “Prosecutions of Offences Acts, 1879 and 
1884,” Parliamentary Papers, 1888, LXXXII, 475; 1889, LXI, 137; 1890, LIX, 203; 
1890–91, LXIV, 509; 1892, LXV, 163; 1893–94, LXXIV, Pt. 1, 559.
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Figure 4. Success of the Director of Public Prosecutions in perjury cases. Sources: 
See Figure 3 caption, and 1894, LXXI, 231; 1895, LXXXI, 467; 1896, LXIX, 259; 
1897, LXXII, 33; 1898, LXXIII, 441; 1899, LXXIX, 279.
1895, for example, the Director pursued prosecutions in only twenty-three 
perjury cases out of a total of sixty-six referred to him. By contrast, the 
Director prosecuted nearly all bankruptcy cases.83 He enjoyed greater suc-
cess with the perjury cases he brought than did most private prosecutors. 
In 1895, again, the Director obtained only eleven convictions in the twenty-
three cases he brought.84
Though perjury cases were only a small part of the Director’s activi-
ties, they loomed large in the public imagination. Perjury cases formed the 
bulk of complaints against the Director, who was also repeatedly summoned 
to Parliament to respond to members’ concerns about inactivity in selected 
perjury cases.85 One paper, the Globe, editorialized bitterly: “There is, we 
believe, an offi cial known as the Public Prosecutor. He is certainly not over 
occupied; and offi cial leisure could not be better bestowed than in a sys-
tematic crusade against the terrible growth of perjury, which has become 
the scandal of every Court in the country, and menaces the whole social 
system with poisonous corruption.”86
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In particular, perjury in divorce cases dominated public complaints 
against the Director.87 The Law Journal commented on the Director’s 
annual report, “It is in the Divorce Court, perhaps, that the most wilful 
perjury is committed, and yet the cases in which any action is taken to pun-
ish the offenders are very rare.”88 The Globe, meanwhile, saw the Divorce 
Court as the fount of all perjury: “the Divorce Court ought to receive es-
pecial attention, as being almost the point of origin of the offence which 
poisons the stream of justice at its source.”89 As we will see in chapter 4, 
concerns about perjury in divorce cases led Victorian legislators to develop 
the Queen’s Proctor as an investigative offi cial, rooting out deceit and col-
lusion in the Divorce Court.
Complaints of perjury in divorce cases are not surprising. In Vic-
torian England women were thought to lie without reservation when ac-
cused of adultery, while men were expected (even obligated) to lie to pro-
tect their mistresses.90 Hence, the Divorce Court was called the “Supreme 
Court of Lies” and the “playground of perjurers.”91 As the Law Times put 
it, “In the Divorce Court, the issue is between husband and wife and an-
other party, on a subject of such extreme delicacy that the truth could not 
be expected.”92 Why demands for the Director of Public Prosecutions to 
bring perjury prosecutions against witnesses in divorce cases would rise 
dramatically in the 1890s is unclear, however. As Barbara Leckie has dem-
onstrated, levels of public interest in the Divorce Court had been high since 
its foundation in 1857. It is possible that the notorious Campbell divorce 
of the late 1880s, and the Russell divorce of the 1890s, stirred outrage.93 
In 1888 Mr. Charles Darling, a Queen’s Counsel and member of Parlia-
ment, offered a bill that would enable either the judge or the jury in Divorce 
Court to immediately consider whether a co-respondent had been guilty 
of perjury and pass sentence upon him or her as if he or she had been in-
dicted and  convicted through the regular process.94 Darling’s bill was never 
passed, but it refl ected a heightened state of anxiety about perjury in the 
Divorce Court.
In his annual reports, the Director attempted to respond to the com-
plaints by explaining the reasons for the diffi culty in attaining convictions. 
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He did so by describing his policy of selective prosecution and suggest-
ing changes in the substantive law of perjury. Even when “the strongest 
cases have been selected, and the cases carefully and effi ciently put before 
the court and jury,” he noted, “it is certainly remarkable that in so large a 
proportion of such cases juries should have refused to convict.” Additional 
prosecutions, he concluded, only would have elevated the acquittal rate 
further by including weaker cases. He defended his rejection of many ap-
plications by pointing out that many of them came from unsuccessful par-
ties who sought to continue litigation by other means.95 In divorce cases, 
the Director noted that perjury was often effectively taken care of through 
the intervention of the Queen’s Proctor, which was often followed by the 
parties abandoning the case.96 As for the cases brought by the Director that 
resulted in acquittals, he reminded his critics that the requirement of mate-
riality often proved insurmountable.
The Director followed a stringent policy of screening perjury cases. 
In addition to evidence of contradiction, he demanded “an amount of 
corroborative evidence forthcoming which will give at least a reason-
able presumption that a conviction for perjury will be the result of such 
prosecution.”97 Perjury cases would be brought against Divorce Court wit-
nesses, meanwhile, only if “further and independent and reliable evidence 
is procurable, in addition to the evidence on the balance of which the Court 
and jury have decided in the original proceedings” (emphasis in original). 
Otherwise, the same factors that promoted perjury in the Divorce Court 
would guarantee an acquittal—the tendency for juries “to fi nd excuses for, 
at all events to look with indulgence upon, such perjuries.”98 The Director 
defended his standards by publishing a letter from the former President of 
the Probate Division (the chief judge of the Divorce Court) saluting Ste-
phenson’s policy of selective prosecutions: “I entirely concur with your 
views as to the objections to multiplying indictments for perjury by the 
Director of Public Prosecutions, especially in the case of witnesses in di-
vorce suits.”99
The Director also had several suggestions for improving prosecution 
of perjury. First, he encouraged judges to make more vigorous use of the 
powers of committal under Lord Campbell’s act. He noted that judges of 
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the superior courts rarely exercised the power, even though County Court 
judges and police magistrates showed less hesitation. Second, as a way of 
encouraging judges to commit suspected perjurers, he urged consideration 
of a modifi ed power to commit to a magistrate for investigation, rather than 
the existing power to commit for trial. Third, he proposed the creation 
of a lesser crime of “lying” or “wilful false swearing,” which would dif-
fer from perjury by not requiring materiality and could be punished as a 
contempt of court by the judge hearing the original case.100 The reaction to 
the Director’s suggestions was mixed. The Law Journal approved of treat-
ing prevarication as a form of contempt, but others feared giving too much 
power to judges.101 The Manchester Guardian supported a combination of 
measures, noting that “a case of serious perjury might require independent 
magisterial investigation, while a case of mere equivocation might appro-
priately be punished as a contempt.”102 Despite interest expressed in the 
Director’s proposals, however, none of them was adopted. Selective pros-
ecution remained the government’s response to the problem of perjury.
The institutional context was altered still more by the Criminal Evi-
dence Act of 1898, which allowed criminal defendants to testify on oath.103 
Many factors were behind the timing of the act, including opposition by 
Irish members of Parliament, as well as the effect of other laws that per-
mitted testimony by defendants charged with selected criminal offenses, 
often those with dire potential reputational consequences. The debate on 
the act will be discussed in chapter 5; however, one element of that debate 
bears mentioning here. Christopher Allen observes that perjury had “de-
clined” as an argument against reform by the 1870s.104 That decline was 
made possible by the selectivity discussed in this chapter. The sting of per-
jury’s prevalence had been diminished by a habit of categorizing only some 
forms of the offense as particularly dangerous. Through the creation of 
norms, therefore, perjury had been made to appear manageable, although 
this appearance concealed a failure to develop any sort of infrastructure 
that would have made possible the reliable and proportionate punishment 
envisioned by Bentham. Instead, perjury was seen as largely the province 
of hardened offenders and best managed through cross-examination, not 
systematic prosecution.
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During the debate on the Criminal Evidence bill, Justice Henry 
Hawkins was one of the only opponents who evoked the specter of an epi-
demic of perjury similar to that described by opponents of the 1851 act. 
Hawkins opposed the Criminal Evidence Act in sweeping terms: “Prison-
ers who are guilty will recognise that their only chance of escape lies in 
swearing that they are innocent. The criminal Courts will thus be fl ooded 
with perjury, the sanctity of the oath will be destroyed, and juries will cease 
to attach more importance to a statement that is sworn than one that is not. 
Hence the very object with which the bill is promoted will be defeated.”105 
Few joined Hawkins in his prediction of widespread perjury. More com-
mon was the fear that hardened criminals would abuse the privilege of tes-
tifying by successfully convincing juries of their innocence. Justice William 
Grantham testifi ed to the danger posed by such individuals: “I have known 
scores of cases where clever old hands would have escaped conviction and 
innocent prosecutors would have been sent forth from Court as perjured 
witnesses or even branded as blackmailers.”106 Supporters of the bill, how-
ever, tended to dismiss the problem. If hardened criminals wanted to add 
perjury to their list of crimes committed and suffer the consequences, then 
so be it. As the Solicitors’ Journal concluded, there was “truth in the ob-
jection . . . that the Bill tends to the increase of perjury, but this is a matter 
which persons who are guilty must settle for themselves.”107 Worry about 
adding perjury to other crimes was seen as misplaced solicitude for the 
guilty. The Solicitors’ Journal commented, “if it is a hard thing, it is hard 
only upon the guilty person.”108
Following the act’s passage, there was controversy about whether 
criminal defendants could be prosecuted for perjury. Before the act, sev-
eral options had been proposed. The Law Times, for example, suggested 
that criminal defendants be protected from private prosecutions for per-
jury for their testimony, prompting an abortive attempt to alter the bill to 
prohibit perjury prosecutions against criminal defendants.109 The ques-
tion reemerged immediately after passage of the reform. In one case, Jus-
tice Walter Phillimore opted to increase the sentence on a convicted robber 
rather than ordering a perjury prosecution, saying that he might “infl ict 
one punishment for two crimes.”110 Other judges were quick to order pros-
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ecutions of convicted prisoners for perjury. The Law Journal frowned on 
this, noting it was “a course, obviously to be deprecated save in extreme 
cases.”111 The opposite course—refusing to bring any prosecution against 
a convicted defendant—was also seen as problematic. It was suggested that 
this would amount to double jeopardy by retrying the same facts.112
Instead, a general consensus emerged to reserve prosecution for 
troublesome cases. As the Solicitors’ Journal suggested: “it is submitted, 
some sort of leniency might be in most cases shown to this class of perjurer. 
Of course, in some cases, when the prisoner tries by sworn evidence to 
lay his guilt on some innocent person . . . no punishment is too severe.”113 
The same periodical criticized judges who made “wholesale threats against 
prisoners of prosecution for perjury” and quoted with approbation Justice 
Thomas Bucknill’s suggestion that perjury prosecutions be reserved for 
“extreme cases.”114 In short, the selective prosecution of perjurers by the 
Director of Public Prosecutions would be echoed by selective actions by 
judges against suspected perjurers among criminal defendants.
By the end of the nineteenth century, the English trial had taken on a 
modern form that would be easily recognizable to early twenty-fi rst-century 
Americans. Parties in civil trials and defendants in criminal ones could tes-
tify on oath and were subject to the hazards of cross-examination. Judges 
still frequently bemoaned the prevalence of perjury in their courtrooms. As 
one County Court judge put it poetically: “Truth and honesty are like some 
of those rich colours which we cannot now produce.”115 At the same time, 
however, they participated in an informal system of prosecutorial norms 
that meant that little would be done to combat perjury. Rather than relying 
on the threat of perjury prosecutions, or contempt of court sanctions, it was 
hoped that cross-examination would expose the liar’s tale, leaving the jury 
to draw the appropriate conclusion.
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chapter  two
The Gentlemanly Art of Cross-examination
c r o s s - e x a m i n a t i o n  i n  t h e  v i c t o r i a n   era was both 
deeply resented and indispensable to the functioning of the legal system. 
Anthony Trollope compared tolerance of the abuses of cross-examination 
to the widespread practice of skinning eels while they were still alive to 
guarantee their freshness: both were tortures “allowed even among hu-
mane people.”1 James Fitzjames Stephen, for his part, asserted that cross-
examination had been “more severely censured by the unprofessional 
community” than any other aspect of legal practice.2 At the same time, 
cross-examination increasingly came to be the primary defense against per-
jury in the courtroom. This tension between public disapproval and utility 
provoked periodic controversies about the practice —both its manner and 
the extent of its subject matter. This chapter explores the progress of these 
debates between the admission of evidence by parties in 1851 and the Crim-
inal Evidence Act at the end of the nineteenth century. Different aspects of 
cross-examination had tellingly different fates during this period. These 
disparate results stemmed from the Victorian bar’s effort to impose limits 
on abusive cross-examination while preserving counsel’s unfettered discre-
tion in posing questions. By undertaking this careful balancing act, the bar 
successfully claimed cross-examination as its distinctive “gentlemanly art” 
while distancing itself from the technique’s most infamous practitioners—
criminal defense counsel.
One caveat is in order, however. This is a history of controversies re-
garding cross-examination, not an empirical study of its practice. Because 
even the few surviving Victorian trial transcripts frequently omit or para-
phrase cross-examining counsel’s questions, the methodological challenges 
posed by any empirical study are so daunting as to be practically insur-
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mountable. Nor, given the highly fl uid defi nitions of professional etiquette 
regarding in-court conduct, do I claim that even prominent scandals re-
sulted in sweeping changes on the ground. Accusatory cross- examinations, 
for example, still occurred after their condemnation in the 1870s. What I 
hope to reveal instead is the shifting ideology of practice: the ways in which 
the bar explained to itself both the distinctive nature of its professional 
identity and the boundaries on advocacy that it chose to police, albeit very 
episodically.
These Victorian debates reveal not only the shifting fortunes of cross-
examination, but also important developments in the histories of the ad-
versarial trial and the emergence of legal ethics. Until now, most scholarly 
attention has been focused on an earlier stage in the history of the common-
law trial. Many writers have devoted their attention to the period from the 
1780s to the 1840s. By the latter date, according to the standard account, 
the adversarial trial had fully emerged as a gladiatorial contest between op-
posing counsel overseen by a judge acting as a neutral umpire.3 Historians 
have seen this rise of adversarialism refl ected in a variety of forms. Defense 
counsel appeared with increasing frequency in criminal trials, for example, 
culminating in what Stephan Landsman calls the “full-fl owering of cross-
examination” in the last decades of the eighteenth century.4 Then, in 1836, 
the Prisoners’ Counsel Act expanded the role of defense counsel by al-
lowing them to address the jury directly. And fi nally in the 1840s, debates 
prompted by the trial of François Courvoisier, a Swiss manservant, for the 
murder of his employer, Lord Russell, helped solidify the principle that 
lawyers should defend even individuals whom they knew to be guilty.5
It would be a mistake, however, to assume that the evolution of the 
criminal trial stopped in the 1840s. As Ray Cocks notes, the late Victorian 
trial was very different from its early Victorian predecessors. The triumph 
of adversarialism was by no means clear-cut: controversies regarding advo-
cacy continued into the closing years of Victoria’s reign, and the popular 
press frequently took the bar to task for what it saw as the bar’s abuse of the 
“license of counsel.”6 The bar itself, meanwhile, continued to wrestle with 
the acceptable boundaries of legal advocacy. Few barristers wholeheartedly 
embraced Brougham’s famous exhortation to use “all expedient means” on 
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their clients’ behalf.7 At the same time, however, the bar lacked a formal 
system of legal ethics or even a comprehensive institutional structure that 
would make possible systematic professional discipline. Standards for legal 
ethics emerged only in vague outline, and as late as the early twentieth cen-
tury, commentators lamented the fact that lawyers’ ethics were largely de-
pendent on the dictates of their individual consciences. This conundrum 
emerges clearly in late Victorian controversies over cross-examination, 
which highlighted the tensions between the bar’s desire for respectability 
and its vigorous maintenance of professional autonomy.
Cross-examination, therefore, was a particular bone of contention 
in the Victorian “license of counsel” debates regarding emerging norms 
of legal advocacy after the 1840s. In the criminal courts, it had been a 
target of criticism as early as the mid-eighteenth century, and these criti-
cisms continued despite the “fl owering” of adversarialism. The limits of 
cross- examination were thus well-known. As John Langbein observes, it 
is a “puzzle” why contemporaries could accept cross-examination as the 
main guarantor of truth in the courtroom when they were well aware of its 
potential abuses—though the previous chapter moves us a bit closer to an 
explanation.8 As we have seen, part of the solution to this puzzle is a rec-
ognition of the limitations of perjury prosecutions as a means of ensuring 
veracity. Another key element, this chapter argues, derives from the way in 
which the bar went about shedding some of the most criticized aspects of 
cross-examination while defending the individual barrister’s control over 
its scope. In particular, the bar condemned accusatory cross-examination 
designed to suggest that a witness was perjured or corrupt while allow-
ing almost entirely unfettered discretion with regard to so-called cross-
 examination to character. The barrister, here, was to be limited by his 
own sense of propriety and fair play, rather than by explicit rules. This 
solution achieved a twofold result, expanding the bar’s control over cross-
 examination at the expense of the bench, while nominally tailoring it to 
comport with the sentiments of civilized society.
This emphasis on the tempering role of “civilized” manners made 
the question of the barrister’s status as a gentleman an important theme 
throughout the debates. In Stephen’s description, the barrister had the dis-
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cretion to “act like a gentleman or like a blackguard,” the assumption being 
that his innate honor, as an educated professional man, would guarantee 
that he chose the former.9 The Victorians saw cross-examination as a dis-
tinctively masculine pursuit, but one that required the barrister to place 
limits on his manly urge to dominate. Instead of drawing analogies to the 
battlefi eld or boxing ring, they presented cross-examination as a profes-
sional technique controlled by the norms of gentility. In 1892, the Law 
Times decried abusive cross-examination as “a species of forensic attack.” 
Should the practice “become universally prevalent . . . we bid farewell 
to the glory of the English Bar, which would cease to be a profession for 
gentlemen.”10 For cross-examination to be transformed from a disrepu-
table practice into a legitimate facet of the lawyer’s “art,” in other words, it 
needed to be reinterpreted and systematized in ways that seemed to evoke 
masculine honor.
Critically, gentility also entailed independence—in this case, inde-
pendence from the client’s control or from the client’s solicitor. Manly in-
dependence required the barrister to distance himself from—and if neces-
sary, to constrain—the untempered passions of his client. This contrasted 
with an earlier period characterized by lawyers’ deference to their elite 
clients.11 This ideal of professional autonomy was developed during the 
same period that the prohibition of contact between barristers and their 
clients was moving from an ambiguous and erratically obeyed guideline to 
a fi rm rule established by the newly founded Bar Council.12 Even as they 
distanced themselves from their clients, however, barristers also placed the 
blame on clients and solicitors for abusive cross-examinations. Barristers 
argued that their duty was to avoid becoming a weapon wielded in the ser-
vice of a client’s desire for revenge or humiliation. Baron Farrer Herschell’s 
1890 formulation of the duties of an advocate included, for example, “never 
yield[ing] to the solicitations of a client, however pressing, to blacken the 
character of an adverse witness.”13 To understand the history of the ideal of 
zealous advocacy, therefore, we need to recognize that nineteenth-century 
barristers demanded the freedom to pursue their clients’ causes without 
interference from the judge at the same time as they accepted personal re-
sponsibility for policing the techniques used on their clients’ behalf. The 
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triumph of adversarialism was made palatable by the bar’s assurances that 
it would be pursued within the boundaries of gentlemanly honor.
These controversies, and the redefi nition of cross-examination they 
provoked, were driven in part by professional challenges to the barris-
ters’ monopoly on courtroom practice. Cross-examination’s emergence as 
the profession’s defi ning skill distinguished common-law barristers from 
Chancery barristers and also from solicitors who had little experience with 
courtroom practice before the creation of the County Courts. For most of 
the Victorian period, the bar’s monopoly was threatened on a variety of 
fronts—from economic pressures caused by increased numbers of barris-
ters, to legal educational reforms pioneered by solicitors, to the prospect of 
competition from the equity bar in a newly unifi ed court system. Elevating 
cross-examination as the barrister’s “art,” an “art” not shared by solicitors 
or equity barristers, served to demarcate professional boundaries that ap-
peared in danger of blurring.
For those familiar with the rhetoric of nineteenth-century profession-
alization, it is striking that barristers relied on the trope of “art” rather than 
“science” in differentiating their particular abilities. Cross- examination, 
as they presented it, was a form of practical knowledge best learned 
through observation or apprenticeship, rather than in the lecture hall. It 
was, therefore, different from the body of specialized, standardized, and 
perhaps even scientifi c knowledge that, along with exclusive access to a 
vital arena (for example, courtrooms or hospitals) and control over entry, 
constitutes a crucial ingredient of most theories of professionalization.14 
Thus,  paradoxically, while English barristers were among the prototypi-
cal professions, their claim to exclusivity rested not so much on a specifi c 
body of knowledge as on practical skill and personal judgment.15 That per-
sonal judgment, in turn, was presented as inseparable from the gentility of 
the barrister. Evolving professionalism depended on older norms of aris-
tocratic conduct. As Mark Osiel has commented, English barristers con-
found the traditional narrative of professionalization with their persistent 
interest in donning “aristocratic garb” even at the expense of economic 
success.16
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Finally, shifting norms of cross-examination brought with them 
various and sometimes self-contradictory concepts of how the truth of a 
witness’s testimony should be assessed. Barristers’ new standards of cross-
examination were rooted in contemporary associationist psychological 
theory and ideas about circumstantial evidence. These standards placed 
a new onus on barristers to carefully review the evidence before the trial 
and to skillfully apply their knowledge of human nature during the trial. In 
part, this shift was made possible by the lengthening duration of many tri-
als. Rather than the brief contests that typifi ed eighteenth-century criminal 
proceedings, both criminal and civil trials now commonly occupied days 
and, as a result, required barristers to be well-acquainted with the record. 
The new style of cross-examination closely refl ected this emphasis on pre-
trial preparation: it sought unheralded contradictory admissions from wit-
nesses that could later be deployed in an argument to the jury, rather than 
dramatic confrontation and confession on the stand.
The Case against Cross-examination
To understand why cross-examination was so contentious we must 
turn to the Old Bailey bar. It was at the Old Bailey—the criminal court 
for the City of London—that advocates began to develop a reputation for 
devastating cross-examinations. In part, they had no choice. Restrictions 
on advocacy before the 1836 Prisoners’ Counsel Act, which fi nally lifted 
the prohibition on speeches to judge and jury, forced defense counsel to 
present much of his case in the guise of cross-examination.17 William Gar-
row, the celebrated Old Bailey cross-examiner, described the limitations of 
this situation: “all that is permitted to us who stand as counsel for prison-
ers is to endeavor, by such questions as may occur to us, to impress on the 
minds of the Jury observations tending to excite distrust of the evidence.”18 
Because of this, the frequency of cross-examination grew apace with the 
appearance of defense counsel. Landsman, for example, notes that as the 
presence of defense counsel became more common during the decades 
between 1740 and 1780, the importance of cross-examination increased 
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 markedly.19 This trend then accelerated dramatically during the last de-
cades of the eighteenth century, as Langbein has pointed out by identifying 
William Garrow’s aggressive cross-examinations of the 1780s as a turning 
point in the history of Old Bailey adversarialism.20
The new assertiveness of defense counsel was widely condemned. 
Though the Old Bailey bar had been a target of raillery from the eigh-
teenth century, opinions of it slid still further in the nineteenth century. 
The growth of the legal periodical press, which provided a regular forum 
for the airing of critiques within the professional community, did much to 
accelerate this decline. Old Bailey barristers were frequently accused of be-
ing both ignorant of the law and innocent of manners.21 Looking back from 
the safety of the late Victorian period, barristers recalled a sharp divide be-
tween Old Bailey practitioners and the rest of the common-law bar. William 
Ballantine, for example, had been refused membership at the Reform Club, 
which led a wag to remark, “An Old Bailey Barrister would be blackballed 
even if he were Jesus Christ.”22 Henry Hawkins recalled the Old Bailey in 
the 1840s as “a den of infamy in those days not conceivable now. . . . Its as-
sociations were enough to strike a chill of horror into you. It was the very 
cesspool for the offscourings of humanity.”23
Critics attributed the Old Bailey’s lack of decorum in part to the ab-
sence of the social controls over behavior that existed in the circuit messes 
outside of London. On each of the judicial circuits, judges and barristers 
traveled as they held assizes. All the barristers, therefore, belonged to a cir-
cuit mess, a largely social group, but one that could and did impose fi nes, 
social sanctions, and even expulsion from the mess for breaches of profes-
sional etiquette.24 The metropolitan courts of London, however, were not 
part of a circuit and therefore lacked even this form of rudimentary and 
informal discipline.
For its critics, the contemptible amorality of the Old Bailey emerged 
most clearly in the practice of cross-examination. Barristers had taken over 
the role played by judges in an earlier period—that of sarcastic interro-
gator. Old Bailey barristers’ cross-examinations were criticized on several 
grounds: they confused the honest witness; they resorted to browbeating 
accusations of perjury and tainted testimony inspired by reward money; 
Y6746.indb   54 7/2/15   2:40:31 PM
The Gentlemanly Art of Cross-examination 55
they failed to respect the rank of witnesses; and they often resorted to cruel 
ridicule of witnesses that may have been entertaining to the courtroom but 
was at best irrelevant to the matter at the bar.25
The history of thief-taking provided an important backdrop to the 
scope granted to defense counsel in their cross-examination. Notorious 
scandals during the 1720s and 1730s established the image of the prosecu-
tor as a perjurer out for blood money at the expense of an innocent defen-
dant. Garrow, for example, demanded of one prosecution witness, “Upon 
your oath, do not you prosecute this young man for the reward?”26 As Ally-
son May’s important research has demonstrated, defense counsel’s role was 
justifi ed by the threat of perjury, especially perjury motivated by reward 
money.27 Accusing witnesses of perjury, however, became an easy rhetori-
cal last resort for counsel; the refrain “upon your oath” suggested as much 
without requiring any well-founded suspicion of perjury.
To the ire of their more deferential critics, Old Bailey counsel de-
ployed these rhetorical tactics without regard for the social status of the 
witness whose credibility was being undermined. Propertied and penniless 
witnesses alike could expect no mercy from cross-examining counsel. Gar-
row’s treatment of one titled witness, Baron Hompesch, provoked an irate 
pamphlet from a solicitor named Thomas Hague, who chose the pointed 
title “A Letter to William Garrow, Esq., in which the Conduct of Counsel 
in the Cross-Examination of Witnesses, and Commenting on Their Tes-
timony, is Fully Discussed, and the Licentiousness of the Bar Exposed.” 
Hague excoriated the bar for “brutal insolence and wanton scurillity” and 
labeled their cross-examination exercises in “prolixity, howling violence, 
frothy extraneous matter and nauseous ribaldry.”28 For Hague, Garrow’s 
cross-examination of Hompesch exemplifi ed the threat to decent reputa-
tions that cross-examining barristers posed. In his cross-examination, 
Garrow implied that Hompesch, a landowner who sought monetary dam-
ages from a man convicted of poaching on his property, had designs on the 
poacher’s wife. Moreover, Garrow asserted that given a choice between the 
baron and his dog, at least the dog was an honest witness. Hague repeat-
edly contrasted Garrow’s insolence with Hompesch’s status as a gentleman 
and an offi cer. The confl ict between aristocratic notions of honor and the 
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norms of courtroom combat had been made clear by Garrow’s refusal to 
take up Hompesch’s invitation to a duel. According to Hompesch, Garrow 
“meanly sheltered himself under the shield of the law.”29
Garrow’s frequent deployment of two of the types of cross-examina-
tion that would feature prominently in late-Victorian debates—accusations 
of corrupt perjury and irrelevant attacks on witnesses’ characters—no 
doubt was driven in part by the exigencies of contemporary trial practice. 
Defense counsel typically had little time to prepare, and having a brief pre-
sented to them in the courtroom itself was not unheard of. In one case cited 
by Landsman, the defendant was unable to fi nd his counsel, and another 
barrister volunteered to handle the cross-examination with no apparent 
preparation other than having listened to the prosecution’s case.30 But by 
making these sorts of attacks hallmarks of an aggressive cross-examining 
style, Garrow left the bar in the uncomfortable position of relying on tactics 
that ran contrary to notions of gentility: gentlemen did not accuse other 
gentlemen of fraud.
Ridicule was not uncommon: Garrow famously asked one witness 
whether he pulled off his false curls when he went to bed.31 Even Thomas 
Erskine, universally celebrated as being the courtliest of the Old Bailey 
barristers, was not above using cross-examination to score unfair points at 
witnesses’ expense. In an action for payment of a tailor’s bill, Erskine cross-
examined a witness who swore that a dress coat had been badly made with 
one sleeve longer than the other. Erskine haltingly queried the witness, 
“You will swear that one of the sleeves was—longer—than the other?” The 
witness responded that he did so swear. Having lulled the witness into a 
false sense of security, Erskine then followed quickly with an angry, “Then, 
Sir, I am to understand that you positively deny that one of the sleeves was 
shorter than the other?” Startled, the witness declared, “I do deny it.”32
Criticisms directed at the Old Bailey bar inspired novelists, who 
saw the literary potential of the duplicitous wit attributed to its barristers. 
The prolifi c author Anthony Trollope frequently included scenes of abu-
sive and misleading cross-examinations in his novels. While Trollope was 
not alone among Victorian novelists in deploring cross-examinations, he 
was probably the Victorian era’s most prominent critic of their abuse.33 As 
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we have seen, he once compared the beleaguered witness to an eel being 
skinned alive by a fi shmonger. Despite the extravagance of both creatures’ 
gratuitous suffering, he wrote, “no one’s blood curdled at the sight, no soft 
heart is sickened at the cruelty”—though, as we will see, in the case of eels 
this was not entirely accurate by midcentury.34 Elsewhere he compared evi-
dence extracted through cross-examination to that produced “by means of 
torture—thumb-screw and such-like,—[that] we have for many years past 
abandoned as barbarous.”35 Trollope’s father was a Chancery barrister, 
and Trollope seems to have inherited an equity barrister’s disdain for the 
common-law bar. His hostility to cross-examination appears to have been 
a lifelong preoccupation; one contemporary records him as “raging and 
roaring” against the system of cross-examination at an 1877 dinner with 
Henry James, a prominent criminal barrister who subsequently served as 
Solicitor and Attorney General.36
Trollope himself had fi rsthand experience of cross-examination. Dur-
ing the 1840s he worked for the Irish Post Offi ce, where he had a reputation 
as an aggressive and active supervisor. In order to trap a suspected mail 
thief in Tralee, he sent a marked coin in a letter that would pass through 
the Tralee post offi ce. When the letter did not arrive, Trollope hurried to 
Tralee, where he found the coin in the pocket of Mary O’Reilly, a young 
postmaster’s assistant. Trollope’s testimony as a prosecution witness was 
central in the ensuing two criminal trials (the fi rst ended in a mistrial).37 In 
the fi rst trial, O’Reilly’s counsel asked Trollope whether he had drawn his 
plan from the same source as the novels he had “dabbled in.” At the sec-
ond trial, O’Reilly was represented by the famous Irish barrister Isaac Butt. 
Butt asked Trollope whether he “deal[t] in fi ctional characters” and recited 
an antibarrister passage from Trollope’s recent novel The Macdermots of 
Ballycloran, asking him whether he still felt the same animosity.38
Trollope’s aversion to partisan cross-examination appears to have 
stemmed from his conviction that barristers actively sought to conceal the 
truth: “it is not that [our lawyer] fails to look on the truth as excellent; it 
is not that he is less averse to murder than another; it is not that he would 
have crime escape unpunished; but the habits of his education, of his trade, 
and his life will not allow him to see clearly.”39 One contemporary reviewer 
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 described Trollope’s novel Orley Farm as “an attack upon the whole sys-
tem of advocacy—not upon its misuse, but upon its use.”40 The novel 
centers on a perjury trial in which the defendant, Lady Mason, is patently 
guilty. It abounds with antilawyer barbs, such as: “There were fi ve lawyers 
concerned, not one of whom gave to the course of justice credit it would 
ascertain the truth, and not one of whom wished that the truth should be 
ascertained. Surely had they been honest-minded in their profession they 
would all have so wished . . . I cannot understand how any gentleman can 
be willing to use his intellect for the propagation of untruth.”41 Barristers, 
in Trollope’s view, were not only willing to overlook evidence of guilt when 
it suited their professional interests, they were also unscrupulous about 
casting false aspersions on other individuals whom they knew to be in-
nocent. In the New Zealander, Trollope describes the fate of the witness: 
“The poor wretch, who has come there to tell, as best he may, what truth 
he knows on the matter, is exposed fi rst to the ridicule, and then to the 
ignominy of the whole court. Nay, may it be possible that he himself did the 
deed? It is clear, so says Mr. Allwinde, that this man is a liar, why not also 
a murderer?”42
Trollope subsequently personifi ed his complaints about common-
law barristers in the memorable character of Mr. Chaffanbrass—modeled, 
as we will see, on a famed Old Bailey counsel—who appears in several of 
his novels. In Phineas Redux, Lord Fawn, a potential witness, contemplates 
with horror the prospect of association with Chaffanbrass, “hating the lit-
tle man, despising him because he was dirty, and nothing better than an 
Old Bailey barrister.”43 In Orley Farm, Trollope covers his stereotyping 
bases by comparing Chaffanbrass to both an Irish assassin and a “dirty old 
Jew.”44 Chaffanbrass delights in the chase; he “bullies when it is quite un-
necessary that he should bully; it is a labour of love.”45
Trollope’s eel analogy resonated with contemporary concerns. In 
striking contrast to an eighteenth-century indifference to animal suffering, 
the nineteenth century saw the foundation of the Society for the Prevention 
of Cruelty to Animals in 1824 (less than two decades later, in 1840, Queen 
Victoria permitted the addition of “Royal” to the name), the initiation of 
private prosecutions of animal abusers on a widespread basis, and legisla-
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tive interest in the question of animal suffering.46 Indeed, by the time Trol-
lope made his comparison, cookbooks and household manuals already de-
plored the “horrid barbarity” of killing eels by skinning them alive, instead 
recommending a quick blow to the base of the skull “with a sharp pointed 
knife or skewer.”47 In the nineteenth century, interest in animal welfare was 
part of a broader fascination with suffering and pain. Pain became an object 
of dread, not merely an inevitable fact of life. But the impulse to protect 
animals was not simply humanitarian; the language of cruelty was closely 
intertwined with visions of class. An accusation of cruelty implied that the 
abuser was both a revanchist throwback to less civilized times and, very 
clearly, not a gentleman. Trollope’s description of Chaffanbrass in The 
Three Clerks includes both an indictment of Chaffanbrass’s delight in infl ict-
ing pain—“it may be said of him that the labour he delighted in physicked 
pain”—and lack of civility—“Mankind in general take pleasure in cruelty, 
though those who are civilized abstain from it on principle.”48
Despite the heated rhetoric of critics like Trollope, the bar’s response 
tended to either dismiss the question entirely or skirt the issue of whether 
some form of control should be imposed. One frequent theme in the legal 
literature of the 1830s and 1840s was that abusive cross-examination was 
not really a problem because it tended to alienate the jury. “But this is dan-
gerous ground,” cautioned William Forsyth in his work on advocacy. “The 
feelings of the jury revolt at such an assumption, and in their sympathy with 
the witness whose character is thus causelessly assailed, they are apt to con-
ceive prejudice against [the opposing party].”49 Counsel, it was implied, 
were already motivated by the dictates of practicality not to exceed the 
boundaries of propriety. Archer Polson, writing in 1840, noted, “Coun-
sel . . . have sometimes pushed their privilege of treating every hostile wit-
ness as a rogue rather too far, and have received some severe rebukes from 
those they had hoped to make the objects either of scorn or ridicule.”50
Another common response was to laugh the problem off with a hu-
morous invocation of witnesses who turned the tables on their examiners. 
Marc Galanter, in his study of lawyer jokes, identifi es the persistence of 
certain types of jokes as evidence of deep-seated ambivalence that the joker 
is unable or unwilling to confront. One of the oldest themes in the annals of 
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lawyer humor is the badgering lawyer defeated by the lower-class witness.51 
Lawyers in the mid-Victorian period both joked about the clever witness 
and quite possibly believed in his or her existence. Stories of the clever wit-
ness are legion and often involve an aspersion either on the bar in general or 
on the individual barrister’s sexual conduct.52 For example: “Dr. Brodum, 
a notorious quack, was once under examination by Mr. Abraham Moore. 
‘Your name is Brodum, I believe,’ inquired the counsel. The doctor nod-
ded assent. ‘Pray how do you spell it—Bro-dum or Broad-hum?’ On this 
there was a loud laugh in court, which was not diminished when the quack 
replied with admirable self-possession, ‘Why, sare, as I be but a doctor, I 
spell my name Bro-dum; but if I were a barrister I should spell it Broad-
hum!’ “53 Polson also relates the classic anecdote of notorious eighteenth-
century hanging Judge Jeffreys’s comeuppance as a barrister. Jeffreys’s wife 
had given birth a very short time after their marriage. “Her husband was 
shortly after this unfortunate occurrence examining a fair witness, who 
gave her evidence with tolerable sharpness. He said, ‘Madam, you are 
quick in your answers.’ ‘Quick as I am, Sir George, I am not so quick as 
your lady.’ ”54 The joke may have been on the barrister, but the underlying 
message served the legal profession’s interests: why formalize controls on 
counsel when even the humblest witnesses could turn the tables on their 
legal adversaries?
Distinguishing the Barrister
Despite the criticisms, cross-examination came to occupy an impor-
tant position in the early nineteenth-century trial, helping to distinguish 
barristers at a moment when solicitors were engaged in sweeping profes-
sional reform. In arguing for the centrality of cross-examination, barristers 
benefi ted from changes in the conceptualization of evidence law. By the 
mid-nineteenth century, jurists had come to accept that cross- examination 
was essential to establishing the truth of matters before the court. Evi-
dence treatises of the time increasingly settled on the absence of cross-
examination as the rationale for the hearsay rule.55 Thomas Starkie, in a 
construction that would later be amplifi ed by John Henry Wigmore, called 
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cross- examination “one of the principal tests the law has devised for the as-
certainment of truth.”56 Rather than relying on the in terrorem power of the 
oath, jurists argued that cross-examination should be the main safeguard 
of veracity. But the shifting rationales of the rules of evidence alone do not 
explain the enthusiasm with which the bar embraced cross-examination 
over the course of the nineteenth century.
Early attempts to reform cross-examination need to be viewed against 
a backdrop of widespread anxieties about the future of the legal profes-
sion. The fi rst third of the nineteenth century was widely seen as a time of 
overcrowding at the bar. Barristers faced heightened competition among 
themselves, economic competition from solicitors, and controversies about 
the traditional education of barristers. Although it is diffi cult to isolate the 
number of individuals who relied on legal practice for the majority of their 
income, Daniel Duman estimates that the practicing bar in England and 
Wales grew two and half times from 1785 to 1835, far outstripping the rate of 
population growth.57 This period of growth was followed by economic de-
pression from 1837 into the 1850s. As a result, fewer barristers were able to 
earn a respectable living from their practices. Moreover, straitened fi nan-
cial circumstances threatened a particularly cherished part of the bar’s self-
image: the barrister as a fi nancially disinterested gentleman, as opposed to 
the solicitor, who was seen as a mere tradesman.58 James Fitzjames Stephen 
identifi ed the “general theory of the distinction between the two branches 
of the legal profession” as the difference between superior and inferior: 
“the one requires the manners, the accomplishments, and the education of 
a gentleman, and . . . these things are not to be expected of the other.”59
The effect of competition within the bar was compounded by the ex-
pansion of opportunities for solicitors during the nineteenth century. In the 
new County Courts, established in 1846, attorneys could appear for clients 
without engaging a barrister. This innovation proved particularly diffi cult 
for junior barristers, who suffered most from the loss of smaller cases that 
could now be handled by solicitors on their own in County Courts. Some 
barristers fought for the right to appear in the County Courts without in-
struction by a solicitor, but few took advantage of the opportunity.60 As the 
County Courts’ jurisdiction was expanded repeatedly during the nineteenth 
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century, barristers’ protests against their shrinking professional monopoly 
were fruitless. By the 1860s, aside from divorce cases, “the county courts 
were now practically courts of complete jurisdiction in civil matters.”61
Not only did solicitors make signifi cant inroads into courtroom prac-
tice, they also challenged the barristers’ leadership of the legal profession 
through pioneering reforms in legal education. Under the auspices of the 
Law Society, solicitors introduced a lecture program in 1833, followed in 
1836 by a unifi ed admission process with formal written examinations.62 
It would take decades, however, for similar changes to be accepted by the 
“higher” branch of the legal profession. From the 1830s on, there was wide-
spread interest in (as well as opposition to) reforms in legal education for 
barristers, as highlighted by the House of Commons Select Committee and 
Royal Commission reports on legal education in 1846 and 1854–55. In 1852 
the Inns established a collective body, the Council on Legal Education, and 
agreed to make admission to the bar contingent on either attending lectures 
or taking a voluntary examination. This fi rst wave of reform, however, had 
little in the way of practical consequences. Unsurprisingly, few would-be 
barristers took the voluntary examination. Moreover, attendance at the 
lectures declined during the 1860s, when serving a year’s pupilage was ac-
cepted in lieu of the lecture requirement.63 Mandatory examinations were 
not instituted until 1872.
Viewing the history of legal education simply as an inevitable—if 
perhaps delayed—natural course of reform misses much of the complex-
ity of the bar’s self-identifi cation during this period. Following in the foot-
steps of the “lower” branch caused much anxiety among members of the 
bar. Barristers sought to base their claims for professional legitimacy on 
gentlemanly status, classical learning, and economic disinterestedness, 
even if competition in the legal market during the nineteenth century made 
their grasp on the fi rst and the third more tenuous. In the instances where 
practical knowledge might be valued, many barristers still maintained that 
it was best acquired through the ad hoc learning experience of apprentice-
ship, rather than as a systematic course of study.64 For those who wanted 
to maintain the traditional education of barristers, cross-examination was 
a convenient example of an “art” best learned at the elbow of a practicing 
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barrister rather than in the sterile confi nes of a lecture hall. John George 
Witt, for example, a barrister with an extensive academic record before 
turning to the law, condemned examinations because of the threat they 
posed to the “principle of apprenticeship,” where real preparation for a 
legal career took place.65
From Confrontation to Mastery of Circumstance: 
Cleaning Up Cross-examination’s Act
All of these factors combine to explain why reforming cross-
 examination became so important in the mid-nineteenth century. Edward 
Cox was one of the fi rst to take up the challenge in a comprehensive way. 
Writing just before the passage of the Evidence Amendment Act of 1851, 
which, as we have seen, allowed parties in civil cases to testify in court, 
Cox formulated new rules to guide cross-examination.66 Cox was a barris-
ter and a professional journalist who actively supported numerous—albeit 
moderate—reform proposals through his journal the Law Times.67 In par-
ticular, he lamented the lax enforcement of professional standards. In order 
to describe these standards comprehensively, Cox produced a long work 
titled The Advocate, which was published as a book in 1851 after having 
been serialized over the previous four years.68 In The Advocate, Cox ren-
dered explicit the practices and techniques of the bar for aspiring students: 
one modern historian calls it the “most extraordinary legal textbook of the 
nineteenth century.”69 In his work, Cox drew upon two important strands 
of Victorian thought in elaborating his new ideals for cross-examination: 
norms of gentility and associationist psychological theories. Cox’s attitude 
throughout The Advocate might be characterized as optimistic—he praised 
the fi rst shoots of change effusively in the hope that they would take root 
and spread. One reviewer described The Advocate’s advice as “a high les-
son and . . . a spirit of nice honour and kindly conduct, of which there are 
but few living examples.”70
In his discussion of cross-examination, Cox hopefully noted that 
“advocacy has, in this respect, vastly improved of late years, and is still 
improving.” Yet, his tone throughout was more embattled than this 
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 assessment would suggest. Cox began by emphasizing the diffi culty of 
cross- examination, which he described as “the severest test of an Advo-
cate’s skills.” He then laid out its goals: “there can be but three objects in 
cross-examination. It is designed either to destroy or weaken the force of the 
evidence the witness has already given against you, or to elicit something 
in your favour, which he has not stated, or to discredit him, by showing to 
the Jury, from his past history or present demeanour that he is unworthy of 
belief.” Even as Cox endorsed its utility as an adversarial technique, how-
ever, he stressed the value of a more civil approach to cross-examination: 
“It is marvelous how much may be accomplished with the most diffi cult 
witnesses simply by good humour and a smile; a tone of friendliness will 
often succeed in obtaining a reply which has been obstinately denied to a 
surly aspect and a threatening or reproachful voice.”71
Cox strongly discouraged the common Old Bailey practice of accus-
ing witnesses of perjury. Addressing a hypothetical aspiring barrister, he 
wrote: “you have no right to charge [a witness] with falsehood unless you 
are in your own mind entirely convinced that [the witness] is lying, and not 
that he is merely mistaken.”72 Cox urged that barristers carefully assess a 
witness’s credibility, noting demeanor, tone of voice, level of engagement in 
his or her narrative, and any uncharacteristic turns of phrase, which could 
be signs of coaching. Only if the barrister judged the witness a deliberate 
liar could he confront him or her with an accusation; and even then, Cox 
cautioned, an imputation of perjury was likely to backfi re, because juries 
were apt to turn the trial into a referendum on the witness’s honor and pun-
ish the barrister for his suggestion. Cox’s proposal that barristers assume a 
responsibility for prejudging witness credibility, meanwhile, ran precisely 
counter to the justifi cation for knowing defense of the guilty developed 
at the same time. In that situation, barristers defended their conduct by 
claiming it was impossible to assess a client’s innocence or guilt before a 
complete trial—the truth of the situation would be revealed by the contest 
between adversaries.73
Rather than confronting a witness with a contradiction, Cox urged an 
unthreatening, patient accumulation of circumstantial evidence that could 
later be used to destroy fabricated testimony: “The safer and surer course 
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is to bring out the discrepancy by inference, that is, instead of seeking to 
make the witness unsay what he has said, it should be your aim to elicit a 
statement which may be shown by argument to be inconsistent with the 
former statement.” In order to garner the circumstantial facts necessary to 
prove inconsistency, the advocate needed to appear devoid of suspicion: 
“there is nothing upon which witnesses of every grade of rank and intellect 
are so sensitive as self-contradiction. They suspect your purpose instantly, 
and the dread of being made to appear as lying, while often producing con-
tradictions and evasions, more often arms the resolution of the witness to 
adhere to his original statement without qualifi cation or explanation.”74 
Rather than the intemperate confrontation of the Old Bailey, the art of 
cross-examination now lay in the stealthy accumulation of circumstantial 
evidence. Cox suggested that barristers would fi nd much less resistance—
both from the jury and from the adverse witnesses—if they argued that 
the witness had been mistaken. Demonstrating the possibility of mistake 
through a skilled cross-examination became, in Cox’s view, the “triumph 
of [the barrister’s] art,” particularly when bolstered by the skilled reading 
of countenances and narrative sensitivity necessary to determine whether 
a witness was consciously lying.75 The idea of mistake was to become a 
touchstone for the “new” cross-examination. The Law Times, for example, 
would explain that “what an honourable cross-examining counsel does is 
to use such means as will detect and expose any conscious or unconscious 
inaccuracy into which the witness may have fallen.”76
Morality, Cox argued, should be the advocate’s baseline: “Your duty 
as an Advocate is strictly limited by the rules of morality. It is no more per-
missible for you to tamper with the truth in others, or tempt them to con-
found or conceal it, than to be false yourself.” Cox disagreed with any ver-
sion of the duty of an advocate that was “opposed to the plainest dictates of 
morality, which forbid us to do an injury to our neighbours, or to lie for any 
purpose whatever.”77 He saw the barrister as a gentleman “subject to the 
curb of education and station.”78 Cross-examination, in particular, should 
be guided by moral principles: Cox exhorted students that their conduct 
should be that of a “Christian gentleman . . . which may be summed up in 
three words—justice, truth, charity.”79 This moral vision led Cox to 
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dismiss the idea that the bench should police cross-examination. Instead, 
he assumed that proper (and suffi cient) control could be exercised by an 
individual barrister’s conscience.
Cox’s vision of the new cross-examination as mastery of circumstan-
tial evidence informed by a keen insight into human nature drew much 
of its strength from contemporary ideas about the nature of memory and 
the utility of circumstantial evidence. Mid-Victorian psychology was dom-
inated by the associationist school, and many of its assumptions guided 
Cox’s arguments, as well as giving a seemingly scientifi c foundation to a 
style of cross-examination that better fi t with notions of genteel conduct. 
Associationist psychology originated with John Locke, who countered the 
earlier doctrine of innate ideas with a conception of the mind as a tabula 
rasa, shaped entirely by sensation and refl ection. Association was the pro-
cess by which these sensations were linked with concepts. For association-
ists, therefore, the primary question became the ways in which sensations 
and ideas were linked.80 In the eighteenth century David Hartley suggested 
that memories consisted of the “perpetual Recurrency of the same Impres-
sions and Clusters of Impressions.”81 Psychologists in the mid-Victorian 
period identifi ed a variety of ways that memories could be contiguous, in-
cluding “order in time, order in place, . . . cause and effect,” and contrast 
or similarity.82 Moreover, the psychologists argued, the circumstances of 
a memory’s creation determined its longevity: memories created in a mo-
ment of strong feeling, either pleasure or pain, were likely to last longer. 
Associationists argued that humans were innately inclined to be truthful—
indeed, that telling a falsehood led to an instinctive feeling of pain.83 As 
the psychologist Alexander Bain wrote, “Contrary statements, opinions, 
or appearances, operate on the mind as a painful jar, and stimulate a cor-
responding desire for reconciliation.”84 This conception of mendacity re-
surfaced in Cox’s advice that advocates should assume a mistaken memory 
before concluding that a witness had committed willful perjury.
The intersection of associationist ideas and legal practice was also 
refl ected in James Ram’s 1861 A Treatise on Facts. Ram quoted Locke to 
explain the way in which events left an impression on the mind. Memo-
ries, he argued, consisted of those impressions that persist in the mind for 
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an extended period of time; their duration was generally proportionate to 
the depth of the original impression. Once triggered, memories “give up 
the persons or things which made the impressions; these persons or things 
then come before the mind’s eye, and become the subject of thought.” The 
trigger could be a question, a passing thought, or a sensory impression: the 
song of a fi eld cricket could evoke “a train of summer ideas of every thing 
that is rural, verdurous, and joyous,” for example. Even a deeply buried 
memory, Ram asserted, could be refreshed by external evidence, such as a 
diary. Such triggers could be employed by a skillful cross-examiner. Ram 
noted that cross-examination “is often of the utmost importance and service 
toward discovering the truth, and the extent to which the witnesses are to be 
believed.” It was particularly useful when testimony was a mixture of truth 
and falsehood, or truth and omissions: “the witness may have spoken truth, 
but not the whole truth; or he may have spoken the truth, and something 
besides the truth; or some of the truth may not have been brought out.”85
Both Ram and William Wills, author of a noted treatise on circum-
stantial evidence, questioned the assumption that any variation in testi-
mony indicated falsity. Wills, for example, observed that inconsistencies 
in the accounts of the same event by different witnesses “are not neces-
sarily to be regarded as indicative of fraud or falsehood, provided there 
be substantial agreement in other respects.”86 Not all sensations lodged in 
memory with the same force. Ram approvingly quotes the late eighteenth-
century natural theologian William Paley’s statement that “I know not a 
more rash or unphilosophical conduct of the understanding, than to reject 
the substance of a story, by reason of some diversity.” In particular, Ram 
argued, variations between a witness’s statement to a magistrate and his or 
her in-court testimony was “natural, and almost unavoidable.”87 When two 
witnesses differed in their accounts of a conversation, Ram found many 
possible explanations for a contradiction short of conscious deception. 
Circumstantial corroboration, in such a case, was a better tool for the iden-
tifi cation of falsehood than simple variation.
Willful perjury, Ram argued, required a compelling motive that could 
mark it as something more than an accident of memory. Ram listed revela-
tions that could damage witnesses’ credit: previous involvement in court 
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cases, having been discharged from the army or from service, fi nancial or 
penal motives for their testimony, a history of enmity against the opposing 
party. A guilty individual was likely to tell a lie in order to parry suspi-
cion. One needed to look for motive for perjury, because “perjury is seldom 
committed in mere wantonness.” Typical motives, he wrote, included an 
interest in the outcome of a suit, envy, spite, revenge, inculpation of an-
other, and having been bribed. Many forms of falsity existed, then, short of 
perjury: “To doubt of truth is not to convict of falsehood. . . . [W]here the 
doubt exists, it need not arise from a suspicion that the witness has willfully 
spoken an untruth.” Like Cox, Ram urged a distinction between treatment 
of truthful and untruthful witnesses based not simply on the accuracy of 
their testimony but also on the intentions with which they delivered it: “Ex-
cept in the case of a dishonest witness, one prepared to trifl e with his oath, 
a witness may justly receive courteous or at least inoffensive, treatment at 
the hands of his examiner.”88
As Ram’s reliance on circumstantial evidence as a backstop for lapses 
in witness memory indicates, Cox’s enthusiasm for it was widely shared. 
Paley’s famous statement that “circumstances cannot lie,” and his use of 
such evidence to prove the presence of God in the world, is testament to 
the prestige it enjoyed.89 Legal scholars, for their part, made circumstantial 
evidence into a crucial tool for exposing perjury even before Cox. Thomas 
Starkie, for example, wrote in 1833:
It is not for a witness . . . to impose upon the Court; for however 
artful the fabrication of the falsehood may be, it cannot embrace 
all the circumstances to which the cross-examination may be 
extended; the fraud is therefore open to detection for want of 
consistency between that which has been invented, and that 
which the witness must either represent according to the truth, 
for want of previous preparation, or misrepresent according to 
his own immediate invention.90
James Fitzjames Stephen also relied on circumstantial evidence as a 
test of veracity: “consideration of the degree to which circumstances cor-
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roborate each other, and of the intrinsic probability of the matter sworn to, 
is a far better test of truth than any oath can possibly be.”91 In exposing a 
liar, “the utmost that can be done is to tie him down to so many details and 
collateral circumstances that if he is lying he can be contradicted by other 
testimony.”92
Lawyers, however, defi ned circumstantial evidence in narrower 
terms than Paley had. Wills, for example, defi ned it as lawyers do today, 
distinguishing it from direct evidence of the factum probandum, or subject 
of the inquiry: “circumstantial evidence is equally direct in its nature, but, 
as its name imports it is direct evidence of a minor fact or facts, incidental 
to or usually connected with some other fact,” usually, the factum proban-
dum.93 Circumstantial evidence, as legal scholars saw it, usually involved an 
inference from the circumstantial fact to the fact in issue. That inference, in 
turn, did not have to be as fi rm as a presumption. Cross-examination, mean-
while, became the art of manipulating circumstantial evidence. As Richard 
Harris described it in his late-Victorian how-to manuals on advocacy:
An isolated event is impossible. . . . The multitude of surround-
ing circumstances will all fi t in with a true story, because that 
is part and parcel of those circumstances carved out from them 
no matter how extraordinary it may seem: just as the oddest 
shaped stone you could cut from the quarry would fi t in again 
to the place whence it was taken. It is therefore, to the rock, of 
which it once formed a part, that you must go to see if the block 
presented be genuine or false. You must, in other words, go to 
the surrounding circumstances.94
For the barrister to trap the lying witness, however, his accumulation of 
circumstances had to be stealthy, in order to avoid giving the opposing 
side the opportunity to repair the damage by corroboration from another 
witness.
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The End of the Perjured Wretch: 
Disciplining Accusatory Cross-examinations
During the 1860s and 1870s, uncertainty about the status and profes-
sional identity of the bar persisted. In addition to the preexisting competi-
tion with solicitors and controversies about legal education, common-law 
barristers now also confronted the problems of competition with the equity 
bar and controversies regarding the adequacy of their disciplinary systems. 
From March 1869, it became apparent that the long-anticipated fusion of 
law and equity would take the form of a single unifi ed court, rather than 
conferring equitable powers on common-law courts and vice versa. The 
prospect of imminent institutional unifi cation provoked professional jeal-
ousy between the common-law and equity bars. Because it was feared that 
common and equity lawyers would be partial to members of their own bar, 
as well as more comfortable with their own court’s practices, lawyers in 
each bar lobbied for the appointment of their fellows as judges in the new 
courts. Lawyers from the two bars also had a sharpened sense of their own 
separate professional cultures: into the twentieth century, members of the 
Chancery bar maintained a deep-seated sense of a professional identity 
apart from and above the common-law bar.95 Equity barristers believed 
that they were both more ethical advocates and more sophisticated legal 
scholars, while common-law barristers felt that their equitable counterparts 
remained defi cient in courtroom representation, particularly in the fi ne art 
of cross-examination.96
The 1860s also witnessed a handful of very prominent cases of bar-
risters being subjected to professional discipline. Although there were not 
many cases in absolute terms, as Wesley Pue points out, “a small number of 
documented discipline cases does not necessarily mean that the Bar’s pow-
ers are inconsequential.” A few highly publicized disciplinary cases could 
and did serve as “cultural showpieces” that allowed the bar to delimit the 
outer boundaries of permissible advocacy.97 Without such cases, as Ste-
phen dolefully opined, the “great objection” to professional rules was that 
if they were “professed without being acted on, [they] become the source of 
hypocrisy and falsehood.”98 These “showpiece” disciplinary proceedings 
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tended to target barristers with liberal or radical political sympathies—
particularly those who had histories of challenging the professional ideolo-
gies of the bar—but their widely reported consequences discredited the 
bar as a whole and built public interest in the arcane procedures of bar dis-
cipline. At the time, both a barrister’s Inn and his circuit mess could claim 
disciplinary authority over him, but intervention by the Inns was rare, and 
a barrister could evade the largely social penalties wielded by the circuit 
mess through the simple measure of leaving it.99 Two cases brought the 
problem of professional discipline to the attention of the public with par-
ticular force, introducing several concerns that would prove central to later 
cross-examination controversies. The fi rst case resembles the Tichborne 
disciplinary proceedings (discussed below) in that, very unusually, it arose 
in part out of in-court conduct by a barrister. The second case prefi gures 
issues of barristers’ autonomy vis-à-vis clients that would reemerge in the 
debates of the 1890s.
In 1861, the newly appointed Attorney General—a radical member 
of Parliament and a Queen’s Counsel named Edwin James— engendered 
controversy for, among other violations of the bar’s gentlemanly code, sup-
posedly throwing his own cross-examination. James had appeared for the 
plaintiff in a fraud case in 1859 and had so severely cross-examined the 
defendant, Herbert Ingram, that Ingram had left court deep in a suicidal 
depression. Ingram later obtained a retrial, which was settled in his favor 
when James failed to pursue the case with his prior vigor. Gossip attrib-
uted James’s leniency to a much-needed £1,250 loan he had received from 
Ingram. In 1861, the benchers of Inner Temple held an inquiry into James’s 
conduct in response to the Ingram case and his rumored credit problems.100 
While the charge in the Ingram case could not be proved, the inquiry re-
vealed the full extent of James’s debts. He had already fl ed England, leaving 
creditors unpaid and resigning from all his public offi ces, but his Inn pro-
ceeded with his disbarment, a penalty James was the fi rst Queen’s Counsel 
ever to suffer.101
James’s fl ight took place in the midst of nineteenth-century Britain’s 
longest-running legal scandal, which also called the disciplinary capacities 
of the bar into question. Patience Swinfen had been a servant maid when 
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she met and married the younger son of a landed estate owner. Her hus-
band was promptly disinherited, but, after several years, his father, Samuel 
Swinfen, relented and allowed the two to return to Swinfen Hall. Samuel 
became fond of Patience and promised her that he would look after her; 
Samuel then left the Swinfen estate to Patience, enraging his older son, 
Frederick. Frederick sued Patience in 1856; she was represented by Sir 
Frederick Thesiger, but her case was short-lived because Thesiger—act-
ing on the advice of the judge hearing the case, Sir Cresswell Cresswell—
agreed to a settlement on her behalf without her consent. Patience refused 
to accept the settlement and eventually won back the estate, with the help 
of a controversial barrister named Charles Rann Kennedy.
Patience and Kennedy then took the completely unprecedented step 
of suing Cresswell and Thesiger, now Baron Chelmsford, Lord Chancel-
lor. They lost the case—badly—because the legal profession acted to pro-
tect two of its most eminent members. Kennedy and Patience, meanwhile, 
had embarked on an adulterous affair (Kennedy was married), and in lieu 
of payment for his legal services, Patience conveyed to him a deed valued 
at £20,000. Unfortunately, their romantic association was as tumultuous as 
their legal partnership, and Patience fell in love with and married another 
man. She demanded the deed to the estates be returned; Kennedy retali-
ated by suing her for his legal fees in the amount of £20,000. Kennedy won 
the initial trial, but the Court of Common Pleas subsequently established 
the principle that a barrister could not sue a client for fees. Kennedy also 
lost his claim to the Swinfen estate—the deed was set aside on the grounds 
that he had exercised undue infl uence over Patience. While disbarment 
proceedings against Kennedy were never concluded, his controversial re-
lationship with Patience highlighted the inadequacy of discipline by either 
the circuit mess or the Inns.102
The infl uence of the early 1860s cases persisted in an ongoing debate 
about the adequacy of the bar’s disciplinary structure. Prompted by the 
question “Is the Bar a Trades Union?,” the Pall Mall Gazette ran a series 
of letters in 1867 debating the role of the bar. The bar’s power to enforce 
its rules occupied a prominent place in the debate. “A Barrister” stated 
that “it would be a very diffi cult matter to say what the rules of the bar are, 
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or what is their sanction, and probably no two members of the profession 
would give the same account of them.”103 The Law Journal agreed that the 
rules were “of a very fl uctuating and uncertain character” and contended 
that the Inns of Court “never act except where a course of conduct has been 
pursued at variance with the honour of a gentleman.”104 Such complaints 
prompted proposals to unify the Inns for the purpose of discipline and to 
codify disciplinary regulations and procedures. Establishment of a joint 
body had to wait until the mid-1880s, when the Bar Council was founded, 
but before then the Tichborne trials would plunge the bar into public scan-
dal once again.105
These controversial trials focused public concern with the ethics 
of the bar on the question of cross-examination. While critics of cross-
 examination had decried abuses, no disciplinary proceeding had focused 
upon the question. Writing in 1865 Francis Parker called for making an ex-
ample of a bullying, browbeating cross-examiner who had “act[ed] towards 
an ordinary adverse witness on the assumption that he is perjured”: “It is 
most desirable that fi t instances of this should be selected for earnest, vigor-
ous protest.”106 Parker would get his wish. Polemics about the Tichborne tri-
als identifi ed in them variously the failure of cross-examination, the triumph 
of cross- examination, and the bounds beyond which cross- examination 
could not be permitted.107 Much of the cross-examination during the course 
of the trials was criticized, but only one barrister was disbarred—Edward 
Ke nealy. Ke nealy, noted for his mercurial temperament, succeeded Ken-
nedy as the bar’s “professional demon” in the 1870s, and his disciplinary 
proceeding served to give Cox’s strictures on advocacy some bite.
The lengthy litigation surrounding the Tichborne Claimant, as chron-
icled by Rohan McWilliams, was set into motion when the Dowager Lady 
Tichborne began circulating plaintive advertisements in Australia and else-
where calling for information about her eldest son, Roger Tichborne, who 
had been missing for twelve years and was presumed dead at sea.108 Since 
Roger’s disappearance, both his father and his younger brother had died, 
leaving the substantial Tichborne estates and the baronetcy in the youthful 
hands of his brother’s posthumous son. Lady Tichborne’s solicitations re-
ceived a response in 1866. Thomas Castro, a butcher in the outback town of 
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Wagga Wagga, wrote to his “Mamma” regretting his lengthy silence and re-
questing fi nancial assistance. Castro quickly garnered the trust of two Tich-
borne family employees living in Australia. One of them, Andrew Bogle, 
accompanied Castro when he went to Europe with his illiterate wife, her 
illegitimate daughter, and a newborn infant in tow. Upon arrival, the Claim-
ant, as he became known, gained the support of the Dowager Lady Tich-
borne, fellow countrymen from the vicinity of the Tichborne estate, and 
sundry fellow offi cers from Roger Tichborne’s time in military service—
all of whom claimed to recognize the slight form of Francophone Roger 
in the much larger and defi antly non-French-speaking Castro. Almost all 
of the rest of the Tichborne family refused to recognize the Claimant and 
maintained instead that he was in fact Arthur Orton, the son of a butcher in 
Wapping who had gone abroad at an early age. The Claimant brought suit 
to regain the estate, thereby initiating what was to become fi rst the lengthi-
est civil trial in English history and then the lengthiest criminal trial.
The fi rst cross-examination took place in Chancery in 1864, based 
on an affi davit the Claimant had made in Australia. It was conducted by 
Mr. Charles Chapman Barber, a Chancery silk, despite the presence of 
Henry Hawkins, a renowned cross-examiner also retained by the Tich-
borne family. Chapman Barber’s restrained cross-examination, which 
was limited to a recitation of facts, was much criticized after the trials as a 
missed opportunity; a more aggressive set of questions could have revealed 
one or more fl aws in the Claimant’s story, discrediting his case before trial. 
Chapman Barber’s supposed inadequacy in cross-examination became evi-
dence in a larger dispute about the role of the Chancery and common-law 
bars in the forthcoming fusion of the high courts of law and equity. In a 
typical display of professional jealousy, common-law barristers comment-
ing on the case held that Chapman Barber’s failure revealed the inadequacy 
of Chancery barristers when they attempted to assume roles traditionally 
held by their common-law colleagues.109
At the civil trial, the Claimant retained William Ballantine, renowned 
Old Bailey barrister and model for Trollope’s abrasive Chaffanbrass; 
the family retained Hawkins and John Duke Coleridge, the Solicitor Gen-
eral.110 Thorough cross-examination ought to have been able to demolish 
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what was likely a fabricated story related by Arthur Orton in his imper-
sonation of Roger Tichborne. In practice, the cross-examination provided 
no real moments of drama. Because of his position, Coleridge rather than 
Hawkins cross-examined the Claimant. Again, the cross-examination was 
a leisurely affair, justifi ed in retrospect by the rationale that its aim was 
to get as many misstatements as possible by the Claimant on the record. 
In this, the defendant’s attorneys closely followed the strategy of cross-
 examination by stealth, based on circumstantial evidence, advocated by 
such commentators as Cox and Ram. However, this very leisureliness later 
became the basis of the popular contention that the Claimant was in fact 
who he claimed to be. Supporters of the Claimant frequently cited the lack 
of a dramatic breakdown during the course of his cross-examination as 
“proof ” of his honesty.
Rather than cross-examination, therefore, the jury turned to appar-
ently incontrovertible proofs of physical identity. Months of testimony in 
the civil trial were fi nally brought to a conclusion by the jury’s willingness 
to seize upon evidence offered by the family that Roger Tichborne had 
been tattooed on one arm. Many observers found both the evidence and 
the jury’s sudden unwillingness to proceed with the case questionable. A 
sudden congeries of defense witnesses testifying to multiple tattoos was 
considered suspicious, particularly given the unlikelihood of a young man 
of Tichborne’s status having such tattoos from an early age. The exhausted 
jury, meanwhile, was thought to be reacting to the prospect (or perhaps 
more accurately, the threat) of hearing another hundred witnesses. Among 
the Claimant’s supporters, therefore, many believed that the family’s wit-
nesses, particularly Lord Bellew, a schoolmate of Roger’s, had committed 
perjury.
At the Claimant’s subsequent criminal trial for perjury, however, the 
criticisms of cross-examination were not directed at its ineffectiveness, but 
rather at the ethics of a highly accusatory style of conducting it. The Claim-
ant’s new counsel, Edward Kenealy, made a supposed Jesuit conspiracy a 
centerpiece of his defense. He suggested frequently and with great vigor 
that the witnesses against the Claimant, including Arthur Orton’s child-
hood sweetheart, Mary Ann Loder, had been paid off.111 He also attacked 
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Lord Bellew at length for seducing a friend’s wife. While Kenealy admitted 
that the alleged seduction had happened well before the events at issue in 
the case, he professed to feeling obliged to raise the issue out of “an over-
whelming sense of duty.” Hawkins, now serving as prosecuting counsel, 
protested strongly, calling the line of questioning a “waste of time” and not-
ing that “there are many things of a disagreeable nature which a man does 
not like to talk about,” but Bellew was forced to answer nevertheless.112 
Kenealy further alleged that the manager of the Tichborne estates, who had 
appeared as a witness for the family, was guilty of criminal misconduct that 
he sought to conceal by preventing the Claimant’s return.
The presiding judge and Lord Chief Justice of England, Alexander 
Cockburn, began his summation with a condemnation of Kenealy’s con-
duct, criticizing his liberality in blackening the reputations of Tichborne 
family members and all those associated with the family, ranging from wit-
nesses from Chile and Australia who had testifi ed to Arthur Orton’s travels 
there to the Jesuits who had educated Tichborne at Stonyhurst. He called 
for censure from the bar, and the public joined in.113 The Guardian de-
clared that “in Dr Kenealy’s method of conducting his case, these devices 
for wasting time and insinuating the vilest charges against both Judge and 
witnesses, have been more fl agrant than we can remember to have heard in 
any court of justice.”114 The Pall Mall Gazette agreed: “If there ever was a 
case in which the particular Inn of Court of which Dr. Kenealy is a member 
ought to feel itself bound to act, it is the present case.”115
But what rule of professional etiquette had Kenealy violated? Edito-
rialists agreed that he had transgressed the norms of courtroom behavior, 
particularly in his use of cross-examination as an occasion for accusation. 
The Pall Mall Gazette thought that disrespect for the court was “not the 
real charge” against Kenealy: “The real charge is that he attacked private 
character recklessly, falsely, without proper grounds, in a great number 
of cases, and in intemperate language.”116 The Law Times concurred: 
“Dr. Kenealy . . . is charged with the most reckless violation of all the rules 
which should govern the conduct of counsel in cross-examination of wit-
nesses and in making comments upon their evidence, whilst it is said that 
the Government of the country, the impartiality of the Judges, the living 
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and the dead who were connected with the case for the prosecution, were 
reviled in bitterest and coarsest terms.”117
The legal profession united in condemning Kenealy’s conduct as a 
threat to its reputation. In the Law Times’s summation, “These are not 
only offences against the Profession—that they do bring dishonour and 
discredit upon the Bar is admitted on all hands—but they are offences 
against public morality, and calculated to impede the course of justice.”118 
What might have been acceptable during the heyday of the Old Bailey bar 
was no longer permissible. The Law Journal echoed Trollope:
It does not follow that what was done in the time of Brougham 
or Denman, or at times anterior to them, can properly be done 
now. Morality has advanced very rapidly in the last forty years; 
and we do not see why the morality of the bar should stand 
still, as an action of doubtful propriety is not helped at all by a 
citation of similar actions by persons of repute in former times. 
Half the evils which have affl icted society have had their exis-
tence prolonged for immense periods of time, because those 
who were conservative of the evils could quote the opinion or 
conduct of some lofty personages in favour of them. Slavery, 
bull-baiting, condemnation for witchcraft, boiling women, 
hanging for theft, burning for heresy, and many other enormi-
ties which shock our age, were highly approved and stoutly de-
fended by men whose memories are even revered.119
Keeping up with the march of civilization was not as easy as all that. 
Even committed critics of Kenealy’s conduct wondered whether the Inns 
were being asked to intrude into the judge’s sphere of authority: “it is ab-
surd to claim for the benchers the right to do what the judges can do for 
themselves, and can do so much more effectually, because the judges see 
the offence committed, they can estimate its impropriety, and can punish 
it adequately.”120 The Solicitors’ Journal protested what it saw as the as-
sumption that the opinion of three judges and a jury censuring an advocate 
made it the duty of his Inn to inquire into his conduct. Such a principle 
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would “convert the Benchers into mere henchmen of the judges, and to 
place into the hands of the latter a most crushing weapon against an ob-
noxious advocate.”121 The Law Journal doubted that the benchers had 
jurisdiction over matters: “[The benchers] ought not to attempt to exercise 
jurisdiction over mere conduct in Court. They are not to set themselves up 
as judges of manners, taste, demeanour, and the like.”122
Another practical diffi culty troubled the commentators: the eviden-
tiary dilemma of assessing whether the context justifi ed Kenealy’s actions. 
“In order to [do so] it would be necessary fi rst to measure the merits and 
demerits of the persons attacked by him; in other words, to try the Tich-
borne case over again in Gray’s Inn parlor after dinner.”123 Moreover, in 
venturing into this new territory, the benchers were proceeding without 
the benefi t of guideposts: a bencher would be “called to sit in judgment 
on Dr. Kenealy, not upon some accusation of an overt act of dishonour 
or wrong—not upon crimen aliquod probosum—but upon a question 
of discretion, of fairness, of good taste, of gentlemanly feeling, of forensic 
license—a question concerning which there are no laws, no rules, not even 
precedents worthy of a moment’s consideration.”124
Kenealy’s supporters argued, with some justifi cation, that his con-
duct was not unique. One wrote to the treasurer of Gray’s Inn informing 
him of his intention to prefer a charge against Hawkins to the benchers of 
the Middle Temple for imputing a conspiracy to support the Claimant. The 
Law Journal rejected the comparison, commenting that “Mr. Haw kins 
undoubtedly used strong language in the course of the case. His diction 
was more choice, his manner more refi ned, and his bearing in all respects 
preferable to that of Mr. Kenealy.”125 But the charge of hypocrisy did carry 
some weight; later, the same periodical argued that “no worse tribunal to 
adjudicate upon [Kenealy’s conduct] could be found than a body of men, 
many of whom daily and hourly hover on the very border-line between 
proper and improper treatment of a witness.”126
Kenealy’s defenders were swimming against the tide. On 2 April 1874, 
the Oxford Circuit voted to evict Kenealy from their mess, rejecting even a 
modest counterproposal that he be given an opportunity to respond. The 
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mess’s condemnation included Kenealy’s imputations against numerous 
prosecution witnesses, appeals to the “Mob outside,” misrepresentation of 
the evidence, calling of a perjured witness, mistreatment of the bench, and 
publication of a libel on the court.127 The actions of the circuit were criti-
cized by some as premature, but the Law Times found nothing to complain 
about, seeing the question in its most basic terms: “What the members of 
the circuit under such circumstances have to decide is, whether they wish 
to continue to dine and to associate in all the familiarity of social inter-
course with a particular individual?”128
In May 1874, a designated committee at Gray’s Inn charged with in-
vestigating Kenealy issued a list of alleged acts of professional misconduct, 
including:
1. By unjustifi ably accusing members of the Tichborne fam-
ily of a conspiracy to ruin the defendant in order to prevent 
him from recovering the Tichborne Estates, and with that 
view of exercising undue infl uence and committing bribery 
to induce witnesses to give false testimony on the part of the 
prosecution.
2. By unjustifi ably accusing several of the witnesses for the 
prosecution [list omitted] of perjury induced and brought 
about in some cases by bribery, and in one case (namely that 
of Mr. Gosford) also by the compounding of a felony.
3. By unjustifi ably accusing Mr. Bowker, Mr. Seymour, and 
Lord Bellew, of inventing the idea that Sir Roger Tichborne 
was tattooed, and of conspiring together to procure the de-
struction of the defendant by false evidence.
4. By unjustifi ably accusing the authorities in the College of 
Stonyhurst of abominable and immoral conduct.
5. By unjustifi ably attacking the character of several other per-
sons [list omitted].
6. By unjustifi ably accusing persons who had the conduct of 
the prosecution of knowingly putting forward false evidence 
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against the defendant, and advisedly withholding true evi-
dence which they knew, or believed, to be favourable to the 
defendant.129
Circumstances, however, suggested an easier way out for benchers who 
remained uneasy. In April, Kenealy established a two-pence newspaper, 
the Englishman, which advocated the preservation of the rights of English-
men, the establishment of female suffrage, and the thwarting of “the further 
march of Romanism and Jesuitry.”130 On 1 August 1874, the benchers of 
Gray’s Inn resolved by a vote of ten to one that Kenealy’s editorship of the 
radical Englishman, a “newspaper replete with libels of the grossest char-
acter,” dictated the vacation of his call to the Inn’s bench.131 The benchers 
had also forwarded copies of the Englishman to the Lord Chancellor, who 
found them “libelous attacks on her Majesty’s Judges and private individu-
als, and also a succession of systematic charges of bias, venality, and cor-
ruption,” and informed Kenealy that he would be removed from the list of 
Queen’s Counsel.132 In December 1874, the Lord Chancellor proceeded, 
removing Kenealy.133
Thus, while Cockburn had called for the bar’s action, control of Ke-
nealy remained very much within the hands of the profession, not the bench. 
Yet, as Kenealy himself pointed out, abuses of cross-examination had oc-
curred on both sides during the Tichborne trials. Both had raised argu-
ably irrelevant past sexual misconduct against witnesses; both had resorted 
to ridicule at the expense of witnesses. And it remained an open question 
whether Kenealy was not performing just the function of detecting perjury 
that Cox and others had envisioned. Norms, however, had shifted, and 
Kenealy had made the error of pursuing his goals with eighteenth-century 
techniques. Members of the bar agreed that this type of license of counsel 
should be sanctioned, even if indirectly.
By the 1870s, therefore, the practice of direct and often baseless ac-
cusations of perjury during cross-examination was, if not expressly prohib-
ited, at least widely condemned. Some of Cox’s aspirations had at last been 
embraced by many of the leaders of the bar. Writing in 1879, Richard Har-
ris referred to the practice of implying that a witness’s previous answer was 
Y6746.indb   80 7/2/15   2:40:32 PM
The Gentlemanly Art of Cross-examination 81
perjured as “an almost exploded style of cross-examination.”134 Instead, he 
reiterated the advice of earlier critics such as Edwin Chadwick that the only 
suitable course for a barrister to take when confronting a perjured witness 
was “to forbear to express the impression [the witness] has inspired.”135 In 
1888, a magistrate for Great Grimsby commented during a parliamentary 
debate that “no Chairman of Quarter Sessions who was worth anything 
at all, and certainly no Judge in the land, would allow counsel to brow-
beat a witness by reminding him of his oath.”136 Mr. Addison had heard 
counsel “remind witnesses that they were upon their oath; but he never 
knew, or rarely knew a counsel of experience to do anything of the kind. 
Such a thing was generally done by very young and inexperienced coun-
sel at Sessions.”137 Baron Herschell called bullying cross-examination “the 
sure mark of a bumbling workman.”138 By 1897, Cox’s journal informed its 
readers that “browbeating and annoying a witness is totally different from 
discrediting him.”139
Cross-examination to Credit
For critics of abusive cross-examination, however, the Tichborne 
case represented one small step forward at the cost of a running leap back-
wards. While the disciplining of Kenealy may have represented a grudging 
demarcation of the outer boundaries of accusatory behavior during cross-
examination, Justice Cockburn’s ruling from the bench that Kenealy could 
inquire into Lord Bellew’s adulterous past was subsequently cited in sup-
port of the proposition that any question tending to “shake” a witness’s 
credit “by injuring his character” could be asked, even if it was irrelevant to 
the facts at issue.140 In the 1879 edition of his Digest of the Law of Evidence 
James Stephen included the illustration of a witness testifying to a tattoo be-
ing compelled to answer the question of whether he had committed adultery 
with the wife of one of his friends. Stephen called this “the well-established 
practice of the Courts,” which was never “more strikingly illustrated than 
in the case referred to in the illustration”—which was, of course, Kenealy’s 
notorious cross-examination.141 Thus, while ungentlemanly accusations of 
perjury were now condemned, barristers still  contended with the tension 
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between their own sense of honor and their role as character assassins, not 
unlike their Old Bailey predecessors.
Everyone agreed that cross-examination as to character was necessary 
on some level; in the opinion of George Bramwell, First Baron Bramwell, 
“the grossest injustice is done when a man of undoubted good character 
is opposed to one of undoubted bad character, and yet they are treated as 
on an equality.”142 But Victorian lawyers were also keenly sensitive to the 
importance of reputation and the dangers posed by revelations of old mis-
conduct in an age that treasured character above all else. As Ram described 
the problem:
The temper of a witness is often tried, and his feelings hurt, by 
his cross-examination on his past conduct. He may have been 
charged with this or that offense; he may have been in prison. 
Questions on these matters are often properly put, with a view 
to see how far the witness is now entitled to credit; yet if the 
conduct inquired into is that of some years ago . . . it may be 
great and needless cruelty to bring again to light such bygone 
stains on his character.143
The plight of the otherwise virtuous witness forced to confess to long-ago 
misdeeds seems to have preoccupied Victorian jurists. Baron Herschell, 
in his lecture on legal advocacy, criticized even arguably relevant evidence 
of past dishonesty: “To require a witness who has long lived a respectable 
life to avow that very many years ago, he was convicted of dishonesty, is in 
general as cruel as it is unjustifi able.”144
Anxieties regarding cross-examination to character were heightened 
by an 1883 decision that exempted counsel from defamation charges for 
words uttered in the course of a judicial proceeding.145 While it had long 
been recognized that such actions could not be brought against judges, wit-
nesses, and counsel in the ordinary course of judicial proceedings, Mun-
ster v. Lamb established that this protection extended even when counsel’s 
statements were both malicious and completely irrelevant to the issue at 
hand. The counsel whose in-court statements were at issue in this case was 
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Charles Lamb, who was actually a solicitor. Henry Munster, the plaintiff 
and himself a barrister, had previously prosecuted William and Ellen Hill 
for a theft that had taken place in his lodging house in Brighton. William 
was convicted and Ellen was acquitted. Subsequently, Lamb defended El-
len against a charge that she had unlawfully administered soporifi c drugs to 
Munster’s servants in order to prevent them from raising an alarm. Accord-
ing to Munster, during the course of the defense Lamb implied that Munster 
was in fact keeping a bawdy house and that the drugs were present there 
for some illegal purpose, such as facilitating rape or procuring abortions. 
In response, Munster sued Lamb for defamation. Reasoning that counsel 
had a need for protection at least equivalent to that already extended to 
judges and witnesses, the court took the opportunity to decide this case on 
the broadest possible basis—assuming both malice and irrelevance. Two 
members of the court commented that the absolute privilege of counsel was 
counterbalanced by the judge’s power to check inappropriate conduct.146
Perhaps not coincidentally, 1883 also saw the fi rst offi cial formulation 
of the judge’s power to curtail cross-examination. The Judicature Act of 
1875 establishing the unifi ed court system also set up a rule-making com-
mittee charged with codifying existing practice. In 1883 the committee 
issued the consolidated Rules of the Supreme Court. Order 36, Rule 38 
provided that “the Judge may in all cases disallow any questions put in 
cross-examination of any party or other witness which may appear to him 
to be vexatious, and not relevant to any matter proper to be inquired into 
in the cause or matter.”147 Despite some initial misgivings as to whether the 
committee had exceeded its powers by including, for the fi rst time, a mea-
sure explicitly giving judges the right to curtail cross-examination, the rule 
was generally praised.148 It was also generally ignored in practice. More 
than three years later the Solicitors’ Journal noted what it believed was the 
fi rst instance the rule was invoked. Signifi cantly, it was a case in which a 
party was conducting a pro se cross-examination.149
Although judges may have been given the power to curtail cross-
examination, they remained chary of exercising it, particularly when the 
questions were posed by leaders of the bar. In December 1891, the weak-
ness of the judicial reed was made abundantly clear in two cases: the 
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 Russell divorce case and the so-called Pearl case. In these two cases, cross-
 examinations to character were conducted in a fashion that generated out-
bursts of public indignation. In 1891, the young wife of John Francis Stan-
ley, the Second Earl Russell, petitioned for judicial separation from him 
on the grounds of cruelty. This was the second earl’s fi rst wife; he would 
subsequently  acquire (and lose) two others, becoming along the way a fer-
vent activist in the campaign for reform of England’s divorce law.150 The 
fi rst Lady Russell was Mabel Edith Scott, whom Lord Russell wed after 
becoming infatuated with her mother, a beautiful widow. Mabel and John 
Francis, commonly known as Frank, were married on 6 February 1890 and 
separated a short fi ve months later, in June 1890. Mabel’s case came to trial 
in December 1891.151
Lady Russell alleged numerous acts of cruelty. She said that the earl 
had forced her to stay up until two or three o’clock in the morning doing 
accounts, that he had insisted she see after a restroom used by both male 
and female servants, and that he had demanded she dress him before he 
went out to a formal event. In order to prove that his cruelty had damaged 
her health, Lady Russell enumerated a series of disputes during which her 
husband had grabbed her by her wrists, thrown her onto the carpet, and, 
once, caused her to bleed at the wrists where her bracelets had torn into 
her skin. After one incident, she came to consciousness naked and in pain 
on the fl oor. They fought about money and about whether she could meet 
with individuals who the earl felt were not suitable company. She said that 
he kept a pistol in their house, and threatened to use it. Nor was his cruelty 
limited to the human species: he had also behaved badly toward her cat 
by tossing it repeatedly toward the ceiling. As a result of these disputes, 
she feared by the summer of 1890 that her health would be permanently 
impaired if she remained with the earl.
Most sensationally, Lady Russell accused her husband of going 
upstairs on consecutive evenings, undressed, to spend several hours in a 
bedroom with a male guest from Oxford. Lady Russell’s accusation was 
incendiary because it resonated with Lord Russell’s mysterious expulsion 
from Oxford as an undergraduate, which involved allegations of an inap-
propriate friendship with the poet Lionel Johnson. During the trial, Lady 
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Russell testifi ed that it was only after she discussed the incident with sev-
eral of Russell’s relatives that she realized it was something “very grave.”152 
There was, however, a great deal of ambiguity about the status of her ac-
cusation. Her own barrister pointedly remarked that the charge had been 
drawn from her only on cross-examination and had not been included in 
the petition. The judge hearing the case commented that her barrister, So-
licitor General Sir Edward Clarke, argued as if “he would rather have had 
nothing to do with this part of the case.”153 During the presentation of Lady 
Russell’s case, Clarke remarked that he was not going to make the serious 
accusation implied in her story.
Russell’s defense painted his wife as a fi scally irresponsible woman 
who came into the marriage burdened with debt and who suffered from 
nervous complaints. The only motive for the suit was, they argued, a bid 
for an allowance. Lord Russell testifi ed that Lady Russell was, according to 
him, a young woman who was used to having her own way and that he had 
to “exercise some restraint very early in the married life.”154 He was fond 
of cats and had never been cruel to any of them. He may have asked Lady 
Russell to look into bathroom supplies, but they were for a different bath-
room that the servants did not enter. As for the incident in which she awoke 
naked on the fl oor, it was because she had fainted and he had attempted to 
revive her, removed her wet nightdress, and wrapped her in a comforter.
Clarke cross-examined Lord Russell. In the course of discussing a 
letter from Lady Russell requesting that the earl not rehire a servant, Clarke 
managed to plunge the case still deeper into controversy. Russell was forced 
to explain that he had previously engaged as servants a family called Wil-
liams. He had seduced the eldest daughter, Kate, about four years ago and 
remained intimate with her until just before his engagement to Lady Rus-
sell. Russell had arranged to pay one pound a week to Kate’s mother, but 
she nonetheless brought a breach of promise suit that had been settled for 
fi ve hundred pounds. In his reexamination, Russell testifi ed that he had 
told both Lady Russell and her mother of this affair before the marriage. 
The following day, Russell commented that the story of his affair with Kate 
Williams had not been known publicly until this trial, a theme that Charles 
Russell, the earl’s counsel, returned to with great zeal during his closing 
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argument. Kate Williams, he said, had been earning her own livelihood 
and “had been able to hold up her head in the eyes of the world; but for the 
base purpose of endeavouring to still further prejudice Lord Russell in the 
eyes of the [ jury, Lady Russell] had not hesitated to sacrifi ce ruthlessly the 
happiness of one of her own sex.”155
Lord Russell’s plight seemed to touch a popular chord. When he was 
cross-examined about his history at Oxford, “there was applause in the 
Court, notwithstanding the protests of the learned Judge.”156 The Presi-
dent, in a summing-up that tended to stress the tenuousness of Lady Rus-
sell’s case, condemned the questions regarding Kate Williams in a thinly 
veiled criticism of Lady Russell: “he could not help thinking that whoever 
had instructed the Solicitor-General to put these circumstances before the 
jury was actuated by nothing but malice.” Similarly, the incident at Oxford 
seemed to have no purpose except “making the jury believe that he was a 
young man addicted to such practices as were suggested.” Yet he called 
Clarke “far too honourable” to make such a charge and praised Charles 
Russell for zealous service on his client’s behalf in cross-examining Lady 
Russell.157 The jury retired for little more than half an hour and quickly 
returned to announce that they agreed Lord Russell had not been guilty of 
cruelty toward his wife. As a result, the unhappy couple remained married 
to one another.
Less than a fortnight after the conclusion of the Russell divorce case, 
many of the same legal luminaries returned to court in a slander case, Os-
borne v. Hargreave & Wife. Charles Russell appeared for the plaintiff, 
Mrs. Osborne, a recently married young woman who had been known un-
der her maiden name, Ethel Elliot, at the time of the events in question; Ed-
ward Clarke appeared for the defendants, Major George Hargreave and his 
wife Georgiana, who was a distant relation of Mrs. Osborne’s.158 The Os-
borne case was commonly known as the “Pearl case” after the missing pearl 
and diamond earrings—with pearls as “large as fi lberts”—whose secret 
travels lay at the heart of the dispute.159 Russell deemed it a case “fraught 
with mystery,” but its widespread public appeal may have had more to do 
with the unusual spectacle of a slander action between two respectable so-
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ciety ladies regarding an accusation that one had stolen the other’s jewels 
while visiting her house.160
Miss Elliot had visited Mrs. Hargreave in Torquay in February 1891. 
The two women were second cousins but had only recently resumed con-
tact after an estrangement of some years (the reason for the estrangement 
was never fully explained in the course of the trial). Major Hargreave, 
meanwhile, had recently left for an extended trip to Aix-en-Provence 
for health reasons. The two women enjoyed a visit of more than a week; 
Mrs. Hargreave expressed admiration for Miss Elliot’s hat, which Miss El-
liot promptly gave to her, and the two had photographs taken. Miss Elliot 
returned to her London home on February 18 to make arrangements for her 
April wedding. On February 19 a young woman claiming to be Alice Price 
sold Mrs. Hargreave’s diamond and pearl earrings to a London jeweler for 
£550. Miss Price fi rst gave a Hyde Park address, but when the jeweler no-
ticed that no one named Price lived at that address, she said she was visit-
ing from Yorkshire. On February 23, the same young woman returned to 
the jeweler to change the check she had received on the 19th to one payable 
to cash.
Back in Torquay, Mrs. Hargreave noticed that her earrings were miss-
ing from their secret cabinet after Miss Elliot’s departure. The earrings, 
which Mrs. Hargreave had inherited from her grandmother, had been kept 
in a specially designed escritoire with a secret compartment that Mrs. Har-
greave had demonstrated to Miss Elliot during her visit. Police in Torquay 
were notifi ed, and the Hargreave’s house was searched several times, with 
the assistance of a friend of the family, Mr. Engelhart. Major Hargreave re-
turned briefl y from Aix on March 1 but went back there on March 4. As 
the search progressed, suspicion fell on Miss Elliot. On March 9, Mr. En-
gelhart took the photos of Miss Elliot to London where the jeweler and 
several of his assistants identifi ed her as the young woman who had sold 
them the jewels. Mr. Engelhart went to Miss Elliot’s brother with his sus-
picions, and the two of them, together with Miss Elliot and her elder sister, 
returned to the jewelers. There, Miss Elliot was once again identifi ed as the 
young woman in question, both by the jewelers and by the bank clerk who 
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had cased the check on February 23. The witnesses, however, differed sig-
nifi cantly in their recollections of the young woman’s attire. Subsequently, 
the Hargreaves successfully sued the jewelers for return of their earrings, 
but rather than prosecuting the recently married Mrs. Osborne, they de-
manded a written confession from her.161 She refused, and sued them for 
slander instead.
Mrs. Osborne’s slander suit provided a full measure of drama. In her 
testimony, she claimed that Mrs. Hargreave had complained about Major 
Hargreave and that the Hargreaves and their friend Engelhart were hard 
up. Mrs. Osborne’s sister recounted an incident in which Major Hargreave 
said that he would commit any crime for money, and her brother insinuated 
that the major had probably taken the jewels himself. When Major Har-
greave took the stand, Charles Russell questioned him repeatedly about 
his trips to Aix: what illness, precisely, was he receiving treatment for? The 
major responded that it was a combination of general poor health, a recent 
bad fall, and the recurrence of an illness he had contracted in India. Rus-
sell pressed for a more specifi c description of the nature of this recurring 
illness; the major said it was blood-poisoning, and Russell skeptically com-
mented that he had not known blood poisoning could recur over a period 
of twenty-one years. The exotic origin of the illness, its persistence, and the 
major’s decision to seek treatment in France allowed Russell to imply that 
the major suffered from venereal disease.
Before the defense testimony was complete, however, the trial came 
to a sudden and curious halt. It was adjourned after Justice Denman re-
ceived a letter from a fi rm of tailors informing him that they had been vis-
ited by a woman matching Mrs. Osborne’s description who had asked 
them to change a large quantity of gold into notes. Subsequent investiga-
tion revealed that one of those notes had been signed by Mrs. Osborne. 
When the trial reconvened, Charles Russell and the rest of Mrs. Osborne’s 
legal team informed the court that they could no longer appear as her coun-
sel. Moreover, Russell expressed their regret “that we have in any sense 
been the medium of conveying” imputations against Major Hargreave and 
Mr. Engelhart. Edward Clarke, for his part, said that Russell “only did 
his duty in acting upon instructions he had no reason to doubt.” Finally, 
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Justice Denman—in a fi t of ill-judged enthusiasm—announced that the 
case had been “nobly conducted throughout”: “I do not think that any hu-
man being can impute the slightest blame to any one engaged in it. On the 
contrary,  everybody who is acquainted with the working of our law must 
feel the highest honour and respect for the counsel who have conducted 
the case.”162
The conclusion of the Pearl case was met with widespread consterna-
tion. The Times greeted the news by lamenting that young ladies moving 
in good society might not be what they seemed: “we are confronted with 
possibilities of evil under the most plausible exterior which are at least as 
appalling as any rapidity of descent from integrity.”163 But Mrs. Osborne’s 
legal travails were not over by any means. Within a week an arrest warrant 
was issued for her, describing her appearance as “rather Jewish,” but she 
had already fl ed to the Continent.164 In February 1892, Mrs. Osborne sur-
rendered to the public prosecutor to stand trial for theft and perjury.165 
After she pleaded guilty in March 1892, the Hargreaves; her husband, Cap-
tain Osborne; and her reconstituted legal team, headed again by Charles 
Russell, argued for leniency, contending that her behavior had been caused 
by “hysteria” and that she had undoubtedly brought the slander case with-
out understanding its consequences. He played on a Victorian tendency to 
explain “bad” behavior by “good” women by assuming that such conduct 
must be indicative of madness, particularly madness caused by physical 
instability, such as pregnancy or childbirth.166 Despite a recent pregnancy, 
Mrs. Osborne was sentenced to nine months’ hard labor, much to the 
shock of her friends and relations. Meanwhile, the Hargreaves benefi ted 
from the notoriety of the trial by selling their jewels at auction for more than 
a thousand pounds.
The Hargreaves, Elliots, and Osbornes mounted a campaign for 
clemency, citing Mrs. Osborne’s history of hysteria and her recent preg-
nancy. The idea of a “respectable” young woman— even one who had 
admitted to theft, perjury, and slander—facing such a sentence struck an 
empathetic chord among the reading public. Woman magazine called for 
the “strong arm of the law” to be relaxed in her case, arguing that her public 
humiliation amounted to punishment “quite as much as that of a woman 
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in a  humble position of life sentenced to a term of imprisonment.” Mrs. Os-
borne’s criminal acts were reframed as gestures of marital love: “for the 
sake of [her husband’s love] she had faced judge, jury, and counsel in the 
forlorn hope of winning her action, and convincing her husband of her in-
nocence.”167 A public appeal for mercy on her behalf was signed by leaders 
of the British medical profession. In the end, Mrs. Osborne served less 
than two months of her sentence: she was released in April 1892.
Public attention remained focused, however, on the conduct of the 
trial, and in particular the role cross-examination had played in it. The 
Times’s editorial question as to how this trial could be deemed to have 
been “conducted ‘nobly’ ” struck a nerve.168 It immediately provoked an 
outpouring of correspondence on the license of counsel with regard to 
cross-examination. Dozens of correspondents wrote to the Times, while 
the legal professional press carried on its own debate. Even humorists en-
tered the fray. Edward Manson published a satirical piece titled “Cross-
 Examination: A Socratic Fragment” in which Socrates and his interlocutor 
progress from an initial assertion that “the object of cross-examining wit-
nesses is to elicit the truth” to a conclusion that “the special excellence of 
the advocate is to advertise himself and make himself popular with solici-
tors” because “law is in the nature of a cock-fi ght, and that the litigant who 
wishes to succeed must try and get an advocate who is a game bird with the 
best pluck and the sharpest spurs.”169
Trollope’s rhetoric of cruelty dominated the discussion. One writer 
called the courts “the torture chambers of the end of the 19th century.”170 
Another compared cross-examination to blood sports, perhaps alluding to 
barrister Henry Hawkins’s notorious fondness for Sunday dog and bad-
ger fi ghts:171 “We have put down prize-fi ghting, bull-baiting, and badger-
drawing. It is high time we should put down Chaffi nbrass [sic], and with 
him witness browbeating, the last surviving of these ‘noble’ sports.”172 The 
Times used the language of torture in an editorial exploring the statement, 
“The discretion of counsel is practically the only security against the trans-
formation of a Court of law into a torture chamber, and this security is rap-
idly disappearing.”173
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Why did nineteenth-century critics turn so readily to the language of 
torture and cruelty? One answer may lie in the fear of status degradation. 
James Whitman’s account of heightened revulsion concerning degradation 
in the nineteenth century is echoed in English concerns about the conduct 
of late Victorian trials.174 Punishment involved status degradation, particu-
larly in Europe, where there was a recent history of differentiation between 
high- and low-status forms of punishment. In England, the demarcation 
between high and low punishment was not as clear, but cross-examination 
to character and prior history threatened high-status witnesses with severe 
reputational costs. Degrading cross-examination transferred the norms 
of the Old Bailey, where most defendants and many witnesses were lower 
class, to the higher-status realm of civil litigation. In the witness box, a lord, 
a lady, or even the Prince of Wales could be reduced to the same ignominy 
as the rude criminal defendant.175
Other critics focused on the practical consequences of unrestricted 
cross-examination: anxiety that a zealous barrister’s questions might lead 
witnesses to refuse to testify and make justly wronged plaintiffs reluctant 
to bring cases for fear that unrelated past embarrassments might be “raked 
up.” One fi rm of solicitors reported that a preeminent engineer who fre-
quently testifi ed as an expert witness raised his fees to a “prohibitive” level 
upon discovering that Charles Russell would be representing the other 
side.176 One “J.H.P.” wrote to say that, although he had been defrauded by 
his broker, he would not prosecute because he feared that the broker would 
employ “forensic bullies” and “his defense would, no doubt, be ‘nobly’ 
conducted.”177 Several correspondents noted that “commercial men” no 
longer brought their disputes into court for fear of degrading treatment.178 
An “Equity QC” took the occasion to tout the superiority of the equity 
bar: “I do not remember to have ever heard a question asked by any mem-
ber of the Equity Bar which could be considered even by the most morbid 
sensitiveness as unfairly put for the purpose merely of terrifying or infl ict-
ing pain.”179
Many correspondents wondered why judges did not intervene. 
They speculated that judges had often been “smart cross-examiners 
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 themselves”180 or that they were “too habituated to the present mode of 
cross-examination to perceive its abuses and protect witnesses from 
them.”181 “Counsel” argued that judges failed to check the abuse of cross-
examination “through timidity, and the natural desire to shun a passage 
of arms with the big bullies of the Courts.”182 The Law Times criticized 
Isaac Butt and Denman for commending “where everyone condemned” 
and opined that “none of our judges appear to be strong enough to stop in 
mid career the leading advocates at Nisi Prius.”183 The Solicitors’ Journal 
concurred, noting that the checking of abusive cross-examination “ought 
not to be left solely in the hands of the judges.”184
A number of correspondents suggested vigorous application of the 
rule of court against vexatious cross-examinations. The Law Journal be-
lieved that the rule had never been invoked since its adoption in 1883.185 
The Solicitors’ Journal called for a formal defi nition of “vexatious” that 
would give force to the rule, which was otherwise a dead letter, but it also 
cautioned that stopping cross-examination is a “matter of extreme diffi -
culty” and that longstanding practice permitted “the greatest latitude.”186 
The Law Journal suggested that a similar provision against vexatious ques-
tioning be incorporated in the Divorce Court rules.187 Other correspon-
dents urged, as Stephen had before, turning to India or to the armed forces 
for a new model. W. T. Dooner of the Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers wrote to 
suggest that civil courts “might do worse than follow the procedure which 
is adopted . . . in courts-martial” whereby judges are required to determine 
that questions would “seriously affect their opinion as to the credibility of 
the witness” before requiring a witness to answer.188
Baron Bramwell, writing from the standpoint of forty-seven years of 
practice, served as the voice of the legal profession at its most unrepentant. 
He declared that he believed Charles Russell’s improbable posttrial asser-
tion that “he did not know that Aix was resorted to for such affections [sic] 
as suggested.” Bramwell dismissed the accusations against the bar, stating 
that he did not know of any counsel notorious for bullying. Instead, he 
argued that the barrister stood in the client’s shoes and was obligated to 
exercise all the rights that belonged to the client; therefore, he had the right 
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to conduct any cross-examination that bore upon a witness’s intelligence 
or honesty. Any roughness that might result was justifi ed by the outcome: 
“Let us judge by the result. By our system is not truth got at, is not justice 
done? I say yes confi dently.”189
Others agreed that cross-examination was necessary and placed the 
blame on recalcitrant witnesses and unscrupulous solicitors. “R.A.M.” 
found it necessary not only against the perjurer and the fraudulent crimi-
nal, but also against a far larger class of “conceited and self-satisfi ed wit-
nesses, whose inaccuracy of observation, weakness of memory, bias, and 
prejudice can be exposed by cross-examination and cross-examination 
alone.”190 Bruised witnesses, another writer suggested, should look to their 
own consciences:
No doubt some witnesses have a rough time of it, but they gen-
erally have only themselves to blame. If they are truthful, frank, 
and intelligent, the most powerful cross-examiner is powerless. 
[But many witnesses are] willful liars; more are gross exaggera-
tors and prevaricators, and others are over-zealous partisans. It 
is the task of the cross-examiner not merely to get evidence out 
of the witness, but to show what manner of man he is. And fre-
quently the sole method of doing this is by means of questions 
on apparently immaterial points.191
“A Good Witness” agreed: “Thirty years’ experience in courts of law has 
convinced me . . . that men and women are so prone to espouse the cause of 
the side upon which they are ‘called’ that they require, as a rule, to be well 
‘shaken up’ in order to bring their minds back to the proper balance.”192
The defenders of cross-examination would concede to only lim-
ited prophylactic measures. Barristers needed to be more careful in their 
evaluation of their clients’ accusations: “to examine upon a speculative 
hypothesis, upon the chance that the witness may admit something to his 
prejudice, is, we think, a most reprehensible practice.”193 At the same time, 
however, Baron Bramwell criticized the suggestion that a barrister should 
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second-guess his client: “Counsel . . . I do not say is blindly to think his 
client is right, but I do say he is to think he may be right till it is shown he 
is not.”194
Little changed as a result of the controversy caused by the Russell 
and Pearl cases, but the heightened emotions revealed the intimate link 
between cross-examination and the barrister’s identity as a gentleman. “A 
Barrister of Twelve Years’ Standing” touched off an outcry by challeng-
ing the gentility of the bar. He asserted sardonically that “barristers are, of 
course, all gentlemen before they become barristers. They change rapidly 
afterwards.”195 In a subsequent letter, he deplored the way “conduct which, 
if in man who was a gentleman and not a barrister would be considered 
disgraceful, in a barrister is not only passed over but is called ‘noble’ by a 
kindly Judge, and excused by the whole profession.”196 More readers re-
sponded to this letter than any other. A barrister of “nearly 24 years’ stand-
ing” proclaimed, “The truth is that if a man is a gentleman he cannot cease 
to be one, and such a man is as incapable of a ‘brutal’ cross-examination as 
he is of any other ungentlemanly conduct.”197 The Law Journal brought 
the topic of abusive cross-examination back to the playing fi elds, declaring 
that it “savours rather of terrorism than fairplay.”198 Moreover, professional 
identity both conferred and ensured gentility: “To charge Sir Charles Rus-
sell or Sir Edward Clarke with such a wicked misuse of their power is about 
as ludicrous as it would be to charge Sir James Paget with using a surgical 
instrument merely to infl ict pain.”199
The question of the barrister’s role as a gentleman brings us back 
to the cases that ignited the correspondence in the Times. Both trials fea-
tured young female litigants using barristers to advance accusations of seri-
ous sexual misconduct against respectable men. In Lord Russell’s case, it 
was homosexuality, and in the Pearl case, it was the coded accusation that 
Major Hargreave suffered from a venereal disease, indicating that he had 
had contact with prostitutes. In both cases barristers took refuge behind 
their instructions, even though the plaintiffs’ cases were tenuous at best. 
The outrage, therefore, also conveys a criticism that the barristers had de-
parted from their specifi cally masculine role as gentlemen. The Law Jour-
nal called on barristers to fulfi ll their role as the “sterner sex,” employing 
Y6746.indb   94 7/2/15   2:40:33 PM
The Gentlemanly Art of Cross-examination 95
a “chivalrous sense of duty.”200 Lord Russell saw his case as a battle of the 
sexes for control of the forensic arena. After the divorce case, Russell wrote 
his friend George Santayana, proclaiming that the verdict showed “men in 
general that women should not have all their own way in law courts.”201
Many participants in these controversies took pains to emphasize the 
broader principle that the barristers should have at least enough autonomy 
from their clients and instructing solicitors to reject potentially degrading 
lines of inquiry. Baron Herschell declared that “this conception of inde-
pendence of the advocate . . . is of vital importance. If it were lost sight 
of, and counsel were to become the mere creature of the party who had 
engaged his service, the profession of advocacy would be a source of public 
danger.”202 It required the advocate “never to yield to the solicitations of 
a client, however pressing, to blacken the character of an adverse witness 
by a line of questioning which his own judgment condemns.”203 Richard 
Harris agreed, opining that in cross-examination to credit “the greatest 
mistake an advocate can make is to let his client dictate to him the mode in 
which his case is to be conducted.”204 Nor should counsel succumb to the 
equally dangerous desire to please instructing solicitors by following their 
suggested lines of inquiry. Such admonitions were more than a little self-
serving in their suggestion that abusive cross-examination had its origins 
in either the client or the solicitor’s fl awed judgment. But they did serve to 
couple zealous advocacy with a duty of restraint. Barristers justifi ed the 
latitude they claimed for themselves in cross-examination by taking on a 
new responsibility for policing the boundaries of reasonable inquiry.
The New Rules of Embarrassment
Barristers’ conduct in cases like the Russell divorce or the Pearl suit 
was made possible by a shift in the rules of evidence relating to cross-
 examination. Increasingly, barristers were allowed more latitude when 
cross-examining on subjects that tended to degrade witnesses without 
subjecting them to criminal liability. Where previously the law had enter-
tained some ambiguity as to either whether such questions could be put or 
whether a witness could be compelled to answer them, the last  quarter of 
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the  nineteenth century saw the emergence of a consensus that such ques-
tions were permissible, although most commentators were unwilling to go 
so far as to say that witnesses could be compelled to answer them.205 At 
one level, this absence of solicitude for a witness’s public character is puz-
zling. Reputation, as many cultural historians have noted, was crucially 
important in late nineteenth-century Britain. Chief Baron Frederick Pol-
lock, for example, was reported to have burst into tears when an apparently 
respectable witness was forced to admit to “a conviction years gone by.”206 
The resolution to this apparent paradox lies in the redefi nition of cross-
 examination as a gentlemanly art— one governed and limited by the bar-
rister’s own honor and moral sense.
During the early decades of the nineteenth century, legal authorities 
debated the existence of a privilege protecting witnesses from questions 
that tended to damage their reputations. Thomas Starkie, for example, 
wrote that “it has been held that a witness is not bound to answer any ques-
tion which tends to render him infamous, or even to disgrace him,” but 
he questioned the extent of the privilege.207 Samuel Phillipps commented 
that opinion was divided on the question. Although at least two cases held 
that “a question, the object of which is to degrade the witness’s charac-
ter, cannot properly be asked,” Phillipps noted that one of the authors of 
these opinions countenanced similar questions in his courtroom in other 
cases.208 Other treatise writers found the privilege uncertain. Andrew 
Amos, in his 1838 edition of Phillipps’s A Treatise on the Law of Evidence, 
doubted the continuing validity of some earlier precedent suggesting that 
even putting such questions would be illegal, but thought it more likely 
that a witness could refuse to answer such a question: “there seems to be 
no reported case, in which this point has been solemnly determined; and in 
the absence of all express authority, opinions have been much divided.”209 
By the 1850s, the window of uncertainty had narrowed. While debating 
the Common Law Procedure Act in 1853, Lord Brougham commented that 
judicial opinion was divided as to whether a witness was protected from an-
swering questions “which did not tend to implicate him in the confession 
of any offence, which did not expose him to the risk of any indictment, but 
which only went to disgrace and degrade him.” In Brougham’s opinion, the 
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privilege did not extend that far.210 John Pitt Taylor questioned the weight 
of “older dicta” indicating that a witness was not bound to answer an im-
material and degrading question: “the privilege, if it still exists, is certainly 
much discountenanced in the practice of modern times.”211
This era of ambiguity drew to a close with the Tichborne trials. After 
the ruling on the Bellew testimony in the fi rst Tichborne trial, Stephen, 
writing semianonymously in the Pall Mall Gazette, declared, “It appeared 
to be the law of England that if a witness is called to testify in any court of 
justice upon any subject whatever his opponent has a legal right to ask him 
any question whatever as to any incident in his past life, the existence of 
which would in any degree affect [his credit].”212 The 1877 edition of Wil-
liam Russell’s A Treatise on Crimes and Misdemeanors doubted whether a 
witness could refuse to answer a question tending “merely to disgrace and 
degrade him.”213 The legal periodical press, meanwhile, took the question 
as defi nitively settled by the Tichborne case: counsel could ask any ques-
tion of a witness, no matter how embarrassing, if it had the potential to 
degrade the witness’s credibility.214
What had previously been seen as a form of abuse increasingly came 
to seem like acceptable practice if the case at hand justifi ed it in the barris-
ter’s estimation. Once this change occurred, commentators suggested that 
abuses of cross-examination could be stemmed by greater attention to dis-
tinctions between “character” and “reputation” and between relevant and 
irrelevant inquiries. Ernest Bowen-Rowlands, for example, carefully delin-
eated the difference between character as general reputation and character 
as disposition in an 1895 article on character evidence.215 Other writers 
called for more stringent restrictions on impeaching a witness’s credibility 
on matters irrelevant to the issue at hand.216 Still other legal commentators 
sought to distinguish between previous noncriminal misconduct that actu-
ally bore on credibility from that which was peripheral or solely intended 
for embarrassment’s sake. The Law Journal complained that “when an at-
tempt is made to forge a link between what is called character and veracity, 
the main diffi culty lies in deciding what are and what are not proper materi-
als for the purpose. Into the inquiry a whole host of moral, social, even of 
religious problems are apt to thrust themselves—problems upon which the 
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greatest masters of casuistry might agree to differ.”217 Sexual misconduct in 
particular, it was argued, should not be taken as indicative of lack of cred-
ibility. The Law Journal thought that “because a man has for some cause 
or other separated from his wife and has committed adultery, it does not 
follow that he will be guilty of the crime of perjury.”218 Similarly, adulterous 
immigration to the United States, leaving behind a family, had no bearing 
on the credibility of witnesses testifying to the quality of wool yarn.219 In 
a later article, the Law Journal advised its readers that “it is much safer to 
proceed upon the principle that sexual immorality has no bearing at all on 
the credibility of the witness.”220 Despite the clarity of the principle, the 
trials of the 1890s provided ample demonstration that the temptations of 
sexual innuendo still proved irresistible for some counsel. Adultery proved 
fertile ground for cross-examination as to credit both inside and outside the 
Divorce Court, as will be discussed in chapters 4 and 5.
The problem was that “the line is hard for any one but the cross-
 examining counsel himself to draw; and that the matter must chiefl y be 
left to his honour and discretion.”221 The Solicitors’ Journal thought the 
“practice of the English bench is, with few exceptions, not to check any 
question, however painful to the witness, but to leave the matter to the 
honour and discretion of the Bar.” The bar’s honor and discretion were, 
in turn, insulated from scrutiny because “the advocate knows what is in 
his brief; the judge and public do not.”222 Moreover, the barrister was also 
protected by his lack of knowledge of the other side’s case: “The most scru-
pulously honourable and fair practitioner cannot know with certainty that 
allegations of which prima facie evidence appears are unfounded when the 
rebutting evidence is in the possession of the other side.”223
Instead of rules and precedent, then, control of cross-examination 
was largely reliant on the artistic instincts of the barrister, as tempered by 
his sense of honor as a professional man. The Law Journal waxed lyrical 
on this subject, presenting cross-examination as both aesthetic and moral: 
“Cross-examination constitutes the fi ne art department of the profession 
of counsel. . . . Like painting, sculpture, poetry and music, it commands 
a multitude of critics, but boasts a limited number of experts.” Given the 
intuitive nature of the activity, cross-examination was best governed by 
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the individual counsel’s conscience. While the extent of cross-examination 
permitted at law inevitably encompassed the potential for abuse, “there are 
many extreme rights which no sane man enforces.” Instead, the Law Jour-
nal placed its reliance on the lawyer’s self-restraint: “counsel is bound in 
honour and out of respect to himself and his profession to consider whether 
the question ought to be put, not whether his client would like it to be 
put.”224 As the Law Journal saw it, then, barristers were to be trusted with 
the reputations and honor of others, because their own honor as gentlemen 
was unquestioned. The construction of this notion of gentlemanly restraint, 
and its paradoxical-seeming reconciliation with the sometimes decidedly 
aggressive exigencies of cross-examination, complicates the usual assump-
tion that the triumph of the adversarial model was an unqualifi ed one.
By the end of the nineteenth century, cross-examination had emerged 
as the main engine of truth in traditional common-law trial contexts. There 
were, however, situations in which cross-examination was still thought to 
be inadequate to the challenge of ascertaining truth. In both the colonial 
courts in India and the new Divorce Court in London, the impetus toward 
mendacity was thought to be too strong for even cross-examination to 
counter it. We now turn to the Victorian experimentation with innovative 
sanctions against deceit in these two novel circumstances.
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chapter  three
Perjury and Prevarication in British India
i n  1 8 5 8 ,  t h e  g o v e r n o r  g e n e r a l  o f  i n d i a ,   Charles 
Canning, passed on a remarkable petition to the Court of Directors of the 
East India Company in London. The petition was from Ishri Pershad, de-
scribed by Canning as a “native of respectability” in the city of Allahabad.1 
Writing in the aftermath of the Indian Rebellion of 1857–58 that had sorely 
challenged British rule, Pershad had a simple message for the British gov-
ernment of the North Western Provinces in India: I told you so. Pershad 
reminded the government that in 1856, before the outbreak of the rebel-
lion, he had proposed a scheme of governance. If only they had listened 
to him, Pershad wrote, “the mutinies of some 40 or 50 regiments would 
never have occurred.”2 Pershad’s scheme was a curious one: he advised 
that sweepers, the so-called untouchables who could pollute higher-caste 
Hindus through even slight contact, be specially attached to each criminal 
court. These sweepers would be employed to spit into the mouths of na-
tives convicted of perjury, thereby defi ling them. Those convicted of per-
jury and defi led could then be converted to Christianity and employed as a 
regiment to defend Allahabad.
The British never seriously considered Pershad’s suggestions; Can-
ning forwarded his petition to London merely as evidence of popular belief 
among inhabitants of the North Western Provinces that the British sought 
widespread conversions. The Court of Directors, for their part, noted that 
Pershad “wish[ed] to recommend himself to the authorities and to obtain 
preferment for himself and his brother” and urged the government in India 
to “strictly abstain from all measures” that might support the belief that 
the British wished to force Indians to become Christians.3 But Pershad’s 
letter is evocative nonetheless. His linkage of effective control of perjury to 
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 colonial governance uncovers the complicated consequences of an ideol-
ogy of colonialism based on the rule of law.
Pershad did not hit on perjury by accident. Perjury loomed large in 
the colonial imagination because of the British conviction of its prevalence. 
British administrators in India tended to see most, if not all, witnesses as 
likely perjurers. Pershad appears to have known this; certainly, he seems to 
have thought that the British would accept his assumption that the ranks of 
perjurers were numerous enough to provide a credible defense for a large 
city like Allahabad. In part because of their unshakeable belief that perjury 
was rampant in India, British administrators returned repeatedly to the 
question of identifying, regulating, and punishing lies and liars. Pershad 
might be forgiven for thinking that his suggestion would simply have been 
the latest in a long series of related legal innovations.
Nor, for that matter, was Pershad’s solution as far out of line as it ini-
tially seems. In proposing a quasi-religious sanction— defi ling contact with 
a sweeper—the proposal combined two other themes that characterized 
British attempts to combat perjury under the East India Company’s rule. 
First, Pershad’s suggestion employed shame as a crucial tool of governance. 
During the period when the Company formally controlled the Indian le-
gal system, which lasted until the Indian Rebellion, the British sought a 
sanction or form of oath that would mobilize community sentiment against 
perjury. They identifi ed lack of ignominy as a key reason why their efforts 
against perjury appeared to fail and tried to develop ways of cultivating the 
revulsion they felt was missing. Pershad would have been familiar with other 
British attempts to inculcate shame, such as tattooing offenders’ foreheads 
or forcing them to blacken their face and ride backwards on an ass; in this 
context, his suggestion looks rather less bizarre. Second, Pershad’s framing 
of his punishment within a religious context—in this case Hinduism—is 
consonant with the British history of placing their criminal law in India 
within indigenous religious traditions. The British radically transformed 
the Islamic law of perjury, ostensibly the law that they administered, while 
maintaining at least the façade of continuity with Islamic tradition. Finally, 
Pershad’s linkage of a criminal offense with military defense suggests that 
forensic deceit was a question of order as much as it was of law.
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This chapter explores the process by which the British redefi ned 
perjury in response to the perceived exigencies of colonial rule. British 
legislative efforts in India stand in stark contrast to the history of law re-
form in England, where little redefi nition of the substantive law occurred 
during the same period. British legislative creativity in the subcontinent 
was driven by anxiety about the ability of British administrators to un-
cover the truth in disputes before them. Perjury justifi ed colonial rule by 
separating rulers from ruled—with the British convinced that they were 
honest and Indians were inherently mendacious—but it also complicated 
it by suggesting that colonial administrators were constantly at risk of being 
duped. Perjury’s contradictions crossed the boundaries between substan-
tive and procedural law, challenging both the defi nition of the crime and 
the legitimacy of the judicial system in British India. The tension between 
these contradictory aspects of the ideology of the rule of law forced ad-
ministrators to revisit the question of perjury constantly, searching for a 
solution to a dilemma created, in large part, by the very nature of colonial-
ism. British interest in redefi ning perjury took multiple forms. The British 
were not only concerned with the evidentiary requirements of the crime 
and its punishment; they also sought to develop an analogous offense—
prevarication—that would strengthen their control over the colonial legal 
process without extensive investigation into underlying facts or the intent 
of the accused. We trace this process through two broad phases: fi rst, a 
period of innovation that lasted until the early 1830s, and second, a period 
of retrenchment and Anglicization between the Charter Act of 1833 and the 
Indian Evidence Act of 1872. These efforts to develop novel strategies for 
the production of truth in the courtroom generated unexpected problems 
and contradictions that cast the development of common-law trial practice 
in a new light.
Perjury and the Colonial Project
Perjury had a special role to play in maintaining the legitimacy of the le-
gal system in India. Belief in widespread perjury challenged administrators’ 
and spectators’ confi dence in the validity of judicial decisions;  combatting 
Y6746.indb   105 7/2/15   2:40:33 PM
106 Experimentation Abroad and at Home
perjury, therefore, was crucial to maintaining colonial rule. Many imperial-
ists have advanced the rule of law as one of the central rationales for colonial 
rule.4 As Peter Fitzpatrick writes, “law was a prime justifi cation and instru-
ment of imperialism.”5 With specifi c reference to India, Thomas Metcalf 
similarly argues that “in place of a religious faith shared with its subject, the 
British colonial state . . . found its legitimacy in a moralization of ‘law.’ ”6 
Examining the struggle over perjury in the British administration of India 
highlights profound anxieties and contradictions in the use of the rule of 
law as a sustaining ideology of colonial rule. It can therefore contribute to 
the growing interest in looking at contradictions and confl icts within the 
colonial project. Scholars such as Martin Chanock have pointed to the ten-
sions caused by embedding the universality promised in the rhetoric of the 
rule of law within a framework of colonial difference.7 But these tensions 
should not be seen as limited to the colonial setting: the rhetoric of legal 
equality in the metropole was both undergirded and in some ways contra-
dicted by a notion of police power that drew upon profound distinctions 
between the ruler and the ruled, between the head of the family writ large 
and the subordinate members of his household.8
British notions of the prevalence of perjury in India paradoxically 
served both to destabilize and to sustain faith in the rule of law as colo-
nial justifi cation. For those closest to the administration of law in India—
the magistrates and judges working for the East India Company—belief 
in the ubiquity of perjury caused them to doubt the practical benefi ts of 
the vaunted rule of law. Unsure of the veracity of much of the evidence 
that they relied on in their decisions, magistrates and judges questioned 
the justice of their judgments. A. Tufton, magistrate in Bahar, complained 
along these lines in 1801: “In short, to speak my mind without reserve, this 
crime is so common and audacious, that it has excited in me the most com-
plete scepticism with respect to all evidence which is offered, and I seldom 
pass a judgment, without having cause to doubt if I have not been imposed 
upon.”9 For the lawgivers, the rule of law was a hopeful pretense, cover-
ing up the awkward reality of justice based on guesswork. In John Coma-
roff ’s apt description, the search for truth in British Indian courtrooms was 
one of the “disarticulated, semicoherent, ineffi cient strivings for modes of 
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rule that might work in unfamiliar, intermittently hostile places a long way 
from home.”10
Yet, at the same time, British ideas about perjury helped defl ect criti-
cism of the practical workings of the colonial state. Native perjury could ex-
plain why the rule of law seemed to bring little in the way of actual progress 
in its wake. In Metcalf ’s summary, “if Indians were people without moral 
principles, then inevitably they lied in court, pocketed bribes, and wilfully 
rejected the benefi ts of British justice.”11 As James Mill argued, Indian 
vices tended to “enfeeble the arm of justice” in British India.12 The Brit-
ish, as they saw it, brought the horse to water, but the Indians, habituated 
to perjury by centuries of despotic government, refused to drink. Perjury 
and prevarication, in the form of prosecutions and discourse regarding 
their prevalence, also sustained colonial ideology by providing a concrete 
location for and confi rmation of beliefs about native mendacity.13 Metcalf 
has pointed out that British ideology depended on the construction of po-
larities, among them “honesty” and “deceit,” with the British as paragons 
of the former and Indians as embodiments of the latter.14 As the previous 
chapters have shown, nineteenth-century jurists were hardly sanguine 
about witness veracity in the metropolitan courts. In India, however, this 
inconvenient fact disappeared: perjury prosecutions and discussion of the 
prevalence of perjury and prevarication ceaselessly created and re-created 
the imagined polarity between honest Britons and deceitful Indians, giving 
it the imprimatur of juridical truth. This differentiation echoed the treat-
ment of slaves in the United States: there, testimony by enslaved people 
was strictly limited, and degrading punishments for perjury, such as public 
whipping or pillorying, were adopted to combat what was seen as an in-
herent mendacity and irreligiosity.15 In both cases, the distinction between 
ruler and ruled justifi ed methods of control within the procedural structure 
of the courts that were directed at entire populations.
Perjury, moreover, speaks to the recent interest in understanding co-
lonialism as a system of production and control of knowledge. As Nicho-
las Dirks writes, “colonialism was made possible, and then sustained and 
strengthened, as much by cultural technologies of rule as it was by the 
more obvious and brutal modes of conquest that fi rst established power on 
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 foreign shores.”16 Bernard Cohn has identifi ed one of the most important 
of these “cultural technologies”: British colonialism’s assumption that so-
ciety could be represented as a series of facts and that administrative power 
stemmed from effi cient use of those facts. The British therefore needed to 
collect the facts, through what Cohn calls “investigative modalities.” These 
modalities took a variety of forms, from historiography and museology, 
surveys and the census, to sciences such as economics and ethnology.17 
Subsequent historians have pointed out that British production of knowl-
edge occurred on different levels of generality, from the broad-ranging ide-
ological constructions of James Mill or William Jones to what C. A. Bayly 
calls “the level of practical, ad hoc, ‘satisfi cing’ administration.”18
Perjury was a problem at the level of “satisfi cing” administration, and 
like other problems on this level, it has received little scholarly attention. 
When the British administration depended on native informants, there was 
almost inevitably fear of deceit.19 Anxiety about perjury and prevarication 
in courtroom testimony was yet another “knowledge panic” of the sort that 
periodically occurred in the British attempt to develop systematic knowl-
edge despite their dependence on the opaque “native” informant. Ap-
proaches to perjury and other types of deceit took a variety of forms during 
the period before the Indian Rebellion. Until the 1830s, British administra-
tors in India exhibited great inventiveness in defi ning and policing the twin 
offenses of perjury and prevarication. Between Thomas Macaulay’s arrival 
in 1833 and the passage of the Indian Penal Code in 1860, administrators 
continued to be concerned by the dangers posed by deceit, but the rate of 
innovation slowed. Finally, as we will see below, the question of Indian per-
jury reappeared in 1872 with James Fitzjames Stephen’s infl uential new In-
dian Evidence Act, which codifi ed practices in India and was subsequently 
proposed as a model for changes in Britain itself.
“A Liar You Are”
The British not only saw perjury everywhere, they also had an un-
precedented level of agreement among themselves as to its ubiquity. Britons 
of all political orientations and statuses in India saw perjury as a signifi cant 
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threat to colonial administration. Joachim Hayward Stocqueler, author of 
popular guidebooks on India, warned newcomers that the “prevalence of 
perjury among all classes of native witnesses” constituted one of the great-
est obstacles to the administration of justice.20 Phrasebooks also inculcated 
the expectation that Indians would lie. George Hadley’s A Compendious 
Grammar of the Current Corrupt Dialect of the Jargon of Hindostan taught 
its readers to declaim “a liar you are!” and “false news do not bring!” for the 
edifi cation of servants and sepoys.21
The idea that perjury was common because there was no community 
sanction against it had its roots in missionary attempts to discredit Hin-
duism. Although missionaries were not allowed to proselytize in British 
India until 1813, evangelical critiques of Indian religions dated back to the 
late eighteenth century, with Charles Grant’s condemnation of Hinduism. 
Missionaries were eager to dispute the Conservatives’ support for native 
beliefs by demonstrating that lying was a vice encouraged among Indians 
by religious ideas and community sentiment. As the missionary J. Statham 
wrote in 1832, “Lying is not considered a vice with them; but on the con-
trary, the man who can dissimulate most successfully is most applauded; 
and the greatest lies, so far from being considered as worthy of censure, are 
extolled.”22 Another missionary tied this affection for rule-breakers to the 
example set by Hindu gods, noting that “as most of these gods are thieves 
or liars, the practice of theft and falsehood among men, cannot be looked 
on, in a very serious light.”23 But the idea spread beyond missionary circles 
to become one of the most common British analyses of perjury: legisla-
tors, as we explore below, sought repeatedly to create community revulsion 
against perjury through manipulation of either the religious oath guaran-
teeing testimony or the punishment awarded to perjurers.
Those Britons who sought to maintain local traditions in India, 
meanwhile, turned the missionary analysis on its head. In their view, Brit-
ish education and institutions did not bring progress but instead had a de-
moralizing effect. The longer the British controlled Indian territory, they 
argued, the more prevalent perjury became. In 1844 William Sleeman, 
Commissioner for Thuggee and Dacoity, devoted an entire chapter of his 
memoirs to the question of Indian mendacity. He argued that honesty was 
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universal in India among the wildest hill tribes, because members of small 
communities depend on the veracity of others, but that experience with 
British rule quickly convinced Indians that the British judges and magis-
trates were incapable of detecting falsehood.24
These dissenters, however, were a small minority. As Metcalf notes, 
“the British saw deception and deceit everywhere in India.” He links this 
fear to colonial anxiety, a British sense of their own “inability to know and 
control their colonial subjects.”25 Because the anxiety stemmed from an 
inescapable condition of colonial rule, no amount of legislative reform or 
vigorous enforcement of the law could quiet it. Nonetheless, the British 
sought to do precisely that—to invent new laws and ways of enforcing them 
that would fi nally put to rest their own anxieties about perjury. As we will 
see, they pursued this largely futile quest with remarkable creativity.
Finding the Law
The British decided early on that they would govern India through 
local law. As a result, they had to discover that law, or be entirely dependent 
on their native law offi cers, the Hindu pandits and Islamic maulavi, kazis, 
and muftis. Bernard Cohn and J. D. M. Derrett record how the British at-
tempted to cement their power by imposing a rigid structure, particularly 
on Hindu law. This endeavor stemmed from their belief that the law could 
be made stable by locating and identifying the oldest exposition as the 
most authoritative. In short, the British sought to locate India’s “ancient 
constitution.”26
As the British assumed control of the criminal justice system in Ben-
gal in 1790, they confronted a law in which even the categories were alien to 
them. Crimes, they discovered, were divided in Islamic law by type of pun-
ishment: qisas (retaliation), diyut (blood money), hadd (fi xed punishment), 
and tazir or siyasa (discretionary or exemplary punishment). In some cases, 
moreover, control of prosecution remained in the hands of a victim’s family 
members. The crimes for which the punishment was fi xed—such as illicit 
intercourse, wine drinking, and robbery—were limited in number.27 Per-
jury was not among them. It was considered punishable by tazir, a category 
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of discretionary punishments that could include imprisonment, exile, cor-
poral punishment, reprimand, or humiliating treatment. The British saw 
Mughal administration of Islamic law, however, as at once too harsh and 
too lenient. Corporal punishments such as mutilation seemed too severe; 
by contrast, the actual punishments normally infl icted in cases of perjury 
struck British observers as too lenient. In the last years of Mughal crimi-
nal administration, British commentators observed, prisoners convicted 
of perjury had received “inadequate” sentences: they were released with-
out any punishment at all.28 The British, therefore, sought to work within 
the fl exibility provided by the amorphous category of tazir to ensure that 
perjury received consistent and stringent punishment. Among the possible 
forms of tazir applicable to perjury was tashhir, or exemplary punishment. 
The history of tashhir in Mughal India combined both Islamic and Hindu 
precedents.29 It was to become, as we see below, one of the favored British 
responses to the never-ending problem of perjury.
The fi rst English treatise on Islamic law, Charles Hamilton’s The 
Hedaya, published in 1791, provided the basic outlines of perjury’s po-
sition in Islamic law. The Hedaya declared that “a false witness must be 
stigmatized.”30 According to the Hanifi te authorities relied upon in The He-
daya, perjury should be punished with shaming, or tashhir. What exactly 
constituted shaming, however, was a matter of dispute. Public shaming, 
scourging, and imprisonment all had some form of precedential authority 
according to The Hedaya. The authorities cited in The Hedaya were silent 
on a number of other questions, including the defi nition of perjury and the 
standard of proof to be applied.
Hindu law proved even more elusive for British offi cials. In part be-
cause the Mughal government had enforced Islamic criminal law, the Brit-
ish found it diffi cult to determine the parameters of Hindu law on perjury. 
The earliest attempt to translate Hindu law was Nathaniel Halhed’s A Code 
of Gentoo Laws published in 1776. Halhed’s work was an English transla-
tion of a Persian translation of the work of a committee of eleven pandits 
assembled by the fi rst Governor General of Bengal, Warren Hastings, to 
compile a digest of Hindu law on various topics.31 In the words of one mod-
ern commentator, “The Hindu criminal law as presented in the ‘Gentoo 
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Code’ is full of impracticable and absurd direction which cannot represent 
any systematic practice.”32 Halhed’s section on the punishments for false 
evidence must have deeply puzzled English lawyers. “The crime of false 
witness,” he translated, “is the same as if a man had murdered a Brahmin, 
or had deprived a woman of life, or had assassinated his friend; or of one, 
who, in return for good, gives evil; or who, having learned a science or pro-
fession, gives his tutor no reward; or of a woman, who, having neither son, 
nor grandson, nor grandson’s son, after her husband’s death, celebrates not 
the seradeh [feast in honor of the dead] to his memory.”33 But from there, 
Halhed’s translation went on to detail the ways in which moral culpability 
changed in relation to the nature of the dispute. For example, false witness-
ing in a matter concerning a horse resulted in guilt “as great as the guilt of 
murdering one hundred persons” while that in a matter concerning gold 
resulted in guilt equivalent to that “incurred in murdering all the men who 
have been born, who shall be born in the world.”34 Despite these extrava-
gant declarations of culpability, Halhed’s text was strangely silent (to legal 
ears) about what, if any, punishment might be imposed in these cases.
These scholarly pursuits were, however, a matter of pressing con-
cern to British administrators as they sought to establish control over their 
new subjects. It seems likely that perjury under the Raj was an “everyday” 
form of resistance, defi ned by scholars as a “form . . . of struggle present 
in the behaviours and cultural practices of subordinated people at times 
other than overt revolt.”35 It would be surprising if there were not some 
elements of everyday resistance in the perjury cases that plagued British of-
fi cials in India. Similar anticolonial resistance has been described by John 
Rogers in colonial Sri Lanka, where popular support for the illegal activity 
of gambling led to what he calls “resistance within the law” marked by false 
accusations and misleading testimony. “Faced with the necessity of deal-
ing with an alien but effective form of power,” Rogers observes, “Sri Lan-
kans treated the colonial courts as morally neutral, and manipulated them 
to their own advantage. They regarded testimony not as true or false, but 
as effective or ineffective.”36
Anecdotal evidence from perjury cases appealed to the Sadar (liter-
ally high) Courts in India suggests that, at the very least, Indian witnesses 
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were likely to put loyalty to family members, friends, or perhaps employers 
above legality. There are a surprising number of impersonation cases, in 
which relatives pretended to be unrelated witnesses.37 The Bengal Sadar 
Court opted for mercy in the case of an ailing seventy-year-old man who 
had pretended to be unrelated to his son, citing his age.38 Nor were the 
impersonators just relatives. Mahommed Alee, for example, impersonated 
the son of a local offi cial.39 Unrelated impersonators or friends also fi gure in 
the cases.40 Still other cases present circumstances suggesting that British 
fears of paid, professional witnesses were not unfounded. One convicted 
perjurer, for example, gave evidence twice in the space of a month, each 
time under a different name.41 While it is diffi cult to discern precise motives 
from the terse accounts of reported cases, the number of impersonation 
cases suggests that giving false testimony on something as basic as one’s 
own identity was fairly common.
Colonial Courts
During the period of the East India Company’s control of India, 
there were two court systems in Company-ruled territory. The fi rst, the 
Supreme Courts within the Presidency towns themselves, operated as En-
glish courts, staffed by common-law judges and possessing jurisdiction 
over suits involving British citizens and Company employees. The second, 
the adalat or mofussil system, administered justice in the mofussil, or coun-
tryside outside the Presidency towns. It was staffed by a combination of 
Company civil servants and native offi cials and applied local law. Although 
the East India Company had initially been content to assume a merely su-
pervisory role, leaving the previous Mughal system of government largely 
unchanged, successive administrations toward the end of the eighteenth 
century dramatically expanded the Company’s control. This process cul-
minated during the governor generalship of Lord Charles Cornwallis, from 
1786 to 1793.42
Under the criminal justice system Cornwallis instituted in 1790, the 
Indian offi cial previously in charge of the criminal side of the judiciary was 
divested of that power, and the Governor General and Council of the  Bengal 
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Presidency served as the Sadar Court.43 At the apex of the mofussil system 
were the Sadar Courts: the Sadar Nizamat Adalat on the criminal side and 
the Sadar Diwani Adalat on the civil side.44 The 1790 system also reorga-
nized the lower criminal courts. Bengal was divided into four divisions, 
or circuits, which were in turn composed of several districts. All criminal 
cases were to be heard by the Court of Circuit, which consisted of two East 
India Company civil servants assisted by native law offi cers. The role of 
these native offi cers, or kazis and muftis, was to decide the law applicable 
to the case and issue a fatwa, or statement of that law. When the judges 
disagreed with their law offi cers, the dispute was referred to the Nizamat 
Adalat. The magistrate, also a Company civil servant, was the principal 
offi cer in each district and was responsible for the investigation of cases. 
This magistrate, however, had authority only to try offenders and infl ict 
punishment in petty cases; all serious cases had to be committed for trial 
before the Circuit Court. After 1790, therefore, the Company had assumed 
direct control over the administration of criminal justice, ousting Indians, 
with the exception of the native law offi cers.45
The process of law-making in India under the East India Company 
proceeded through a variety of means. Islamic law formed the basis of 
the criminal law in Bengal and Madras, and for many of the residents of 
Bombay, but it could be and was modifi ed through legislation. Before the 
Charter Act of 1833, legislation was passed separately in each Presidency, 
and new laws were referred to as “regulations”; after 1833, law-making 
was consolidated for all of British India, and new laws were referred to 
as “acts.” Below the level of legislative enactment, however, the picture of 
law-making becomes rather more murky. The principle of stare decisis was 
not adopted by the Sadar Courts of Bengal, so although selected case deci-
sions were published, they provided an erratic guide to the nature of the 
law. In addition to case law, the Sadar Courts of each Presidency issued two 
types of general letters distributed to all inferior judges, known as “circular 
orders” and “constructions.” These letters refl ected the Sadar Court’s bu-
reaucratic role in supervising the lower courts and responding to queries 
and problems raised in monthly reports from the judges. Constructions, 
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in theory, provided just that: the authoritative construction placed by the 
Sadar Court on regulations.46
In this hybrid legal system, perjury presented an immediate prob-
lem. While the British sought to retain Islamic criminal law in Bengal, they 
found it impossible to maintain Islamic law regarding perjury. After 1790, 
when the British fi rst fully assumed direct control over the administration 
of criminal justice in Bengal, selected aspects of Islamic law were changed 
because the British found them unworkable—most notably, the law of 
evidence, certain punishments such as mutilation, and the law of murder, 
which had left prosecution largely within the discretion of a victim’s rela-
tions.47 These changes have been ably studied by Jörg Fisch;48 what is less 
well-known is that the British quickly discovered that redefi nition of the 
substantive law of perjury and its punishments was also crucial to their as-
sumption of judicial control. In this context, the demands of colonial gov-
ernance drove change in both the procedural and substantive laws.
Bengal: Inscribing the Sentence
In 1797 the government of Bengal moved to amend the law of perjury, 
one of the fi rst changes made to the substantive criminal law outside of 
the law of murder. As already mentioned, British judges feared that the 
discretionary punishment administered to perjurers was too mild. While 
the British were, in theory, administering Islamic law, the impetus for this 
change clearly came from the British judges themselves, not from their Is-
lamic law offi cers. In October 1797, the Third Judge of the Circuit Court, 
Dacca Division, reported to the Register of the Nizamat Adalat on the state 
of affairs he had observed while on circuit in Chittagong. He complained 
that “[perjury] is prevalent to a most gross and notorious degree in this 
district. Hardly a trial occurred before me, in which I did not fi nd reason 
to impeach the veracity of the witnesses on one side or the other.”49 The 
Third Judge had a solution that he believed other British judges would 
concur with: imposing harsher penalties than those possible under Islamic 
law. Specifi cally, the Third Judge recommended that a convicted perjurer 
Y6746.indb   115 7/2/15   2:40:34 PM
116 Experimentation Abroad and at Home
be tattooed, both to create the stigma of infamy and to alert subsequent 
judges to the unreliability of his or her testimony.
The Nizamat Adalat was inclined to agree with the Third Judge but 
felt that his suggestion should fi rst be circulated to and approved by its 
Islamic law offi cers.50 They suggested use of a form of permanent tattoo-
ing, called godna, which women commonly used for decoration.51 A month 
later, the judges of the Nizamat Adalat obtained a representation from the 
law offi cers that the proposed punishment was not forbidden under Islamic 
law. The law offi cers pointed out that discretionary punishments for perjury 
already included blackening an offender’s face and public exposure upon 
an ass. New discretionary punishments, such as the tattooing proposed by 
the Third Judge, were permissible by analogy. Moreover, they interpreted 
the Qur’an’s prohibition on wusheer (tattooing) as designed to stop women 
from ornamenting themselves. As to the question of what text to tattoo 
on the face of the unfortunate perjurer, the law offi cers recommended der 
gowahe duroogh go asteen (“this person is a perjured witness”), which they 
assured the Nizamat Adalat could be read in both verse and prose.52
Satisfi ed by this, the Nizamat Adalat submitted a draft regulation al-
lowing a judge to impose a “mark of ignominy” in addition to the usual 
punishment of exposure.53 Adopted as Regulation XVII of 1797, it noted 
“the prevalence of perjury” in the courts. Under it, judges who determined 
that the prisoner would not be suffi ciently punished by the “usual mode of 
public exposure” could direct “the words ‘derogh go,’ or such other words 
as, in the most current local language, may concisely express the nature of 
the crime, to be marked on the forehead of the prisoner, by the process 
commonly denominated ‘godena.’ ”54 The regulation warned judges that 
it should be used with “utmost deliberation and caution” to ensure that 
only offenders truly deserving of the lifelong stigma of tattooing be thus 
punished.55 Finally, in passing, it defi ned the crime of perjury, declaring it 
to be “the wilful delivery of false evidence on oath, or under solemn obliga-
tion esteemed equivalent to an oath, in some judicial proceeding; and in a 
matter material to the issue thereof.”56
The use of godna as punishment was innovative on a number of lev-
els. As Radhika Singha points out, it “was probably the Company’s pecu-
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liar contribution to punishments of infamy.”57 British authorities had pre-
viously used godna to reduce the danger of escapes by convicts sentenced 
to life terms. By extending it to perjury, the Company administrators re-
sponded to specifi cally colonial anxieties by attempting to make the lie visi-
ble. They attempted a (literally) Kafkaesque unifi cation of the criminal and 
the identity of the crime, immediately and indelibly comprehensible to all 
who might encounter the convicted offender. This emphasis on visibility 
was both an attempt to create public infamy and a practical tool for colonial 
magistrates who could prohibit convicted perjurers from any subsequent 
testimony in court.58
Ironically, despite the role of the judges in suggesting the new punish-
ment, they proved extremely hesitant to use it. In 1801, magistrates responded 
to a survey from Governor General Richard Colley, Lord Wellesley. They 
were asked about the frequency of perjury in their districts and what mea-
sures they had taken. Eight magistrates, one-quarter of the respondents, said 
that they had not used the punishment of godna even once over the previous 
four years.59 Another fi ve respondents said they had seldom used godna.60 
Nor were these respondents from quiet districts in which perjury cases were 
unheard of: in Patna, a district in which few usages of godna were reported, 
there had been thirty-two convictions for perjury over the same four years.61 
Similarly, Nuddea, where godna had never been used, saw twenty-nine tri-
als of forty-fi ve individuals, yielding twenty-six convictions.62 The judges, 
it would seem, were squeamish about their new powers. Curiously, this did 
not stop some of them from suggesting that still stronger sanctions were 
needed. The magistrates of Chittagong, Jelalpore, Shahabad, and Juanpore, 
for example, recommended extending the punishment for perjury to include 
transportation as well, while the magistrate at Dinagepore wanted to add the 
pillory to the repertoire of discretionary punishments.63 The magistrate at 
Bahar wanted to go still further and called for the power to impose confi sca-
tion of all property, permanent disqualifi cation from testifying, prohibition 
on inheriting property in the future, and transportation in cases where the 
perjury could have led to the imposition of the death penalty.64
At almost the same time as Wellesley’s survey, the Nizamat Ada-
lat received another suggestion from a local judge that resulted in a new 
Y6746.indb   117 7/2/15   2:40:34 PM
118 Experimentation Abroad and at Home
 amendment in the law of perjury. The report of the Third Judge of the Moor-
shedabad Court of Circuit prompted the Nizamat Adalat to propose another 
regulation altering the law of perjury.65 The Third Judge complained, and 
the Nizamat Adalat agreed, that “a practice has become very prevalent in 
different parts of the Company’s provinces, for parties in civil suits to prefer 
unfounded charges of perjury against the witnesses of their opponents, and 
against their own witnesses, where their evidence does not establish every 
point which they may have been brought to prove, and similar charges of 
subornation of perjury against the adverse parties in such suits.”66 Not only 
did perjury tend to multiply exponentially under these circumstances, with 
perjured evidence brought in to support charges of perjury, but this prac-
tice also compounded the diffi culties of getting witnesses to testify in the 
Company courts, as any potential witness feared prosecution, either from 
his or her own side or from the opposing party.67 Accordingly, the Nizamat 
Adalat proposed a regulation that, as adopted, prohibited magistrates from 
receiving charges of perjury proffered by parties in civil suits against their 
own witnesses or those of the other party, and held all witnesses, plaintiffs, 
and defendants in civil suits not liable to be prosecuted for perjury unless 
they were committed by the zillah (local) judge.68
The new regulation diminished the power of the Indian legal profes-
sion, which was then in its infancy, having begun to be regulated by law 
only in 1793.69 This innovation also placed the problem of perjury in India 
on substantially different footing than in England. In England, as we saw 
in chapter 2, the absence of a system of public prosecution until late in the 
nineteenth century meant that the responsibility for detecting and pros-
ecuting perjury fell almost entirely on the opposing party’s counsel. Detec-
tion of perjury in England relied on cross-examination by the opposing 
party’s barrister. In India, by contrast, the judge was expected both to de-
tect perjury and to initiate prosecutions. The regulation prohibiting party-
initiated perjury prosecutions explicitly countenanced cross-examination 
by the judge: “leave it in the discretion of the Judge to determine when any 
witnesses brought before him are guilty of perjury, which he may always 
be able to do by cross-examining them minutely, and by confronting them, 
when necessary, with the witnesses of the adverse party.”70 By severely re-
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stricting the power of citizens to initiate perjury cases, the colonial govern-
ment confi rmed its primary responsibility for policing the populace.
Administrators remained uncomfortable about leaving so much 
 power—both in evidentiary determination and in sentencing—in the 
hands of the native law offi cers who sat alongside British judges. The Ben-
gal government went so far as to propose vesting the circuit judges with the 
power to determine guilt or innocence, but the suggestion was rejected by 
the Nizamat Adalat.71 Instead, the court proposed a regulation specifi cally 
tailored to meet complaints about the administration of Islamic law, giving 
judges the power to overrule native law offi cers’ fatwas.72 Regulation II of 
1807 had already provided for submission to the Nizamat Adalat when the 
law offi cers and the Company judges disagreed about the punishment;73 
the new Regulation XVII of 1817 went further, authorizing the judge, on his 
own initiative, to alter sentences. At the same time, the limitation banning 
party-initiated perjury prosecutions in civil cases was extended to criminal 
cases.74
The changes of 1817 demonstrate just how far the British had strayed 
from Islamic law. The convoluted treatment of perjury in Regulation XVII 
of 1817 bears out Fisch’s thesis that, by this time, the British version of Is-
lamic law was largely, but not entirely, superfi cial. In Fisch’s description, 
“with Regulation 17, 1817 the foundation of the British system of criminal 
justice was laid. It was the last regulation concentrating on basic issues be-
tween the European and the Islamic conception of justice.”75 Overall, the 
Sadar Court opted not to abolish the structure of Islamic law but instead 
assumed complete control over the decisions of the offi cers interpreting 
that law. Similarly, the Bengal Sadar Court subsequently continued to refer 
to Islamic legal authorities in determining perjury cases, while enforcing a 
law of perjury almost entirely derived from statutory enactments.
At the same time that British authorities were restricting the ability of 
Indians to initiate perjury suits, they also legislated to expand the domains 
of potential perjury. In Bengal, this process began almost as soon as the Brit-
ish took control of the criminal justice system. In 1793, putwarries, or local 
revenue-collecting offi cials, were made liable to the penalties of perjury for 
any falsifi cation in their accounts.76 Statements before land  assessors were 
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also made subject to the penalties of perjury, as were statements before col-
lectors regarding land assessments.77 Other Presidencies followed Bengal’s 
lead.78 The result of this expansion was to bring much of Indian interaction 
with the colonial government under possible perjury penalties. Not only 
did British administrators see perjury everywhere, they also gave them-
selves the power to prosecute for perjury in almost any interaction.
Given the attention paid to making prosecution for perjury easier, 
what were the consequences of these reforms? In the late 1820s, Henry 
Strachey, a retired judge who was a member of a prominent family of Indian 
civil servants, and whose work was praised by James Mill in the History of 
British India, compiled fi gures on perjury in Bengal.79 Strachey was no 
advocate of ideas of character; he took violent exception to Mill’s assertion 
of a distinctive Indian national character, for example, noting the diffi culty 
of forming “a correct judgment on such a subject.”80 Nevertheless, his fi g-
ures reveal frequent prosecutions for perjury among Bengalis: according 
to his numbers, convictions for perjury in Bengal alone outstripped those 
for all of England and Wales. For 1826 and 1827, for example, there were 
219 convictions in both the Lower and Western Provinces of Bengal. In En-
gland, meanwhile, there were approximately twenty perjury cases yearly, 
resulting in around ten convictions.81 While direct comparisons are dif-
fi cult to make, not only because of differences in population, but also be-
cause of access to the judicial system, Strachey’s fi gures suggest that despite 
the complaints of colonial magistrates about the diffi culty of prosecuting 
perjury cases, many more cases were being brought in India, and many led 
to convictions.
Overall, however, while the British in Bengal had ensured that they 
remained in control of judicial decisions, redefi ned the law of perjury to 
correspond with the common law, specifi ed the standard of proof, and 
searched for shame sanctions meaningful to Bengalis, they nonetheless re-
mained attached to the idea that they were administering Islamic law. Their 
native law offi cers were frequently called upon to render opinions. In other 
Presidencies, however, this level of solicitude for at least the façade of Is-
lamic law was noticeably lacking.
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Madras: The Invention of Prevarication
After 1817, innovation in the law of perjury came from the south, in the 
Presidency of Madras. Under the governorship of Edward Clive in 1802, a 
judiciary was established in Madras largely in imitation of that in Bengal.82 
The Company’s highest criminal court, however, was called the Foujdari 
(as opposed to Nizamat) Adalat in Madras. The law of perjury there was 
initially borrowed from Bengal, albeit in piecemeal fashion. One of the fi rst 
regulations establishing the criminal justice system in 1802 provided for 
punishment by godna in cases of perjury and echoed the defi nition of per-
jury adopted in Bengal.83 Prosecution of cases by parties in civil suits was 
prohibited in 1810; this was reenacted in 1816 after the reorganization of 
the lower courts, extended to criminal cases in 1822, and extended to all 
tribunals in 1829.84 Meanwhile, concern that sentencing discretion was al-
lowing the law to be applied too leniently led to a tightening of the law of 
perjury in 1811. Under Regulation VI of that year, imprisonment was to be 
between four and seven years only, banishment was provided for, a reward 
was offered, and the offense was made nonbailable except under special 
circumstances.85
The Foujdari Adalat offered its own contributions to the law of 
perjury during this period, through circular orders. In 1814, the court in-
structed lower tribunals on procedure in perjury cases. It noted that pros-
ecutions for perjury against Indians were frequent but “generally unsuc-
cessful.” Warning that “it is scarcely to be expected that an uneducated 
native should, of himself, state facts and circumstances with the precision 
here required,” the court placed the responsibility for developing a com-
plete record on the criminal judge. A proper charge should contain the 
words spoken by the accused, the place and time, the judicial proceeding 
in which they were relevant, and the falsehood of the accused’s statement. 
In particular, the court reminded judges that “no person should be made 
the object of a prosecution for perjury, who has not been cautioned against 
committing himself on his oath, and has, subsequently, persisted in main-
taining falsehood for truth.”86 Seven years later, the court intervened again 
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to clear up confusion as to the standard of proof required for conviction in 
perjury cases.87
In 1822, the law of perjury in Madras began to depart signifi cantly 
from that of Bengal. Prodded by the discontent of local judges, Madras in-
novated fi rst through the invention of a crime of prevarication, and second 
through legislation against false accusations. As in Bengal, local judges took 
the lead, but in Madras their suggestions met resistance from the Sadar 
Court. The Foujdari Adalat was at best a reluctant partner in legislation. 
Thomas Warden, the Second Judge on Circuit, Western Division, wrote 
the court angrily in 1822, annoyed that it had focused on the question of 
materiality in responding to his complaints about perjury. Instead, Warden 
wrote, “it is where contradictory evidence by the same witness is given on 
points material to the issue that I wish to engage the consideration of the 
Court.”88 Warden protested that the requirement of some evidence dem-
onstrating the falsehood of the alleged perjury prevented the prosecution 
of cases of contradiction apparent on the face of the depositions. He sug-
gested instead the creation of an intermediate crime, between perjury and 
contempt of court, if the law of perjury itself could not be altered.
The Foujdari Adalat, however, was not immediately swayed by 
Warden’s plea. It responded by dismissing the two scenarios Warden had 
posed: fi rst, a witness testifying successively to a murder happening by 
“torchlight” and by “daylight”; and second, an actual case where witnesses 
had testifi ed that death resulted from different causes, despite the fact that 
the alleged deceased’s relatives seemed unconvinced that he was, in fact, 
deceased.89 The fi rst, the court argued, was merely speculative, while the 
second called for more diligent investigation by the police and magistrates, 
not a change in the law. Nonetheless, it was willing to consider penalties 
for prevarication that would be less severe than those for perjury, but more 
severe than those for contempt of court.90 Accordingly, a draft regulation 
was prepared to create a new crime of prevarication that would respond to 
administrative concerns about the limited investigative abilities of colonial 
offi cials. R. Clarke, secretary to the Regulation Board, explained: “The dif-
ference between [perjury and prevarication] consists in this, that perjury is 
a distinct assertion of that which can be proved not to be, or a denial of that 
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which can be proved to be; whereas prevarication is the giving of contradic-
tory or inconsistent evidence, which affects the credibility of the evidence, 
though neither the extent of the witness’s falsehood, nor the precise points 
in which he has departed from the truth be capable of ascertainment.”91 
Under the proposed regulation, prevarication would be punishable by a 
fi ne of one hundred rupees, six months’ imprisonment, or up to a year’s 
imprisonment if a convict could not pay the fi ne.92 Despite approval from 
the Foujdari Adalat, the regulation was not enacted.
Insight into why the question of confl icting depositions appeared so 
critical to Madras judges can be found in George Campbell’s description 
of criminal procedure in British India.93 Campbell described a process that 
repeatedly created depositions. Beginning with the original complaint, 
each police station was required to keep a diary of daily events, including 
statements from witnesses, which was forwarded to the local magistrate for 
his review each morning. The magistrate would then take depositions in 
the course of investigating the cases forwarded to him. If a case was com-
mitted for trial, all the witnesses would appear for a third time before the 
judge, generating a second set of depositions.94 All of this happened before 
the trial itself, generating a dossier of statements and depositions for review 
by the trial judge. As Archibald Galloway, a military offi cer and chairman 
of the Court of Directors of the East India Company, observed, because 
of what he saw as the overall tendency for Indian witnesses to lie, “the ne-
cessity of written documents is therefore greater in India than in our own 
country; and any expedient suggested with the view of multiplying them 
ought of all things to be encouraged.”95 Making lying discoverable merely 
through contradictory depositions, therefore, responded to the largely 
written nature of judicial proceedings under the Company. While the use 
of godna united convicted perjurers with their sentences, the invented of-
fense of prevarication reduced the complexity of testimony and credibility 
assessment to a simple dossier. Both made the crime legible to offi cials who 
feared its obscurity.
The following year, the process of criminalizing prevarication be-
gan anew. This time C. M. Lushington, Second Judge on Circuit, West-
ern Division, initiated the process with a report claiming that “the most 
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 common case of perjury as it appears in our Courts, is totally unprovided 
for,” namely, swearing to opposite facts before the magistrate and circuit 
judge respectively.96 Unlike three years previously, the Foujdari Adalat was 
extremely resistant to the suggestion of change, declaring peevishly, “It 
seems extraordinary to the Court that explanation to the extent to which it 
has already been required and seems still called for, should be necessary to 
the understanding of so clear a point as that the wilful falsehood of a wit-
ness’s false assertion must mainly be established by proving the fact he has 
denied.” The Foujdari Adalat then concluded that it “will here dismiss the 
subject.”97
Despite this attempt to close the door on the topic of prevarication, 
the matter was soon forced back into the court’s purview. The Presidency 
government took the unusual step of referring the question to the Advocate 
General, a solicitor employed by the East India Company to manage the 
Company’s legal affairs with respect to English law, asking him whether an 
individual swearing to two contradictory depositions in England would be 
liable for the punishment for perjury.98 The Advocate General responded 
that there was some precedent for taking two contradictory depositions as 
evidence of perjury.99 The government forwarded his letter to the Foujdari 
Adalat, along with a pointed hint that “Governor in Council is satisfi ed of the 
expediency and propriety of admitting the same kind of proof to establish 
perjury in the Company’s Courts” and suggested that the Foujdari should 
effect this object, either by issuing a circular order or by drafting a new regu-
lation.100 The Foujdari Adalat balked, respectfully taking issue with the Ad-
vocate General’s interpretation of English case law.101 The court also noticed 
the problem of possible reprosecution for perjury, with the accused tried 
twice, fi rst on the basis of a contradiction and subsequently on the falsity 
of one or another of his or her statements. After further prodding from the 
government, the court agreed that the law could be changed but insisted on a 
new regulation, rather than making the change through a circular order.102
At the suggestion of the Foujdari Adalat, the law as eventually en-
acted contained a number of protections for potential defendants.103 First, 
the court urged that prosecution be used “exclusively for cases where the 
contradiction is direct and positive” and where a distinct corrupt motive 
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could be discerned.104 Second, the regulation expressly prohibited sub-
sequent trial for perjury by the usual way of proving the falsehood of one 
of the two statements.105 Finally, the regulation required evidence that the 
defendant was duly sworn and that before affi xing his or her signature to 
the contradictory depositions, their contents were distinctly read over to 
him or her.106 Shortly after passage of this regulation, the Foujdari Adalat 
issued a circular order clarifying the new requirements for composing in-
dictments.107 Contradiction had been made a crime, albeit one amalgam-
ated into the defi nition of perjury. This, however, did not appear to be 
enough for the judges of Madras. Six years later, they supported another 
bill to create a separate offense of prevarication, this time punishable by 
one month’s imprisonment or a fi ne of fi fty rupees.108 While the court had 
stressed determination of a corrupt motive in the earlier regulation, later 
commentators concluded that motive could be inferred from the deposi-
tions themselves, relieving the courts of any additional factual inquiry into 
intent.109
Perhaps chastened by this unusually contentious process, the Fouj-
dari Adalat actively consulted the local judges before embarking on its next 
initiative. In February 1827, the court sent out a request for input from the 
judges on a new regulation that would make preferring false accusations a 
crime.110 As with the earlier prohibition against accusations of perjury by 
opposing parties, the effect would be to further concentrate the power of 
policing in colonial hands. The response to the suggestion was overwhelm-
ing. Judges from throughout the Presidency wrote to complain of the prob-
lem in their districts. W. Lavie, the assistant criminal judge at Combaco-
num, saw the practice as spanning social classes: “the better class of native 
are for the most part rich, and are in consequence enabled to purchase evi-
dence, and . . . the lower orders are so very depraved that a person possess-
ing the means may at any time procure as many witnesses as he pleases.”111 
J. Monro of Tinnevelly attached a multiple-page accounting of some of the 
false accusations brought over the previous four years.112 A. Sin clair esti-
mated that the average number of false complaints seen yearly was “around 
76.”113 S. Nicholls, a criminal judge at Madura, attributed most false accu-
sations to a desire for revenge.114
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The judges differed among themselves as to the best means of de-
terring false accusations: fi nes, degrading punishment, imprisonment and 
fi nes, or lashings.115 Magistrate E. Smalley of Nellore wanted to discrimi-
nate among classes in punishment: men of property, he wrote, should be 
fi ned up to three hundred rupees; “persons without property but above the 
lower orders” should be confi ned for two months with hard labor; mem-
bers of the lower orders should be fl ogged.116 Still others thought that the 
best way to prevent false accusations was to create a more stringent form 
of oath, such as requiring an accuser to swear “in the village Pagoda.”117 
After reviewing all of these suggestions, the Foujdari Adalat recommended 
a graded approach based on the severity of the accused offense. The police 
were authorized to administer a solemn declaration to the complainant in 
all nonbailable offense cases, along with a warning about the penalties for 
perjury. For bailable offenses, a Criminal Court could punish the complain-
ant by a fi ne of up to two hundred rupees, or imprisonment with or with-
out hard labor for up to one year. For nonbailable offenses, the offender 
would be committed for trial before the Court of Circuit and liable to pun-
ishment of up to seven years’ imprisonment with hard labor and lashing 
with the cat-o’-nine-tails.118 This structure was subsequently modifi ed, and 
the distinction between bailable and nonbailable offenses was abandoned. 
Instead, all false charges could be punished by imprisonment of up to six 
months, although the regulation noted that judges could consider “the ap-
parent motives and tendency” of the charge in sentencing.119
Taken together, the two innovations in Madras worked to extend the 
purview of perjury and to greatly ease detection of the offense. They re-
sponded to fears about the duplicitous native informant, as either witness 
or accuser, with new penalties and new technologies for detection.
Bengal Sequel: Making Innovations Islamic
While the original outlines of the law of perjury had been settled in 
Bengal, the innovations in Madras left judges in Bengal with a dilemma: 
should they join their southern colleagues in expanding the defi nition of 
perjury? In an early decision, the Nizamat Adalat had rejected the argu-
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ment that perjury could be proved simply through contradictory deposi-
tions; instead, it demanded that, in conformity with English practice, one 
of the depositions be proved false.120 The Madras law, however, revived 
the question. In 1841, the Nizamat Adalat changed course and adopted the 
Madras rule. Henceforth, “the mere fact of a witness having wilfully given 
two statements directly at variance with each other, on a point material 
to the issue of the case in which he gives the testimony, must be held to 
be perjury.”121 This decision was prompted by evidence that prisoners in 
Bengal were already being convicted of perjury on the basis of contradic-
tory depositions. In the monthly report of H. Nisbet, a session judge of 
Sarum, fi ve individuals were listed as convicted for perjury on the basis of 
contradictory depositions, including one in which two years had elapsed 
between the original statement before a magistrate and the testimony given 
at trial.122
But the judges of the Nizamat did not justify their volte face by refer-
ence to the Madras law; instead, they argued that it was merely a recog-
nition of Islamic law. In their circular order, they referred to a ten-year-
old construction that contained an extended opinion by the Islamic law 
offi cers of the Calcutta Sadar Court. The opinion responded to a query 
asking what evidence was suffi cient to convict in cases of perjury. Among 
the circumstances the law offi cers considered was the delivery of contra-
dictory evidence by the same witness before different courts. According 
to the law offi cers, if a witness claimed to have witnessed a crime and then 
dropped the accusation, it became the responsibility of the judge to assess 
the witness’s motives. If “the retraction be made under a proper sense of re-
pentance and contrition,” the witness was not liable to tazir (discretionary 
punishment); but if it was made “with contempt and boldness,” then the 
witness was liable.123 If a witness subsequently remembered details initially 
forgotten, he or she was not liable to tazir. The law offi cers went further 
than the Madras law by declaring that witnesses who made statements that 
were “highly improbable, and bordering close upon impossibility” were 
also punishable by tazir.124
At the same time, however, Bengal judges sought to soften the impact 
of the innovation. In a circular order of 1850 they cautioned session judges 
Y6746.indb   127 7/2/15   2:40:34 PM
128 Experimentation Abroad and at Home
against indiscriminately using their power to commit parties for perjury on 
the basis of contradictory depositions. The court warned:
By an indiscriminate or injudicious use of the power vested in 
the sessions judge, witnesses would be forced to adhere to any 
perjury, which they may have committed before the magistrate, 
whereas by abstaining from punishment of those witnesses who 
may appear to correct at the sessions the falsehood of their fi rst 
evidence, and limiting the order of committal to those who 
manifestly make a false deposition before the sessions judge, 
the ends of justice would be more satisfactorily attained.125
Like the earlier opinion by the Sadar Court law offi cers, and unlike their 
counterparts in Madras, the Bengal judges sought to discriminate between 
motives for inconsistency and thereby temper the new law. Interestingly, 
however, they did not once again invoke Islamic or Hindu precedent to 
justify this qualifi cation, although both types of precedent could be found. 
While consistency with Islamic law seems to have been a powerful trope in 
Bengal jurisprudence, it was not always employed by the Sadar Court in 
grounding its opinions.
Macaulay and the Indian Penal Code
After passage of the Charter Act in 1833, law-making in India was 
centralized in a single legislature. At the same time, an Indian Law Com-
mission was appointed to create a shared law for all residents of British 
India. Back in England, Thomas Macaulay had lobbied actively for ap-
pointment as Law Member of the Legislative Council. Among his duties in 
this post was service on the Law Commission, which, aside from Macaulay, 
consisted of Charles Cameron, an English barrister; John McLeod, a civil 
servant from Madras; and George Anderson, a civil servant from Bombay 
who had taken part in the drafting of the Elphinstone Code.126 Much of the 
work of the commission was, however, the result of Macaulay’s nearly solo 
effort, as his fellow commissioners either fell ill or proved themselves of 
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little use.127 Remarkably, over the course of three years in India, from 1834 
through 1837, Macaulay was able to complete a draft of a comprehensive 
system of criminal law, the Indian Penal Code.
En route to his employment, Macaulay had an encounter with Indian 
justice that may have proved crucial in shaping his views on the problem 
of false evidence.128 As he prepared to leave Ootacamund for Madras, his 
manservant was arrested on a charge of seduction and adultery. Macaulay 
offered to settle the suit by paying the aggrieved husband, but, as he wrote, 
“the prosecutors of my servant interfered, and insisted that he should be 
brought to trial in order that they might have the pleasure of smearing him 
with fi lth, giving him a fl ogging, beating kettles before him, and carrying 
him around on an ass with his face to the tail.” Macaulay commented, “I 
have a very poor opinion of my man’s morals, and a very poor opinion also 
of the veracity of his accusers.”129 Macaulay was irritated because his ser-
vant’s detention prevented his travel; when his fi rst request for an immedi-
ate trial was denied, he wrote an irritated letter to the station commandant 
asking him to intervene. The servant was tried that evening and acquit-
ted. As Macaulay prepared to leave at last, there was a riot during which 
his servant was dragged out of a palanquin and stripped naked. Macaulay 
returned to the commandant and had the rioters arrested, remarking with 
satisfaction, “Nothing can be well imagined more expeditious than the ad-
ministration of justice in this country when the judge is a Colonel, and the 
plaintiff a Councillor.”130 While Macaulay nowhere mentioned the infl u-
ence of this episode in his subsequent work as Law Member, the fear of 
false accusations for profi t and a revulsion toward the shame sanction of 
tashhir are apparent in the Indian Penal Code.
Publicly, however, perjury fi gured in the project of codifi cation as 
an example of the problem of disparity in punishment among the three 
Presidencies, one of the primary reasons for the establishment of the com-
mission. Macaulay seized upon uniformity as the guiding principle of his 
efforts. His much-quoted baseline was, “the principle is simply this; unifor-
mity when you can have it; diversity when you must have it; but, in all cases 
certainty.”131 Perjury served Macaulay as a convenient example of existing 
inconsistency. In Bengal, he noted, forgery was punished with a term of 
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imprisonment double that infl icted for perjury, while in Bombay, the situ-
ation was reversed, with perjury punished with imprisonment double that 
for forgery; in Madras, the two crimes were punished equally.132
Though Macaulay’s debt to Bentham and also the English com-
mon law is apparent, his sympathy for existing laws under the East India 
Company is less clear. The Elphinstone Code had little specifi c infl uence 
on him; he even dismissed it outright, asserting that “the penal law of the 
Bombay Presidency has, over the penal law of the other Presidencies, no 
superiority, except that of being digested.”133 Elsewhere, Macaulay wrote 
contemptuously, “the Bombay Criminal Code is the description of Code 
which I should expect from a laborious and experienced zillah judge.”134 
(Unfortunately, the response to this comment is unrecorded.) By contrast, 
Macaulay’s code was written in a clear and concise style, with reference to 
illustrations to clarify potential ambiguities.135
In the draft Indian Penal Code submitted to the Governor General in 
October 1837, perjury was renamed “false evidence” and included in the 
section of “offences against public justice.”136 Giving false evidence was 
defi ned as when “in any stage of any judicial proceeding, being bound by 
oath, or by a sanction tantamount to an oath, to state the truth, [a man] 
states that to be true which he knows to be false touching any point mate-
rial to the result of such proceeding.”137 The offense of “fabricating false 
evidence” was defi ned as “caus[ing] any circumstance to exist, intending 
that such circumstance may appear in evidence in some stage of a judicial 
proceeding” in order to mislead the decision maker.138 Both giving false 
evidence and fabricating false evidence were to be punished with imprison-
ment for a term between one and seven years, with the possibility of an ad-
ditional fi ne. Macaulay, however, excepted fabrication of false evidence by 
the accused from his defi nition. His greatest departure from the common 
law came in his linking the punishment for false evidence to the severity of 
the accusation. Giving or fabricating false evidence in a capital case was 
treated more severely: transportation for life or imprisonment for a term 
between seven years and life. Doing the same in noncapital cases that were 
punishable by more than seven years’ imprisonment, the falsifi er was to 
be punished just as a person convicted of the offense would have been.139 
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While Macaulay could have argued that discriminating among lies accord-
ing to their consequences and motives had Indian antecedents—as we have 
seen, both Hindu and Islamic law made similar distinctions—he did not. 
Unfortunately, none of his writings on the Indian Penal Code identifi es the 
source of his ideas on this topic, so whether they arose from Macaulay’s 
own inclinations or local inspiration remains unclear.
Macaulay’s use of imprisonment, fi nes, and transportation repre-
sented a decision to reject the punishment of tashhir, or public exposure. 
In his “Notes on the Penal Code” on the draft Indian Penal Code, Macaulay 
explained that the commission had considered this punishment carefully 
before deciding to abandon it. A primary reason for their rejection was the 
inherent inequality of the punishment, which weighed heavily on those 
with refi ned sensibilities while having little effect on “hardened and im-
pudent delinquents.” Prisoners who preserved a sense of shame were, for 
Macaulay, prime candidates for rehabilitation, a goal that the stigma of pub-
lic shaming would make more diffi cult to achieve. As he wrote, “If it were 
possible to devise a punishment which should give pain proportioned to 
the degree in which the offender was shameless, hard-hearted, and aban-
doned to vice, such a punishment would be the most effectual means of 
protecting society. On the other hand of all punishments the most absurd is 
that which produces pain proportioned to the degree in which the offender 
retains the sentiments of an honest man.” Underlying Macaulay’s objec-
tion to the disproportionate, and therefore un-Benthamite nature of shame 
sanctions, was a fear of the vagaries of the Indian mob: “That the amount 
of punishment should be determined, not by the law or by the tribunals, 
but by a throng of people accidentally congregated, among whom the most 
ignorant and brutal would always on such occasion be the most forward, 
should be a disgrace to an age and country pretending to civilization.”140 
Thus, bringing forty years of experimentation to a close, Macaulay set the 
stage for an end to the long search for an appropriate shame sanction in 
British India.
With regard to the question of perjury specifi cally, Macaulay acknowl-
edged that it was one of the instances in which his proposed penal code had 
been modifi ed for local, Indian conditions.141 The offense of perjury, he 
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commented, was “not one of very frequent occurrence in western countries. 
It is notorious, however, that in this country the practice is exceedingly 
common.” Macaulay described judges in India as doubting the veracity 
of all testimony and therefore being prone to seize on circumstantial evi-
dence in preference to witness testimony. The consequence, according to 
Macaulay, was that wily litigants turned to fabricating evidence: “in India, 
where a judge is generally on his guard against direct false evidence, a more 
artful mode of imposition is frequently employed. A lie is often conveyed 
to a court not by means of witnesses, but by means of circumstances.”142 
Macaulay therefore advocated punishing the fabrication of evidence with 
the same severity as the giving of false evidence. He concluded a note on 
“Offences Relating to Public Justice” with a plea for punishing falsity in 
pleading as perjury, but, despite his passionate Benthamism, such a mea-
sure was not incorporated into the draft.143
After the publication of Macaulay’s “Notes” and his return to England 
in 1838, debate on the code continued in India. It was during this phase of 
the debate that a number of policies developed by the three Presidencies 
were incorporated into the penal code. In 1847, the law commissioners 
published a Second Report, detailing responses to the code and suggest-
ing changes. The inquiries answered by the commissioners covered a wide 
range of issues. Mr. Hudleston wondered “why the word ‘perjury’ which 
is perfectly intelligible to the people of India, and has been so long in use, 
is discarded.” A. D. Campbell, one of Macaulay’s successors on the Law 
Commission, responded that the commissioners decided to abandon the 
“technical terms” of English law where they did not adopt its defi nitions. 
Henry Seton, meanwhile, questioned the exception made for those who 
fabricated evidence designed to exculpate themselves. The commissioners 
wrote, “we answer, that . . . the temptation to escape from death or infamy 
though deserved, by means of fraud which injures no individual, is greater 
than the weakness of human nature can in general resist.”144
Some suggestions were received more favorably than others. John 
Fryer Thomas, a judge on the Madras Sadar Court, wrote to urge “lower-
ing the penalty of the offence, and enjoining frequent prosecutions.” The 
commissioners found Thomas’s argument “valid” and advocated omitting 
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the minimum one-year sentence in a revised code. Thomas also suggested 
incorporating the Madras innovations that made contradictory depositions 
punishable as perjury and prevarication a separate crime. The commission-
ers doubted whether an individual could be convicted of “false evidence” 
merely on the basis of contradictory depositions. They wanted to differen-
tiate the forgetful witness who later recalled the truth from the witness who 
sought all along to mislead the court. The latter witness, they suggested, 
could be apprehended through two successive prosecutions, because a 
successful defense on the fi rst charge would entail failure on the second. 
They also thought that “if necessary, a special rule might be enacted to 
sanction this mode of procedure.” As for the crime of prevarication, the 
commissioners wrote that they were “disposed to think a Clause for the 
punishment of persons who being on oath, &c., in any judicial proceeding, 
shall prevaricate or make contradictory or inconsistent averments in a man-
ner indicating a deliberate intention to conceal the truth, would have a very 
salutary effect.”145 They recommended punishment of up to six months’ 
imprisonment or a fi ne.
After the Indian Rebellion, the Indian Penal Code fi nally became law 
in 1860.146 In its fi nal form, it incorporated many of the suggestions mooted 
in the Second Report. While preserving most of the original Macaulay-
 authored sections, it also added substantial new material. In keeping with 
one of the suggestions made by Thomas, the minimum of one year for im-
prisonment was dropped. In another response to Indian circumstances, 
impersonation of another person was specifi ed as an enumerated offense, 
to be punished by up to three years’ imprisonment, or fi ne, or both.147 But 
the suggestions derived from the Madras innovations— either a separate 
crime of prevarication or special rules for serial prosecutions for false evi-
dence in contradictory depositions—were not included. As the law became 
more centrally controlled, the innovations of the Presidency legislatures 
fell by the wayside.
In the years between Macaulay’s draft penal code and its eventual 
passage in 1860, several reforms relating to the law of perjury were passed: 
fi rst, the abolition of religious oaths, and second, the end of tashhir. Both 
had originally been part of the attempt to spur community sentiment against 
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perjury, and their abolition marked a movement away from the strategy of 
working within what the British thought were local religious beliefs.
Abolition of the Religious Oath
Macaulay’s desire to end religious distinctions in the law eventually 
bore fruit, although in a more attenuated form than he might have desired 
and for motives other than his own preference for uniformity. Two years af-
ter his draft penal code, the government of India considered replacing oaths 
tailored to the deponent’s religious belief with a single affi rmation referring 
only to “Almighty God” that could be used by all native  witnesses.148 The 
change, however, appears to have been motivated by fear that Indian upper 
classes were avoiding testifying in the Company’s courts out of repugnance 
to the previous form of oath.
This proposal met with decidedly mixed reactions. The judges of 
the Bombay Sadar Foujdari Adalat agreed without reservations.149 The 
judges of the Madras Sadar Adalat, meanwhile, disagreed violently among 
themselves. The majority of the court felt that abolition of oaths was ill-
 conceived and “would be attended with pernicious effect.”150 They for-
warded to the government of India a letter they had previously written to 
Macaulay’s law commissioners arguing against the abolition of the oath. In 
it, they noted that “a general impression prevails among the native commu-
nity in the territories subject to this Presidency . . . that evil will be visited 
through supernatural agency upon the perjurer.” Not only that, “we learn 
from history, that by the common consent of all mankind, in all ages, rever-
ence has been attached to these ‘appeals of a religious nature.’ ”151
One member of the Madras court, however, disagreed. Acting Puisne 
Judge A. D. Campbell submitted an extensive minute surveying his reasons 
for supporting the abolition of all oaths. He rejected the appeal to conven-
tional wisdom, tartly noting that the majority of mankind in earlier times was 
as liable to have been on the side of error as that of truth. Instead, Campbell 
argued that truth was most likely to be found in communities in which the 
use of oaths was unknown. If attention had been given to crafting a form of 
oath that was truly binding on the conscience of natives, Campbell allowed, 
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some good might have resulted, but as it was, the oath as administered was 
“mere mummery and an empty form binding on the conscience of few or 
none.” European affection for empty oaths had “driven from our courts all 
the more reputable classes of the community.”152 Campbell found in the 
Indian experience confi rmation of Bentham’s prediction that increased re-
liance on the oath would only drive truth out of the courtroom. Instead of 
modifying the oath to meet the religious scruples of Hindus and Muslims, 
Campbell concluded that it should be abolished.
Despite Campbell’s enthusiasm for more dramatic measures, the act 
as proposed was limited to the substitution of a solemn affi rmation for the 
previous ceremony of swearing on the Qur’an or water from the Ganges. 
The Sadar Court of Bengal suggested extending the act to all native wit-
nesses and taking great care in translating “Almighty God” into vernacular 
languages.153 The judges of the Sadar Court of the North Western Prov-
inces at Allahabad, meanwhile, requested that the use of the new oath be 
declared imperative. They cited a recent case in which a Muslim witness 
was able to escape conviction for perjury by pretending to be Hindu, swear-
ing upon Ganges water, and then, in his criminal trial for perjury, claiming 
that the oath he had taken did not bind his conscience. Mysteriously, he 
was acquitted on this basis.154
The Indian law commissioners then commented on the debate. They 
called for an even broader application of the new affi rmation: not just to 
witnesses, but to all judicial testimony; not just to Hindus and Muslims, but 
to all who came before the courts.155 Andrew Amos, Macaulay’s successor 
as Law Member, took a narrower view. He opposed his fellow commission-
ers’ proposed expansions.156 The act as eventually passed followed Amos’s 
suggestions closely. Its scope was limited to Hindus and Muslims and re-
placed the previous oaths with an affi rmation: “I solemnly affi rm, in the 
presence of Almighty God, that what I shall state shall be the whole truth, 
and nothing but the truth.”157 False statements made following such an af-
fi rmation were to be subject to the same penalties as perjury. Nonetheless, 
even this somewhat limited expansion of the right to affi rmation caused 
great interest and consternation among those in London considering the 
question of the oath.
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The judges, however, were never entirely reconciled to the abolition 
of the oath. In 1847, the government of India collected statistics to show 
that perjury had increased since its abolition. In Bengal, the number of 
cases doubled: from 289 in 1834–39 to 605 in 1840– 44. In Bombay, mean-
while, the number of convictions increased from 325 in 1834–39 to 609 in 
1840– 45. Madras alone reported a fall in the number of cases, from 428 
to 331 for the same two periods as Bombay.158 The authorities in London, 
however, responded without excitement, blandly noting that the reader’s 
“attention may be directed to this subject.”159 The register of the Sadar 
Foujdari Adalat in the North Western Provinces reported that the judges 
of the Sadar Court, as well as all but one of the zillah judges, attributed the 
increase in perjury in the North Western Provinces to the consequences 
of the 1840 act. They rejected an alternative explanation that the increase 
resulted from the more expansive defi nition of perjury embraced by the 
Bengal and North Western Provinces in 1841, according to which evidence 
of contradiction alone was suffi cient to prove perjury.160 Given that Madras 
was the one place to report a decline, and that the broader defi nition of 
perjury had previously existed only there, the alternative explanation was 
stronger than the Sadar Court acknowledged.
Ten years after the act’s passage, the government of Bombay returned 
to the same question.161 Compilation of crime fi gures from the previous 
decade revealed that not only had the overall number of commitments for 
perjury risen dramatically, but also the percentage of convictions had in-
creased.162 Judges consulted tended to blame the increase in perjury on 
the abolition of the oath; as summarized by the register of the Foujdari 
Adalat: “the general impression appears to be that the increase noticed 
by the Honorable Court is chiefl y attributable to the substitution of the 
declaration now in use for the oath formerly administered to Hindoos and 
Mahomedans.”163 A. Elphinston, magistrate at Khandesh, ascribed the in-
crease in the rate of convictions to an even greater increase in the num-
ber of cases from which magistrates could select the most “glaring cases 
of perjury, more susceptible of clear proof.”164 Some judges advocated a 
return to pre-1840 forms of oath used in Bombay: “to command truth by 
the placing of the hand on the Geeta, the cow, the child or the grain must 
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be reverted to.”165 But, as happened four years earlier, no changes followed 
on the judges’ recommendations.
The abolition of the oath remained a bone of contention for the judges. 
As J. F. Thomas of the Madras Sadar Court wrote, in commenting on the 
Indian Penal Code: “It is not apparently suffi ciently borne in mind, that we 
have no oath by which we can bind the conscience of the Hindoo. He does 
no violation therefore to his conscience, in forswearing himself; and he nei-
ther does nor can he perceive, and feel with us the enormity of perjury.”166 
In their dogged affection for the religious oath, the judges maintained the 
conviction, identifi ed by Lata Mani in her work on sati, that India was best 
governed through the idiom of religion.167 They did so out of a belief that 
religious ritual could affect community sentiment, which they thought cru-
cial to preventing crime. But, after the centralization of law-making with 
the 1833 Charter Act and the creation of the Indian Law Commission, the 
initiative in law-making had passed out of their hands. Moreover, the In-
dian Law Commission was more likely to be dominated by individuals like 
Amos—English-trained lawyers who steered Indian law closer to the En-
glish common law and away from the precedents of the East India Com-
pany. A similar progression can be seen in the abolition of tashhir.
The End of Tashhir
Macaulay’s arguments against the punishment of public exposure, or 
tashhir, had a striking effect in India, even while passage of his Indian Penal 
Code was delayed for more than twenty years. In 1848, Charles Baynes, in 
his treatise on the criminal law of Madras, saw fi t to quote Macaulay’s con-
demnation of tashhir almost in its entirety.168 In Bengal the reaction was 
even more rapid. The Sadar Court at Calcutta issued a circular order ad-
dressed to the Courts of Circuit and session judges requiring them to sus-
pend execution of sentences of tashhir for three months.169 The immediate 
objective of the circular order was to allow for appeals to the Nizamat Ada-
lat, but it seems to have been a preliminary step toward the abolition of tat-
tooing.170 The President in Council for the government of India responded 
to this, conveying his support for an even broader abolition of all forms of 
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tashhir.171 Macaulay’s argument against shame punishments seems to have 
been widely adopted among legislators in India, bolstered by the abolition 
of pillory in England.172 Judges, meanwhile, pointed out that tashhir was 
rarely infl icted in their jurisdictions.173
Despite this apparent consensus, however, no general abolition of 
the punishment of tashhir was enacted in 1838. The reason for this appears 
to have been the separation of the issue into two questions: fi rst, expanding 
the power of the judges to order transportation in perjury cases, and sec-
ond, ending tashhir.174 The fi rst was passed, while the second was allowed 
to languish for another decade.175 It reemerged in 1848 as an amendment 
to legislation specifi cally aimed at abolishing the remaining use of godna, 
which had been limited to cases of imprisonment for life. Governor Gen-
eral James Dalhousie offered his support for the broader abolition of all 
forms of tashhir, citing the reasoning of the law commissioners and the ab-
olition of similar punishments in Europe and wondering about “the causes 
which have led to its being dropped out of sight” since its discussion ten 
years previously.176 Dalhousie’s proposal was met with widespread support 
from offi cials in Bengal, with the judges of the Foujdari Adalat in Madras 
dissenting ineffectually on the basis that Indians in the south wear such 
“very scanty clothing” that inmates could not reliably be identifi ed by dis-
tinctive prison wear alone.177 Unswayed by this argument, the government 
proceeded to abolish tashhir throughout India.178
As with the abolition of the religious oath, judges remained skeptical 
of this innovation long after the act’s passage. Less than a week before the 
act was sent to the Governor General for his formal assent, the judges of 
the Bombay Foujdari Adalat belatedly voiced misgivings. They argued that 
imprisonment had little apparent effect on Indians and that public disgrace 
was necessary to “stigmatize” certain selected crimes, including perjury 
and forgery.179 The government was unmoved, noting only that “the rea-
sons urged by the authorities at Bombay have not in any degree altered 
the opinion of the President in Council.”180 Dissent persisted nonetheless. 
Chief Justice of Bombay Matthew Sausse minuted authorities in London in 
1859 requesting a return to shame punishments.181
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Though Sausse was described as having a “frigid, morose, and taci-
turn temperament,” and was known by contemporaries as “Sausse the 
Silent,” his minute was voluble on the problem of perjury, albeit in a strik-
ingly unsympathetic fashion.182 He called the 1849 act a “very grave error,” 
attributing it to a misguided impulse to treat Indians and Europeans alike. 
This overlooked, in Sausse’s view, the distinctive nature of India, where 
“falsehood is the rule, truth the exception.” Sausse thought that the change 
had been motivated by “two or three instances” of suicide among perjurers 
who had been publicly exhibited riding an ass backwards. He took this as 
an indication of the success of the punishment, arguing that “I should have 
thought it a great point to be gained to have discovered a punishment so 
intrinsically harmless that could produce so deep a sense of humiliation” 
and concluding that the repression of perjury was “of infi nitely greater mo-
ment to the community at large, than the contingent suicide of a few con-
victed perjurers.”183 Sausse the Silent appears to have spoken in vain; no 
change in the law of perjury or its punishment was proposed as a result of 
his minute, and the Indian Penal Code, passed shortly thereafter, was not 
altered to incorporate punishments other than imprisonment, fi nes, and 
transportation.
This period of innovation in the law of perjury and prevarication in 
India was brought to a close by the eventual adoption of the Indian Penal 
Code in 1860, followed by the Indian Evidence Act in 1872. By the time 
Ishri Pershad wrote the curious letter that began this chapter, British ad-
ministrators’ attempts to confront what they saw as widespread mendacity 
in India, and what Indians may well have seen as justifi able resistance to an 
imposed judicial system, amounted to little more than an enduring obses-
sion. Justice in many cases had become a quixotic attempt to discern which 
of the parties was honest, not who had the better case. Disturbingly, judges 
confronted with the same case could come to radically different assess-
ments of the credibility of witnesses. More than half a century of attempts 
to control perjury through legal innovations had led not to more effi cient 
application of the law, but to the creation of a cadre of judges ruling on the 
basis of the perceived mendacity of witnesses. The imperatives of policing 
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the courtroom had come to overshadow the touted gift of impartial justice 
according to law.
Coda: James Stephen and a Law of Evidence for India and England
Further Anglicization and codifi cation followed on the heels of the 
Indian Penal Code. James Fitzjames Stephen, already a prominent scholar 
of evidence law in Britain, arrived in India in 1869 to take up the position of 
Legal Member of Council. Over the next three years, Stephen wrote much 
of the 1872 Indian Evidence Act as well as revising the Indian Criminal 
Procedure Code.184 Although Stephen arrived in India with pronounced 
views on the underlying logic of the evidence law, he also adapted to what 
he saw as the situation on the ground, in particular, the dilemma of govern-
ing cross-examination. In Stephen’s description, it was “little more than an 
attempt to reduce the English law of evidence to the form of express propo-
sitions arranged in their natural order, with some modifi cations rendered 
necessary for the particular circumstances of India.”185 As it happened, one 
of the modifi cations deemed necessary for the “particular circumstances of 
India” related to cross-examination.
Stephen’s fi rst version of the Indian Evidence Act contained unusu-
ally rigorous restrictions on cross-examination. It exempted witnesses 
from answering any question injurious to their credit when the matter in-
quired into was unrelated to current proceedings. Moreover, it required a 
barrister to obtain “express written instructions” from his client regarding 
any questions as to credit.186 The motivation for these restrictions appears 
to have been the continued employment of judges in the Indian countryside 
who were not legally trained and therefore thought to be at risk of being 
bullied by counsel. Suspicion of Indian advocates who had been appearing 
in courts both as vakils (pleaders) and as barristers also probably played 
a role.187
Stephen’s proposal raised howls of protest from the bars of Bombay, 
Calcutta, and Madras. The Calcutta bar declared that “the combined effect 
of these sections seems to be an almost absolute prohibition of any question 
affecting the character of witnesses.”188 The Bombay bar suggested that if the 
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bill were to pass, “it would be better to abolish private cross- examination 
altogether, and entrust it solely to judges.”189 In the fi nal form of the Indian 
Evidence Act the express instruction provision was eliminated, and the 
court was instructed to exercise its discretion on questions as to credit only 
after deciding that “the truth of the imputation would seriously affect the 
opinion of the Court as to the credibility of the witness.”190 The judge was 
also instructed to consider the remoteness in time of the alleged imputation 
and any disproportion between the importance of the imputation against 
the witness’s character and the importance of his or her evidence.191 Even 
with the revision, the judge was granted signifi cantly more power in India 
to determine the boundaries of cross-examination.
Although the Evidence Act had been written in part in response to lo-
cal circumstances, such as the prevalence of legally unsophisticated judges, 
Stephen soon decided that what was good for the colony would also be 
good for the metropole. Shortly after his return to England in 1872, he was 
invited by Attorney General Sir John Coleridge to propose a codifi ed law of 
evidence for England based on the Indian Evidence Act.192 The bill failed, 
but Stephen tried again in 1877 with a criminal code bill that contained 
provisions for testimony by criminal defendants.193 Again, his attempt at 
codifi cation failed, wrecked by Irish opposition and the intransigence of 
the Lord Chief Justice.194
Undeterred by his earlier failure, in 1886 Stephen again advised the 
Lord Chancellor that he favored redefi ning perjury along the lines of his 
Indian codes. Punishment for perjury would be determined by what was 
at stake in the underlying case: perjury in capital cases or cases that could 
result in imprisonment would result in a more severe sentence.195 As in 
India, Stephen recommended limitations on the examination of prison-
ers. Prisoners would not be examined on oath, and the judge would be 
responsible for questioning, not the prosecution. Notably, however, by the 
1880s there was less support among reformers in the legal community for 
limits on cross-examination. Sir Harry Poland wrote the Lord Chancellor 
and opposed this aspect of Stephen’s reform. “I have changed my opinion 
on the subject & now think that there should be no limit,” he confessed. 
“The accused, if called, must be treated as an ordinary witness, leaving the 
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 cross-examination as at present to the good taste, judgment and discretion 
of the [prosecuting counsel].”196 Like Stephen’s earlier attempt, this pro-
posal also failed.
Despite this failure, Stephen’s codifi cation efforts represented a new 
era, one in which solutions pioneered in the colonial context were reintro-
duced in England in an attempt to resolve the enduring issue of counsel’s 
discretion versus the judge’s authority in cross-examination. In fact, even 
after his attempts at parliamentary codifi cation failed, Stephen remained 
convinced that his Indian Evidence Act had important lessons for English 
evidence law. During the Tichborne controversy, he insisted that a solution 
to this dilemma might be located in the Indian Evidence Act of 1872.197 En-
thusiasm for Stephen’s work continued to play a role in debates on the law 
of evidence in England. In the fl urry of letters regarding cross-examination, 
the Indian experience again came up as a model. One writer proposed giv-
ing the judge the power to ask prisoners about disputed points in testimony 
and also to invite prisoners to respond to the evidence against them, as in 
the Indian Criminal Code.198 As late as 1898, “B.C.S.” wrote to the Times 
to suggest that the model for English reform could be located in India: “So 
far as a single observer can judge from his own limited experience, and from 
conversation with others, the Indian system is completely successful.”199
India was not the only venue for experimentation with novel ap-
proaches to the legal production of truth during this period, however. 
The Divorce and Matrimonial Causes Act of 1857 created a situation in the 
metropole that had revealing similarities to the colonial one: in the eyes of 
jurists, parties to divorce cases, like “natives” in India, were assumed to be 
liars. If mendacity was a given, and the normal sanctions of gentlemanly 
honor and the oath were assumed to have no weight even among respect-
able parties, how could the truthfulness of witnesses be guaranteed? Work-
ing within the traditional system of common-law crimes seemed, as in India, 
not to be an option. Dramatically new circumstances appeared to call for 
innovations that went beyond conventional rules. In divorce proceedings, 
rather than looking to invented Hindu or Muslim traditions, British jurists 
opted to turn to a source less exotic but also novel: inquisitorial justice.
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chapter  four
The Queen’s Proctor: 
An Inquisitorial Experiment
i n  1 8 7 8  t h i n g s  b e g a n  t o  g o   badly for the Castles. James Cas-
tle, a gas-fi tter, and his wife, Elizabeth, had been happily married for three 
years, but early in 1878 Elizabeth started drinking heavily, or in the parlance 
of the time, she became “addicted to habits of intemperance.” The follow-
ing year James learned that Elizabeth had committed adultery with another 
gas-fi tter, Walter Wombwell. James responded by throwing Elizabeth out of 
their house; he also fi led a petition for divorce against her, naming Walter as 
a co-respondent. At the Divorce Court, James was represented by counsel, 
but Elizabeth and Walter neither appeared nor responded to the charges. 
The judge granted James a provisional divorce, or a decree nisi, subject to 
intervention by the Queen’s Proctor.1
Unfortunately for James, his case attracted closer scrutiny. An initial 
investigation by the Queen’s Proctor showed that James had entered into 
a bigamous marriage before fi ling a petition for divorce and had commit-
ted adultery himself. This discovery ended James’s chances for a smooth 
divorce. First, at the Queen’s Proctor’s direction, James was prosecuted 
for bigamy and convicted at London’s Central Criminal Court; mean-
while, hearings of the Queen’s Proctor’s motion to rescind James’s decree 
nisi were postponed until he fi nished serving his three-month sentence.2 
Once released from jail, James still had to appear in the Divorce Court, 
where the Queen’s Proctor was prepared to prove his case with the mar-
riage certifi cate from James’s second, bigamous union.3 Unsurprisingly, 
James chose not to contest the Queen’s Proctor’s intervention.4 With his 
divorce petition  rescinded, James remained married to Elizabeth. Except 
for his  prosecution for bigamy, James’s story is a typical example of the 
kinds of action taken during the late Victorian era by the Queen’s  Proctor, 
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a prominent Victorian law offi cer responsible for uncovering deceit in di-
vorce cases.
Though it may be tempting to dismiss the Queen’s Proctor as an 
anomalous institution, rooted in peculiarly Victorian moral standards and 
irrelevant in an era of no-fault divorce available on the same grounds to 
both husband and wife, it provides an opportunity to consider the reveal-
ing intersection of important questions in the history of adversarial trial 
procedure and family law. As we will see, this anomalous institution, more 
inquisitorial than adversarial, was yet another experiment in ensuring wit-
ness veracity undertaken in the environment created by nineteenth-century 
legal reform—an experiment pursued and then abandoned in the face of 
growing criticism. The Queen’s Proctor’s failure reveals much about the 
nature and limits of the common-law system in practice: where cross-
 examination fi t comparatively smoothly into an adversarial model, the 
Queen’s Proctor generated a steadily tightening knot of contradictions. We 
are increasingly accustomed to thinking about marriage as a contract with 
three parties: husband, wife, and the state.5 The Queen’s Proctor instanti-
ated the participation of the state in an unusually direct fashion, not only 
specifying the terms of the marriage contract, but actively trying to deter-
mine the true circumstances of marital disputes brought before the Divorce 
Court. He represented community interests within the context of an adver-
sarial proceeding, drawing upon community sentiment while compensat-
ing for the inadequacies of party-controlled fact-fi nding.
The history of the Queen’s Proctor also contributes to our growing 
understanding of how social norms as expressed through narratives and 
legal regimes interacted in marital cases. The analysis of law’s use of sto-
ries has been particularly fruitful in the study of marital disputes, in which 
strong social norms structure (often confl icting) ideas of the “just” resolu-
tion of a problem. As Austin Sarat and William Felstiner have demonstrated 
in their work on contemporary divorce cases, marital litigation brings a 
broad range of people into contact with the law, many of whom seek vindi-
cation of their own narratives rather than having specifi c fi nancial and legal 
goals.6 Scholar ship on the history of marriage in the United States by Norma 
Basch and Hendrik Hartog also demonstrates the infl uence of the narrative 
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approach. Basch’s work uses the idea of narrative framing to structure her 
analysis; in her introduction she devotes particular attention to the role of 
narrative construction in divorce suits, where stories are shaped to meet for-
mulaic legal requirements.7 Hartog, meanwhile, describes the same concept 
as role-playing, noting that legal subjects “assume[d] identities recognizable 
in law” and attempted to “impose identities on their opponents.” Failure 
to undertake this project of narrative adaptation might deprive one of legal 
recourse: many adulterers, for example, “lived complicated lives that might 
never fi t into the stories that the law recognized as justifying divorce.”8
Nineteenth-century English divorce cases introduce an additional 
complication to our thinking about storytelling in such cases. What hap-
pens to social expectations of stories when all the participants are expected 
to lie? As we have already seen in chapter 1, the nineteenth-century Divorce 
Court was considered a “playground of perjurors.”9 According to received 
wisdom, the extraordinarily harsh social penalties for such transgressions 
guaranteed that women would always lie when accused of adultery; al-
though the consequences for men were less severe, their chivalrous desire 
to protect the reputations of their paramours made them equally unreliable. 
Indeed, under the circumstances, honesty from the male partner in the re-
lationship could seem downright ungentlemanly. In the course of an 1859 
parliamentary debate, for example, the Lord Chancellor noted that “his 
experience had shown him that it was considered a point of honour for a 
man to shelter the partner of his guilt” in cases of adultery.10 Given these 
social norms, even the most artful cross-examination seemed powerless to 
bring the truth forward. As a result, England’s response to the problem of 
mendacious divorce plaintiffs was both extreme and unique.
While suspicion of party-controlled narratives and wistful compari-
sons with continental criminal procedure form a signifi cant current in U.S. 
legal thought, little attention has been directed to the possible results of 
any attempt to graft inquisitorial elements onto common-law procedure. 
The experience of the Queen’s Proctor provides a cautionary tale for those 
who seek to circumvent party-controlled narratives. In nineteenth-century 
Britain, “facts” susceptible to proof—in particular, the act of adultery—
were thought superior to the unreliable stories that parties presented. By 
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reducing the analysis of complicated divorce cases to a simple “did he or 
didn’t he?,” the Queen’s Proctor made it seem as if such cases were simple 
to resolve—a matter of applying a bright-line rule to relatively uncompli-
cated facts. This apparent simplicity, however, concealed an array of new 
diffi culties. Most importantly, these evidentiary preferences effectively re-
wrote the substantive law of intervention in divorce cases, shifting the em-
phasis away from collusion and toward adultery, creating a harsher regime 
than even England’s conservative lawmakers had intended.
Despite the Queen’s Proctor’s anomalous status in Anglo-American 
legal history and highly public role in regulating divorce, it has received sur-
prisingly little scholarly attention.11 This chapter seeks to fi ll this gap with 
a more detailed study of the fi rst quarter century of the Queen’s Proctor’s 
activities, from 1861 to 1884. In particular, it employs archival records and 
newspaper accounts of unreported cases to generate a more comprehen-
sive portrait of those activities than can be gleaned from the highly selective 
minority of cases that were reported at the time. During these twenty-four 
years, the Queen’s Proctor intervened in at least 216 cases, of which only 
33 were reported.12 This chapter examines 171 cases, of which 146 provide 
details on the case from decree nisi through fi nal disposition.
The Divorce Court
England was comparatively slow in legislating for divorce, unlike both 
the United States and France. The Divorce Court was established only in 
1857 in London.13 While the creation of a judicial court to hear divorce 
cases was path-breaking, given that divorce had previously been obtain-
able only through a private bill in Parliament, the new legislation was less 
innovative in its substantive defi nition of divorce.14 Divorce was available 
to the husband on the basis of his wife’s adultery; a wife, meanwhile, had to 
prove adultery combined with some other marital offense, such as cruelty, 
desertion, incest, bigamy, rape, or sodomy. Critics thought that this double 
standard prompted collusive cases, as adulterous husbands either feigned 
aggravating circumstances or asked their wives to pretend to commit adul-
tery. The court was headed by one judge—known as the Judge Ordinary 
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until 1873, after which he was known as the President—and had jurisdic-
tion over admiralty and probate matters, as well as matrimonial causes.
Shortly after the Divorce Court’s establishment, moves began to 
reform it. The original structure of the court was thought to be defi cient 
on a number of grounds. First, one judge could make scant headway on 
the hundreds of cases that arrived yearly. Second, the publicity of divorce 
cases was thought to endanger public morals, particularly given the atten-
tion they received in newspapers. Third, lawmakers feared that collusion 
was making a mockery of the substantive law. This third concern became 
the justifi cation for the Queen’s Proctor’s role in the Divorce Court.15
In 1859, the Lord Chancellor proposed that the Attorney General 
be notifi ed as part of every divorce petition; the Attorney General, in turn, 
would be able to institute inquiries if he felt there was reason to suspect col-
lusion. Critics maintained that this new responsibility would be an imposi-
tion on the already overworked Attorney General, so the Lord Chancellor 
soon modifi ed his proposal to have the judge of the Divorce Court notify 
the Attorney General “whenever they thought it desirable.”16 The House 
of Commons, however, defeated this proposal. Members objected to the 
apparent duplication of proceedings and to the lack of provisions giving 
the Attorney General the power to conduct the investigations for which 
he was asked to assume responsibility. As one member concluded, “Alto-
gether the clause was so crudely framed and seemed so insuffi cient for the 
objects desired, that, unless it could be amended, he must vote against it.”17 
Nor were members of Parliament the only ones with reservations: the Law 
Times quoted the Lord Chancellor’s opposition to the proposal, saying that 
the true question “is not whether collusion is possible in one case in fi ve 
hundred, but is it right to burden the 499 honest cases with the needless 
cost, delay and inconvenience of an investigation.”18
The following year, the proposal reappeared. In addition to autho-
rizing the Queen’s Proctor to appoint counsel to represent the undefended 
side in cases where the respondent failed to appear, a new bill gave the 
Queen’s Proctor power to investigate suspected cases of collusion.19 By 
making the Queen’s Proctor the responsible offi cial, rather than the over-
burdened Attorney General, the main objection to the previous year’s bill 
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was overcome. The Queen’s Proctor was a part-time offi ce held by a civil-
ian—a lawyer trained in canon law—who was responsible for looking after 
the crown’s interests in cases of intestacy and other causes. Intervention 
in divorce cases would substantially expand his responsibilities but would 
not swamp an already busy offi ce. Robert Rolfe, Lord Cranworth then of-
fered the amendment that would become the basis for the Queen’s Proctor’s 
jurisdiction: all divorce decrees were henceforth to be decrees nisi, subject 
to rescinding by the court.20 The Queen’s Proctor had three months after 
the decree nisi to fi le a motion to intervene on the grounds of suspected 
collusion or suppression of material facts. If the Queen’s Proctor received 
the Attorney General’s permission to proceed with the case, he could re-
tain counsel and subpoena witnesses for what was effectively a second trial 
before the Divorce Court.21 Despite some grumblings from the House of 
Commons as to the expense of the new offi ce, the bill passed without fur-
ther incident and became law in August 1860.22
Two areas of crucial importance for the later development of the 
Queen’s Proctor emerge from the parliamentary debate and contemporary 
reactions: community participation in identifying abuses and the defi nition 
of collusion. Parliament expressed an unusual concern with encouraging 
community participation in the activities of the Queen’s Proctor. The task 
of rooting out collusion, a number of lords suggested, should be partially 
delegated to the neighbors of the petitioners seeking a divorce. Speaking 
for the bill in Parliament, the Attorney General expressed skepticism of the 
ability of the Divorce Court judge to provide a suffi cient bulwark against 
collusion in undefended cases, noting from his experience overseeing the 
court that “the Judge was unable to ascertain anything relative to the ante-
cedents of the parties to a suit, or the position of the witnesses, beyond that 
which the counsel for the petitioners might think proper to furnish from 
his instructions.”23 To remedy this problem, Lord Cranworth proposed a 
system of community notifi cation: the court would grant a provisional de-
cree nisi and then “issue notices to the neighbourhood in which the parties 
lived, so as to afford any person who was aware of any collusion between 
the parties an opportunity of coming before the Court before a fi nal decree 
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was pronounced.”24 Advocates of the Queen’s Proctor held out particular 
hope for friends and relatives as informants.25
Lord Henry Brougham’s speeches and writings before the act’s pas-
sage provide a clue to the origin of this somewhat unusual recourse to popu-
lar input outside the traditional channel of the jury. In a proposal submitted 
to the Law Amendment Society, Brougham referred to the experience of 
the House of Lords as a model to draw upon: “In the House of Lords,” he 
wrote, “divorces have often been prevented in consequence of suggestions 
made to individual peers, which led to sifting of the case, brought forward 
by collusion, and as it were conspiracy, of parties—suggestions which of 
course cannot be made to the judges of a court.”26 By adopting the practice 
of the House of Lords, the Divorce Court reformers preserved an element 
of popular participation and laid the groundwork for presentation of the 
Queen’s Proctor as representative of the public interest.
This element of popular participation also attracted criticism, how-
ever, albeit from an enraged minority. One contributor to Law Magazine 
and Review compared the Queen’s Proctor to the Venetian stone recep-
tacles for anonymous accusations, or bocce del leone:
In Venice there existed a much-prized institution. Whoever 
knew too much of his fellow-man or woman disburdened him-
self of his plethora of knowledge by imparting it into the mouths 
of one of the Lions which stood on the Giant’s staircase [at the 
Doge’s palace]. This valuable institution, long since disused in 
the place of its birth, has . . . been transferred to a new locality, 
viz., London. The Attorney General and the Queen’s Proctor 
have become the lions’ mouths, and are to tell the Court all that 
the public in general, or spies in particular, know about any 
petitioner or any respondent.27
By invoking Venice, the contributor played on a favorite Victorian anxiety: 
the fear of becoming a mercantile empire fallen into tyranny and despotism 
with a democratic citizenry co-opted into the service of a police state.28
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In the second topic appearing throughout the House of Lords’ de-
bate, agreement on a defi nition of collusion proved elusive. Shortly after 
the act’s passage, the Solicitors’ Journal sought to distinguish the varieties 
of collusion:
we may class the cases generally as follows:—fi rst, cases where 
one party commits adultery with the connivance of the other, 
for the purpose of qualifying the adulterer for, or of enabling 
the other party to procure, a divorce; secondly, where, without 
adultery, the parties conspire to impose upon the Court, and 
obtain its judgment by putting forward a false case, or keeping 
back the true one . . . ; and thirdly, where there has been mere 
passive connivance or insensibility to dishonour, and it is im-
possible to discover the real motives of the parties.29
It was only in the second case, the Solicitors’ Journal thought, that a Queen’s 
Proctor could conceivably protect the court from abuse. The indefatigable 
Lord Brougham, a law reformer for all seasons, tried to develop his own 
typology: “There are two types of collusion, one from the mere common 
purpose of the parties, who being . . . equally desirous of divorce, make 
almost all such cases really undefended; the other when there has been 
such connivance as shews that the offence was committed with the design 
of causing a dissolution of the marriage.”30 The dividing line between the 
two was action. Parties committing acts with the sole design of attaining a 
divorce fell into the second category. While he considered the former less 
culpable than the latter, Brougham argued that the court should be able to 
investigate both sorts of collusion.
Skeptics argued that with these new measures, Parliament had dan-
gerously broadened the defi nition of collusion. Previously, in the ecclesi-
astical courts, collusion had been narrowly defi ned as the agreement for 
one party to commit (or appear to commit) adultery in order to obtain a 
divorce; under the new parliamentary defi nition, collusion included any 
agreement to present and prosecute a false petition.31 As one essayist in the 
Law Magazine and Review observed in 1874, collusion under the Divorce 
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Act had come to encompass any “agreement between the parties as to the 
institution or conduct of the suit itself.”32 Later, the defi nition of collusion 
would become still more expansive, so that by 1880 collusion included 
any agreement between parties to withhold material facts that might be ad-
duced as evidence in support of a countercharge.33 The link between these 
defi nitions was an agreement between the parties; as we will see, however, 
by the end of the nineteenth century collusion would be defi ned by some 
as concealing relevant facts from the court, whether or not the other party 
agreed to hide them.34
After the establishment of the Queen’s Proctor, several minor changes 
were made. Six years later, for example, Parliament opted to lengthen the 
time for intervening from three months to six months.35 In 1873, this was 
followed by an extension of jurisdiction to cases involving suits for nullity 
of marriage.36 Concern about the Queen’s Proctor’s ability to force oppo-
nents to pay his costs led to legislation in 1878 making provisions for a vic-
torious party to charge costs to the Queen’s Proctor.37 This measure, how-
ever, seems to have been a dead letter until the early years of the twentieth 
century. Finally, as mentioned in chapter 1, in an abortive reform attempt in 
1888, Mr. Darling, a Queen’s Counsel and member of Parliament, offered a 
bill that would enable either the judge or the jury in Divorce Court to im-
mediately consider whether a co-respondent had been guilty of perjury and 
pass sentence as if he or she had been indicted and convicted through the 
regular process. Darling withdrew his bill within two weeks of introducing 
it, but the extreme measures he proposed suggest the extent to which per-
jury in the Divorce Court was publicly perceived as a threat.38
Outside of the law regarding the Divorce Court itself, one other sig-
nifi cant change affected divorce suits during this period. The prohibition 
on parties giving evidence in suits “arising from adultery” was fi nally abol-
ished in 1869. As we saw in chapter 1, adultery and breach of promise had 
been exempted from previous legislation allowing interested parties and 
witnesses to testify.39 Even Lord Denman, an otherwise stalwart proponent 
of admitting all possible evidence—his father wrote the fi rst legislation to 
allow interested witnesses to testify— expressed his reservations about 
this reform by asserting that in adultery cases he “would never consent to 
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put a man into the position of either being obliged to commit perjury or 
to betray the partner of his guilt.”40 Furthermore, other critics noted that 
such perjury would be virtually immune from prosecution, because it was 
seen as excusable.41 Nonetheless, despite the strong resistance to allowing 
evidence on adultery, momentum for reform came from the frustration of 
Divorce Court judges, who protested that the law was irrational, given that 
parties could testify to adultery in other proceedings. The judges’ views 
eventually carried the day, and in 1869, after several abortive attempts, the 
Evidence Further Amendment Act became law, allowing parties to be com-
petent (but not compellable) witnesses in suits arising from adultery.42 This 
change, discussed in more detail in chapter 5, meant that the Queen’s Proc-
tor had access to testimony delivered in court, by the parties, regarding 
adultery from 1869 on.
The Queen’s Proctor in Action
In 1909, a Royal Commission on Divorce and Matrimonial Causes 
was convened to reconsider the law of divorce, particularly its accessibility 
to the poor and the ongoing controversy regarding the publicity of Divorce 
Court proceedings.43 Among the witnesses were Hamilton Cuffe, the Earl 
of Desart, who had just stepped down after fourteen years as the King’s/
Queen’s Proctor; Lord Chief Justice Richard Webster Alverstone, who, as 
Attorney General, had supervised the activities of the King’s Proctor; the 
current President of the Divorce Court; and numerous solicitors and bar-
risters who practiced before the court. Many of these individuals had ex-
perience with the Divorce Court dating back into the 1880s. By combining 
their published testimony with the limited records of the Queen’s Proctor 
from the late 1870s and 1880s preserved in the Public Records Offi ce at 
Kew, and with other sources, we can piece together a general description 
of the Queen’s Proctor’s practice, including how the Queen’s Proctor ob-
tained information about suspicious cases, investigated them, and selected 
a few for intervention.44
The fi rst step toward an intervention began with the Queen’s Proc-
tor’s receipt of information alerting him to something suspicious in a di-
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vorce case before the decree nisi was made absolute. Over time, the Queen’s 
Proctor moved from largely passive reception of information to a more 
active role. Testimony before the Royal Commission describes the later, 
more active role, in which a majority of cases were identifi ed either by the 
judge of the Divorce Court or by the Queen’s Proctor himself. According 
to one solicitor testifying before the commission, the Queen’s Proctor was 
usually “put on the scent” by aspects of divorce cases that the judge singled 
out as requiring further investigation.45
Sir John Bigham, President of the Divorce Court, described the se-
lection of cases by judges: “It depends on the judge, who may notice dur-
ing the evidence some circumstances that he thinks suspicious. He may 
then put questions himself to the witnesses, and if his suspicions appear to 
be well founded, or if he thinks they are well founded, then what he does, of 
course, is to send the case to the King’s Proctor.” The judge, in turn, relied 
in part on the cooperation of the bar. As Bigham pointed out in his testi-
mony, “it is supposed to be the duty of the counsel in an undefended case 
to bring to the notice of the judge any circumstances of which he may be 
cognizant pointing to collusion, a duty which I know has been admirably 
performed by counsel in the court.”46
Another way in which the Queen’s Proctor was able to monitor ongo-
ing cases without actually attending the Divorce Court was through short-
hand transcripts. All cases heard in the Divorce Court were taken down in 
shorthand. If the judge found a case suspicious, he could order the short-
hand notes transcribed and sent to the Queen’s Proctor. These notes were 
used in another way as well. According to the Earl of Desart, all the short-
hand notes of undefended cases were transcribed and sent to the Queen’s 
Proctor for review.47 Undefended cases were of particular interest because 
they were common, with some six hundred to seven hundred cases per year, 
and were typically heard in ten to fi fteen minutes.48 It was widely thought 
that collusion in undefended cases was both more common and harder to 
detect, because the judge had so little information to go on.49 Hard-fought 
cases, meanwhile, were thought to be relatively unproblematic.50
Beginning around 1880, the records of the Queen’s Proctor increas-
ingly refer to the Queen’s Proctor himself as the source of information. 
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Between 1880 and 1885, approximately two-thirds of the interventions 
are listed as being based on information from the Queen’s Proctor.51 This 
designation appears to encompass a variety of ways in which the Queen’s 
Proctor monitored ongoing cases. In one case, the registry records that the 
Queen’s Proctor’s suspicions were triggered by a police report from the 
Daily Telegraph.52 More frequently, however, the registry notes visits by 
the Queen’s Proctor’s assistant to the Divorce Court to peruse case regis-
ters. Given that around the same time the records cease naming the judge 
as a source of information, referrals from the judge must be included in this 
latter category.53
A large number of cases, however, were based on information from 
individuals in the community. Before the 1880s, letters provided the main 
source of the Queen’s Proctor’s information. After 1880, information pro-
vided by outsiders continued to play a role in generating cases, albeit a 
reduced one. Most of the letters the Queen’s Proctor received were iden-
tifi ed as coming from solicitors. Occasionally, other types of individuals 
appeared—including an estate agent, a plasterer, and the relieving offi cer 
of St. Pancras.54 Some solicitors were identifi ed as representing the parties, 
or their families and friends; others were similarly employed even if they 
were not identifi ed as such. Still other letters were anonymous. Newspa-
per coverage of divorce cases made it possible for community sentiment to 
generate the kind of protest Brougham envisioned when he argued for the 
establishment of the Queen’s Proctor.
In general, however, an aggrieved losing party or a close relative was 
the most likely source of the Queen’s Proctor’s information. Early on, the 
court established the acceptability of hearing evidence from parties or rela-
tions of parties, although it was occasionally contested by counsel.55 A fa-
vorite story of the supporters of the Queen’s Proctor related the anguish of 
the mother of a man involved in an adulterous relationship with a married 
woman. Upon seeing the news that her son’s paramour had been granted a 
divorce, the mother sought to inform the court of her unfi tness to receive a 
decree; but, under the previous restrictions on intervention, there was no 
way for the mother’s testimony to be communicated to the court.56 By con-
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trast, by the end of the period studied here, it had almost become expected 
that the source of information would be a relative.
Turning to the investigation of suspicious cases, the Queen’s Proctor 
was often in possession of a surprising amount of information from letters 
alone. In one case, the respondent’s solicitor sent the Queen’s Proctor fi ve 
signed affi davits; in another, an anonymous letter writer provided photo-
graphs.57 The Queen’s Proctor’s staff frequently met with letter writers and 
parties during the early stages of investigation. We know from the Queen’s 
Proctor’s registry that many investigations were conducted by solicitors 
working in the vicinity of the alleged malfeasance, and that some solicitors 
performed a great deal of this work. In 1884, the Queen’s Proctor Augustus 
Stephenson described the role played by London-based investigators, say-
ing that while he did employ local investigators, he “usually sends down 
persons from London to make inquiries” because “it is diffi cult work and 
local agents are often interested.”58 On at least one occasion, however, the 
Queen’s Proctor hired the author of a letter to act as his local agent.59 Many 
of the published accounts of cases mention affi davits, so it is probable that 
local solicitors sent affi davits to the Queen’s Proctor’s offi ce in London; un-
less the case was contested, there was little reason to compel witnesses to 
travel to the capital.
The expenses for the cases give a rough indication of the amount of 
effort involved in their preparation. From 1861 through 1873, costs ranged 
from £56 to £1,522, with twenty-nine cases coming in at more than £300.60 
While the Queen’s Proctor could ask the judge to award costs when he suc-
cessfully proved collusion, the infrequency of such victories meant that 
Parliament paid for most of the Queen’s Proctor’s expenses until 1878, 
when the grounds for requiring defeated parties to reimburse the Queen’s 
Proctor were broadened. Moreover, the Queen’s Proctor did not hesitate 
to conduct extensive investigation of many more cases than those in which 
he eventually intervened. Investigations could easily go on for months, in-
volving dozens of interviews and prepared affi davits, as well as participa-
tion by both local and London solicitors, and by hired detectives, only to 
have the Attorney General decide at the last minute not to request leave 
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to  intervene.61 In his testimony before the commission, the Earl of Desart 
reported investigating between 306 and 631 cases per year over the previ-
ous fi fteen years and intervening in only between 11 and 33 cases.62 While 
it is diffi cult to determine how many cases were investigated in earlier pe-
riods, the relatively small number of interventions is typical. Parliamentary 
returns on the Queen’s Proctor’s activities from 1861 through 1876 show 
between zero and thirteen interventions yearly.63
Given the disparity between cases investigated and those in which 
the Queen’s Proctor intervened, what made the difference? From 1879 
through the early 1880s, we have records of the cases that were brought 
to the Queen’s Proctor’s attention. During this period at least, no type of 
case or source of information appeared to result in automatic intervention. 
The Queen’s Proctor refused to intervene in cases brought forth by the 
Judge Ordinary, by outraged aunts alleging collusion, by other relations, 
by anonymous letters, and by discontented losing parties.64 Provision of 
incriminating affi davits, photographs, or trial notes was also not necessar-
ily enough to spur the Queen’s Proctor to intervene.65
The Queen’s Proctor was clearly hesitant to intervene in cases in 
which the respondent claimed poverty as a reason for failing to put up a de-
fense. In one instance, however, he intervened when a respondent, James 
Bakey, wrote from the Mountjoy Convict Prison explaining that his incar-
ceration had prevented him from defending his wife’s petition. Bakey also 
disclosed details of his wife’s adultery. The Queen’s Proctor then investi-
gated, leading to an intervention that resulted in Caroline Bakey’s decree 
nisi being rescinded.66
While the witnesses before the Royal Commission in 1909 identi-
fi ed undefended cases as particularly interesting to the Queen’s Proctor, 
the early registries reveal a more complicated attitude. The registry shows 
the Queen’s Proctor’s assistant searching the lists of defended cases.67 Un-
defended cases, meanwhile, seem to have drawn more attention when 
they were defended at the outset. When a respondent or a co-respondent 
dropped a countercharge, or if there had previously been a cross-petition 
for divorce or a suit for judicial separation by the respondent, the Queen’s 
Proctor was likely to notice. The Divorce Court judges, meanwhile, seem 
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to have also responded to countercharges put forward by the respondent 
in selecting cases to refer to the Queen’s Proctor; evidence insuffi cient to 
block a decree nisi could serve as the basis for an intervention.68
The Queen’s Proctor’s interest in dropped countercharges refl ects a 
suspicion that sudden silence might indicate collusion; and it also points to 
what was arguably the most crucial factor in determining which cases would 
be selected for intervention: the probability that convincing proof would 
be forthcoming. Lord Alverstone, who was responsible for approving in-
terventions as Attorney General, suggested why so few cases progressed 
to intervention. He insisted on a standard of full proof before proceeding 
to trial: “I never allowed the King’s Proctor to intervene unless I thought 
he was certain to be successful.”69 But what constituted convincing proof ? 
We turn now to that question.
From Suspicious Stories to Incontrovertible Facts
On a pleasant Saturday in July 1876, a horse brought to a close the 
fi rst chapter in the history of the Queen’s Proctor. Francis Hart Dyke, who 
had held the offi ce since 1851, was thrown by his mount while riding near 
Windsor and subsequently died from his injuries. Dyke had a long history 
as a civil lawyer, beginning practice in Doctor’s Commons in 1825 and serv-
ing as the Registrar of Canterbury. When he assumed the offi ce of Queen’s 
Proctor, his responsibilities were largely limited to obtaining letters of ad-
ministration for the crown in intestacy cases.70 The 1860 statute giving the 
Queen’s Proctor power to intervene in divorce cases dramatically expanded 
his role. Dyke adapted to the change and served as Queen’s Proctor for the 
next sixteen years. As a civilian, Dyke represented the continuity of the new 
Divorce Court with previous ecclesiastical law governing marriage, but his 
successor came from quite a different background. Augustus Keppel Ste-
phenson, the son of the Chief Commissioner of the Inland Revenue, had 
been called to Lincoln’s Inn in 1852 and took a position with the Treasury 
Solicitor’s offi ce in 1856.
One year before Dyke’s untimely death, Stephenson had been ap-
pointed Treasury Solicitor. His appointment as Queen’s Proctor,  therefore, 
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marked the institutional incorporation of the Queen’s Proctor within the 
Treasury Solicitor’s offi ce. Subsequently, Stephenson would become the 
second Director of Public Prosecutions in 1884, as the work of that offi ce 
was also incorporated into the Treasury Solicitor’s offi ce. Stephenson, a 
“man of strong opinions,” is credited with that “naked ‘take-over’ ” through 
his “sheer forcefulness.”71 Stephenson also accelerated changes in the se-
lection of prosecution of divorce cases. During Stephenson’s tenure, the 
trend toward focusing on adultery cases solidifi ed, largely determining the 
pattern of interventions for the remainder of the century.
The Queen’s Proctor’s approach to intervention thus changed from 
the fi rst period, when the offi ce was held by Francis Dyke, to the second, 
when it was held by Augustus Stephenson, with adultery overshadow-
ing collusion as the dominant rationale. This shift was a consequence of 
the diffi culties the Queen’s Proctor encountered in bringing cases based 
on collusion. Under the statute establishing the Queen’s Proctor’s respon-
sibilities in divorce cases, intervention was authorized in cases of collu-
sion or where parties withheld material facts from the court; other reasons 
cited for intervention echoed the grounds for preventing a divorce under 
ecclesiastical law, including condonation, connivance, conduct conducing 
(for example, a husband’s desertion or cruelty might be taken as conduct 
“conducing” his wife’s adultery, even if it fell short of grounds for divorce), 
and, of course, the petitioner’s own adultery. Collusion was the Queen’s 
Proctor’s clearest mandate, but straightforward cases of collusion proved 
few and far between.
From the beginning, the Queen’s Proctor encountered substantial 
problems establishing proof of collusion, understood as an agreement be-
tween parties to mount a false case. As the counsel for the Queen’s Proctor 
in Gethin v. Gethin dolefully informed the Judge Ordinary in a case he 
was about to lose, “collusion, like bribery, could never be directly proved; 
it could only be established by results.”72 The Law Journal, meanwhile, 
thought that the Queen’s Proctor’s lack of success was “because parties 
who act in collusion manage matters very skillfully.”73 The Queen’s Proc-
tor’s diffi culty proving collusion may have been exacerbated, indirectly, by 
a statutory provision in force until 1878 that allowed him to recover costs 
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from a defeated opponent only when the intervention alleged and proved 
collusion.74 As a result, the Queen’s Proctor may have been tempted to 
charge collusion in cases where he had little possibility of substantiating 
the allegation.
Even cases in which the circumstantial evidence of collusion seemed 
highly persuasive were liable to be dismissed. In Cox v. Cox, for example, 
no collusion was found even though the petitioning wife was represented 
in her suit by her supposedly estranged husband’s solicitor.75 In Poore v. 
Poore and Lake, the Queen’s Proctor demonstrated the “attendance of 
the respondent, co-respondent, and co-respondent’s mother at the offi ce 
of the petitioner’s solicitor during the preparation of the suit,” which the 
Judge Ordinary thought “most suspicious” but nonetheless did not fi nd 
to be conclusive evidence of collusion.76 Similarly, the Solicitor General, 
appearing for the Queen’s Proctor, confessed in another case that “he had 
no legal proof of collusion, although there was probably a good legal un-
derstanding between the parties, as the co-respondent, who was a wealthy 
man, had lived with the respondent and Mr. Gavaron [the petitioner] had 
for the last 10 or 11 years lived with another woman at his chambers in 
Clifford’s-inn.”77
One of the few cases in which the Queen’s Proctor successfully es-
tablished collusion, Barnes v. Barnes and Grimwade, is the exception 
that proves the rule. In Barnes, the petitioning husband not only granted 
his estranged wife an allowance, but also had several interviews with her 
both before and after petitioning for divorce, promising that if she did not 
oppose the petition he would “be a friend to her” and “would not hurt a 
hair of the co-respondent’s head.” One of these interviews apparently took 
place in a public house.78 With this as the standard, it is unsurprising that 
the Queen’s Proctor rarely succeeded in proving collusion.
The cases examined reveal that, in the early years, the Queen’s Proc-
tor often charged the petitioner with collusion and adultery but succeeded 
in proving only the adultery.79 In what is probably a response to these 
early verdicts as well as an effort to expedite cases, Divorce Court judges 
often decided cases, or urged juries to decide cases, solely on the ques-
tion of adultery, even when the Queen’s Proctor offered other allegations.80 
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 Occasionally, judges even refused to hear evidence of other charges. In Ra-
venscroft v. Ravenscroft, Smith and Whitney, the Judge Ordinary cut off 
testimony after the question of adultery, saying that “it was unnecessary to 
go into any further evidence, because the end of the intervention was at-
tained as soon as it was proved that the petitioner had been guilty of an act 
of adultery, for his petition must then be dismissed.”81
Shortly before Francis Dyke’s death, the Queen’s Proctor had been 
tarnished by several high-profi le defeats, particularly in what the Law 
Times called “the two recent and notorious trials of Van Reable v. Van Re-
able, and Gladstone v. Gladstone.”82 Van Reable involved a dispute between 
two foreigners working in England as language instructors. Amelie Van Re-
able accused her husband Alphonse of adultery and cruelty and received 
a decree nisi after he made no offi cial answer to her charges. He did, how-
ever, submit an affi davit to the court containing countercharges. The court 
then passed the affi davit along to the Queen’s Proctor, who decided to in-
tervene, accusing Amelie of adultery and collusion. In an unusual example 
of an allegation of physical cruelty committed by a wife, the Queen’s Proc-
tor alleged that she “pulled and tore his whiskers, and scratched his neck 
and hands with her nails, and, on one occasion in the end of the year 1871, 
threw herself on the respondent and seized him by the throat nearly suffo-
cating him, saying at the same time she wished he was dead.”83
The trial was unusually lengthy, lasting fi ve days, and focused on 
the accusation that Amelie had committed adultery with Captain Brutton, 
the son of a next-door neighbor. Captain Brutton had rented a room from 
Amelie, and the Queen’s Proctor urged the jury to consider that “this inti-
macy was inconsistent with innocence.” Amelie maintained that they were 
merely good friends and strongly protested their innocence in what the 
Times called “a remarkable confl ict of testimony.”84 Despite a strong sum-
mation in the Queen’s Proctor’s favor by the judge, who deemed Amelie’s 
friendship with Captain Brutton “calculated in the highest degree to excite 
suspicion,” the jury was clearly unconvinced. After only ten minutes’ delib-
eration, they rejected all the Queen’s Proctor’s allegations.85
The Gladstone’s divorce case, meanwhile, was still more hotly con-
tested than the Van Reables’. Like Van Reable, this was a petition for divorce 
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brought by the wife, and the Queen’s Proctor intervened on the basis of col-
lusion and adultery. Unlike the Van Reable case, however, the respondent 
had vigorously defended himself. In fact, Mrs. Gladstone’s counsel argued 
against the charge of collusion on the basis of the “pertinacious nature” of 
the divorce suit. The Queen’s Proctor also revived accusations of adultery 
presented by Captain Gladstone in the divorce trial, leading to an angry 
rebuke by the judge, who reminded the Queen’s Proctor that he could not 
call for a retrial of questions already determined by a jury. After a lengthy 
and contentious trial, in which the Queen’s Proctor was forced to with-
draw the charge of collusion at the eleventh hour, the jury found against the 
Queen’s Proctor on the remaining charge of adultery without even leaving 
their box.86
These two prominent failures resulted in unprecedented public 
criticism of the Queen’s Proctor. The Law Journal called for making the 
Queen’s Proctor liable for costs in the cases it lost. While the Queen’s Proc-
tor could receive costs from a defeated petitioner in cases in which collu-
sion was proved, no such provision allowed parties to recoup costs from 
the Queen’s Proctor, even where the interference might have been reck-
less or frivolous. As the Law Journal noted, the defense costs in both Van 
 Reable and Gladstone undoubtedly exceeded £1,000. The Queen’s Proctor 
“is fallible,” the Journal noted, “and as his mistakes infl ict grievous loss on 
innocent persons, it is only just that some means should be found either of 
limiting his actions or of compensating those who so suffer.”87 Both Parlia-
ment and the legal community responded to the call for reform. Parliament, 
as already noted, passed a measure in 1878 enabling the judge to award 
costs when the Queen’s Proctor failed to prove his case. The Legal Depart-
ments Commission, apparently wanting to rebuke Dyke without removing 
him from offi ce, recommended that, upon Dyke’s retirement, the business 
of the Queen’s Proctor be transferred to the Treasury Solicitor, rather than 
remaining an independent offi ce.88
Because of Dyke’s fatal accident, the transfer occurred shortly after 
the commissioners’ recommendation. The new Queen’s Proctor, Augus-
tus Stephenson, was clearly mindful of the criticisms mounted against his 
predecessor. He brought a new consciousness of costs to the selection of 
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cases.89 He was also much more hesitant than his predecessor in interven-
ing in highly contentious cases. Instead of searching for collusion in murky 
and suspicious cases such as Van Reable and Gladstone, Stephenson had a 
pronounced preference for the easy mark. He liked incontrovertible cases, 
particularly ones in which he could obtain a reversal without proceeding 
to trial. He also appears to have learned from Gladstone to differentiate the 
Queen’s Proctor’s intervention from countercharges raised in the divorce 
trial. Even where the divorce trial generated a detailed list of allegations of 
adultery, the Queen’s Proctor was certain to provide additional names.90 
All of these changes served to accelerate the shift away from accusations of 
collusion toward proof of adultery.
By the early twentieth century, this shift had become so pronounced 
that the Queen’s Proctor’s trials were referred to as “adultery trials.” In 
contrast, in one early case, counsel for the petitioner questioned whether 
the Queen’s Proctor could intervene on the basis of alleged adultery alone, 
given that the statute authorizing interventions mentioned only collusion.91 
Once the emphasis shifted to adultery, what did the Queen’s Proctor have 
to show to persuade a judge or a jury that the alleged act had occurred? 
Although proving adultery was easier than proving collusion, the Queen’s 
Proctor still needed to provide a suffi ciently detailed allegation.92
Proving adultery in court had literary parallels in the growing genre 
of novels concerned with the discovery of adultery. At the same time as the 
Queen’s Proctor searched for “irresistible inferences” of adultery, novels 
featuring adultery and divorce grew in popularity.93 Barbara Leckie iden-
tifi es parallels between the way in which sensational novelists of the late 
Victorian period conveyed the slow realization of a partner’s adultery and 
the practice of the Divorce Court.94 In the typical novelistic formula, initial 
suspicion of a husband’s adultery is followed by an unwelcome disclosure 
by a servant. The distraught wife then seeks a formal denial from her hus-
band, but the denial’s effect is soon overwhelmed by the wife’s discovery 
of a written record, usually notes in her husband’s hand that trace the his-
tory of his infi delity. In the fi nal phase of discovery, the wife spies on her 
husband’s meeting with his paramour. Forensic discovery of adultery in 
the Queen’s Proctor’s cases both coincided with and departed from the tra-
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jectory of literary discovery that Leckie describes. Testimony by servants 
and spies and evidence in the form of letters did feature in Queen’s Proc-
tor’s cases, but they were overshadowed by the Queen’s Proctor’s preferred 
forms of evidence: legal documents and physical evidence. Where novels 
located the discovery of adultery in narratives—servants’ stories, diaries, 
and letters—the Queen’s Proctor shied away from stories in favor of facts 
less susceptible to contested interpretations.
Perhaps unsurprisingly, the Queen’s Proctor favored facts with a legal 
imprimatur. Conclusions generated in other court cases, witnessed mar-
riage certifi cates, and legal complaints signed by petitioners in other cir-
cumstances were seen as highly infl uential. As in the case of Elizabeth and 
James Castle, a marriage certifi cate from a bigamous second marriage was 
effective evidence. In a case of bad timing, one woman’s petition for divorce 
was defeated because she was named as a co-respondent in an uncontested 
divorce suit before her own decree nisi was made absolute.95 Similarly, a 
respondent’s prior criminal conversation suit against the petitioner’s lover 
was taken as convincing evidence against his claim that he did not know of 
his wife’s adultery.96
When legal documents were lacking, the Queen’s Proctor often 
turned to evidence from the body, specifi cally illegitimate children and ve-
nereal disease, both of which had the potential to be interpreted as conclu-
sive evidence of adultery. The existence of an illegitimate child constituted 
almost insurmountable evidence against a petitioner.97 Lavinia Sparks, 
for example, tried to contest evidence that she had given birth to a child 
while estranged from her husband, despite testimony from a nurse who 
identifi ed her as the mother, though she had used the name Mrs. Fisher. 
Sparks’s lover, Mr. Fisher, claimed that he had escorted a prostitute, not 
Mrs. Sparks, to the hospital and registered her under his name. The 
President would have none of the story, because Fisher had subsequently 
registered the child’s mother as “Lavinia Alberts Watkins,” Mrs. Sparks’s 
maiden name. Fisher protested that he was using an old friend’s name only 
for convenience, but the President was unsympathetic. He complained that 
Fisher had not only committed “a criminal act” if his story was true, “but 
the man who would say he had committed it was capable of any falsehood.” 
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Mrs. Sparks lost her case, and her decree nisi was rescinded.98 Another 
surefi re way to get one’s decree nisi rescinded was to testify while pregnant 
with an illegitimate child: the Divorce Court came close to deeming such 
behavior contempt of court.99
While an illegitimate child was evidence generally used against a wife, 
children could be proof of a husband’s adultery, too. In Bowen v. Bowen and 
Evans, the petitioning husband was discovered to be living with another 
woman who had given birth to a child since the date of the decree nisi; he 
was presumed to be the father and the decree was rescinded.100 In another 
case, the Queen’s Proctor was able to present evidence of both bigamous 
remarriage and an illegitimate child, when the petitioner was found to have 
married a very pregnant bride, who gave birth two months later. The biga-
mous husband subsequently abandoned his petition for divorce.101
Another form of evidence from the body—the communication of ve-
nereal disease—invariably told against the husband rather than the wife. 
Venereal disease acquired after marriage was considered “practical proof 
of adultery,” and communication of the disease constituted legal  cruelty.102 
The Queen’s Proctor periodically included venereal disease and its commu-
nication among its allegations.103 But evidence of venereal disease was not 
as incontrovertible as an illegitimate child; in at least two cases the Queen’s 
Proctor intervened in response to countercharges of venereal disease but 
failed to prevent the decree nisi being made absolute.104
Many cases turned on evidence of cohabitation or frequent visita-
tions, although this was less defi nitive than the birth of a child or a biga-
mous marriage certifi cate. Two unmarried people living together as man 
and wife was considered defi nitive evidence of adultery.105 Neighbors tes-
tifying to frequent visitations by unmarried acquaintances could also serve 
as proof of adultery.106 In one case, Mr. Stocker, an engineer, tried to de-
fend himself against testimony that he was often visited at his lodgings by 
various women. He explained that “he was engaged in inventing a washing 
machine, and that he required [women’s] assistance in the experiments he 
was conducting.” The women in question, he maintained, were all expe-
rienced laundresses. The Judge Ordinary was unimpressed, and Stocker’s 
petition was dismissed.107
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As in novels, another form of commonly used evidence included tes-
timony from servants and hotel keepers, but this could be treacherous for 
the Queen’s Proctor. Hotel keepers and landlords could testify to parties’ 
simultaneous stays in shared bedrooms, but they could also be accused 
of misidentifi cation, particularly in the case of hotel chambermaids, who 
were thought unreliable.108 While the standard for identifi cation was lower 
in Queen’s Proctor’s interventions than in divorce cases, errors could still 
count against the Queen’s Proctor.109 One of the most dramatic defeats of 
the Queen’s Proctor came at the hands of an actress, Mrs. Wilson, who 
decisively refuted the testimony of hotel staff. Mrs. Wilson, who worked at 
the Birmingham Theatre under the name of Lillie Lonsdale, had received 
a decree nisi after complaining of her husband’s adultery and cruelty. The 
Queen’s Proctor intervened, accusing Mrs. Wilson of committing adultery 
with John Smith, a family friend and Birmingham solicitor, at the Eagle 
Hotel in Stafford. A chambermaid identifi ed Mrs. Wilson as the veiled lady 
she saw with Mr. Smith. Mrs. Wilson, however, was able to establish an 
alibi by showing that she had been at Llanbrynmair, in North Wales, and 
had gone to the train station there both the day of the alleged adultery and 
the following day to inquire whether a hamper had arrived for her. The 
stationmaster, a local shopkeeper, and the hotel landlady in Llanbrynmair 
were all able to testify to Mrs. Wilson’s presence there on the two days in 
question, making travel to Stafford a practical impossibility. The Judge Or-
dinary in the case did not even call on petitioner’s counsel to make a closing 
statement, but instead found for Mrs. Wilson immediately.110
In contrast to their dispositive role in adultery novels, letters could 
be ambiguous evidence in court, as the Queen’s Proctor found when he 
attempted to prove collusion in Marris v. Marris and Burke on the basis 
of a letter from the petitioner’s wife to her lover, which read as follows: 
“I went to Warser-gate yesterday, felt disappointed there was no note or 
message for me. Just had your whereabouts. The important question 
is fi nally  settled, and the article is waiting your claim. I have not felt so 
happy for years as now. Come or write me what you wish me to do; bet-
ter telegraph.”111 The Queen’s Proctor argued that this letter, because it 
came with the apparent endorsement of the petitioner (he had written the 
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address on the outside), proved collusion or connivance. The petitioner, 
however, argued that the “article” in question was not a reward or payment 
for the co-respondent, but rather was his wife herself, whom he was evict-
ing from his house. The Judge Ordinary agreed, granting the petitioner 
his decree. The Queen’s Proctor had better luck in Mayes v. Mayes, where 
the petitioner admitted in letters to being the father of his estranged wife’s 
child. He denied they were in his handwriting, but a special jury did not 
believe him.112
Like the unconvincing denial by husbands in novels, parties’ testi-
mony was rarely credited by the judge. In Boardman v. Boardman, the 
Judge Ordinary celebrated the fact that the parties could testify but cau-
tioned the jury that their testimony was not to be believed:
Whatever may be the result of the case, we must all rejoice that 
we have had the husband and the wife and the person alleged to 
have committed adultery with the wife in the witness box. Do 
not suppose that I mean to suggest that the assertion of those 
witnesses, that they did not commit adultery, is a very service-
able fact in the case, for we all know what human nature is, and 
the interest they have in denying the truth of such a charge; but 
the value of their testimony is that it has enabled them to an-
swer or explain all the little things which have been suggested 
about them.113
Similarly, in the divorce case of Ricketts v. Ricketts, the President dismissed 
the testimony of the respondent, saying that “he did not think the respon-
dent was a person worthy of credit.”114 But when the case came before Jus-
tice Butt, sitting in the Divorce Court, upon the Queen’s Proctor’s interven-
tion, Butt found the petitioner just as unbelievable: “It was impossible,” he 
said, “to take her word against that of all the other witnesses, among whom 
was a daughter of her own.”115 Butt seems to have been a general skeptic 
when it came to party testimony; in Willimot v. Willimot he was similarly 
dismissive of the petitioner, saying that “he could not accept anything that 
Willimot had said.”116
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By the late 1870s and 1880s, the Queen’s Proctor’s offi ce under Ste-
phenson had clearly become skilled at preparing an incontrovertible case 
of adultery, judging by the number of cases in which petitioners declined 
to defend themselves against the Queen’s Proctor’s charges.117 In Collins 
v. Collins, for example, the Times reported that “information reached the 
Queen’s Proctor that the petitioner herself had not led a reputable married 
life, and on this becoming known to the petitioner it was intimated that 
she should not resist his opposition to the decree.”118 Under Stephenson, 
the Queen’s Proctor’s intervention went unopposed in well over one-half 
of the cases from 1879 through 1884. Another indication of the Queen’s 
Proctor’s growing ability to develop an unanswerable case can be seen in 
the declining number of cases he lost. During the Queen’s Proctor’s fi rst 
decade, fi fteen decrees nisi were made absolute in fi fty-six interventions.119 
By the time of the Royal Commission in 1909, however, the King’s Proctor 
boasted a perfect record of thirty-one decrees nisi rescinded in thirty-one 
interventions during the previous year.
The Divorce Court and the Queen’s Proctor developed a procedure 
for voluntary withdrawal of divorce petitions rather than going through a 
trial. The Queen’s Proctor would fi le a plea calling upon the petitioner to 
show cause why the petition should not be dismissed. If the Queen’s Proc-
tor did not receive an answer to his plea by a certain date, an assistant in the 
Queen’s Proctor’s offi ce would swear out an affi davit testifying to the peti-
tioner’s failure to respond. The petition would subsequently be dismissed 
upon payment of the Queen’s Proctor’s costs.120 After 1878, the Queen’s 
Proctor could receive costs even in cases in which collusion was not al-
leged, and judges routinely awarded costs. Poor petitioners could arrange a 
payment schedule.121 By 1892, Stephenson noted, in a “large proportion of 
the cases in which the Queen’s Proctor takes action the parties abandon the 
decree nisi on the delivery by the Queen’s Proctor of his plea, showing the 
grounds of his intervention, and allow the decree to be rescinded without 
going to trial.”122 Fewer and fewer interventions, therefore, were heard by 
the Divorce Court judge.
While the Queen’s Proctor became skilled at presenting clear evi-
dence of adultery, the defi nition of collusion had become profoundly 
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 uncertain. The current President of the Divorce Court testifi ed in 1910 that 
all the King’s Proctor’s cases he had tried were cases of misconduct by the 
petitioner and that he had yet to encounter a true case of collusion.123 The 
Earl of Desart supported this testimony, saying that he intervened in, at 
most, between one and three cases of genuine collusion yearly.124 Lord Al-
verstone, however, stated, “I came to the conclusion, rightly or wrongly, 
early in my career as Attorney-General, that, practically speaking, the great 
majority of cases brought before me were collusive cases, that is to say, that 
the husband could not obtain a divorce according to our existing law if the 
facts had been known.”125 This assertion supported earlier testimony by a 
solicitor that “what has been held as collusion in the Divorce Court, I think, 
has been carried a very long way.”126 Alverstone’s defi nition implicitly ex-
panded the defi nition of collusion to include adultery by the petitioner, 
which, according to the Earl of Desart, made up the majority of the cases in 
which the Queen’s Proctor intervened.127
In effect, the Queen’s Proctor, rather than resolving the thorny di-
lemma of what, precisely, constituted collusion, opted for a “clean hands” 
doctrine derived from equity.128 As Henry Fenn, Court Reporter at the Di-
vorce Court for thirty-fi ve years, wrote:
[The King’s Proctor] has his duties to fulfi l, however unpleas-
ant they may appear on the surface to the lay mind, and future 
petitioners ought to be fully aware of the fact that they must 
come into Court with what is known as “clean hands”; that is to 
say, their past moral conduct must bear the strictest investiga-
tion, and be fully able to bear the “fi erce light,” which beats on 
suitors in the Divorce Court. Woe betide those who have not 
“clean hands” and who want relief from the marriage tie!129
At the end of his career, the Earl of Desart echoed Fenn in his testimony 
before the commission: “I have come to the conclusion that the principle 
that the petitioner must show clean hands before he or she can obtain a di-
vorce, should be maintained.”130 While a “clean hands” doctrine may have 
appeared to be an attractive solution to the potentially unlimited discre-
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tion embodied in the Queen’s Proctor’s remit, it too had unintended con-
sequences that would, in turn, hasten the Queen’s Proctor’s decline in the 
twentieth century.
A Double Standard?
While the Queen’s Proctor’s redefi nition of collusion and his con-
comitant focus on adultery were largely unplanned responses to practical 
problems, they were not inconsequential. They involved a striking depar-
ture from the Queen’s Proctor’s original responsibility as envisioned by 
Parliament. The ramifi cations of this shift, in turn, were paradoxical: with 
respect to the questions of the double standard and the judge’s discretion 
in divorce cases, the actions of the Queen’s Proctor served both to defer 
criticism and to heighten it. By the early twentieth century, they had laid 
the groundwork for new criticisms of both the Queen’s Proctor and the law 
of divorce itself.
The Queen’s Proctor’s turn to rooting out adultery as his primary 
mission served to further limit the availability of divorce, because estranged 
couples frequently established other relationships while still married.131 
The registry of Queen’s Proctor’s interventions for the 1880s contains a 
litany of couples discovered “acting as man and wife,” having illegitimate 
children together, and attempting to marry.132 Although the Queen’s Proc-
tor had been established to intervene in divorce cases in order to thwart 
couples who might act together to obtain a divorce they did not deserve, he 
now devoted his attention to marriages so defi nitively broken that the par-
ties had, in many cases, set up new relationships. The typical target of the 
Queen’s Proctor’s intervention, in short, was no longer a couple working 
together to escape matrimony, but a pair of long-separated individuals who 
sought divorce in order to regularize their new unions.
The double standard in the law of divorce, which made it more diffi -
cult for wives to end their marriages than for husbands, was apparently not 
replicated in the interventions of the Queen’s Proctor. Early on, the Queen’s 
Proctor had been more likely to intervene in cases in which the wife peti-
tioned for divorce, but this disparity soon subsided.  During the fi rst fi ve 
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years of the existence of the offi ce, women made up only 38 percent of pe-
titioners seeking divorce, but seventeen of the twenty-eight interventions 
were in cases brought by wives. During the last fi ve years of the period 
studied, in contrast, interventions in cases brought by women dropped 
dramatically as a percentage. Of the thirty-one cases studied, only nine 
involved intervention into cases brought by female petitioners, while the 
percentage of women as petitioners overall remained roughly constant at 
42 percent.133
Given the small sample size, it is unclear how much weight can be 
assigned to the earlier discrepancy. It may represent an early gender bias 
in divorce—many contemporaries saw divorce as “intended for the hus-
band.” This argument, however, seems to be contradicted by the fact that 
female petitioners at this time had equal or better luck winning decrees 
than their male counterparts.134 Also, in earlier cases, there is the sugges-
tion that “it looks more respectable for the husband to be charged with 
adultery than the wife.”135 Whatever the explanation for the early dispar-
ity, by 1910 Lord Alverstone did not hesitate to describe the typical case 
as involving a husband-petitioner: “I found in the great majority of cases 
where it turned out there had been collusion, the wife was the person who 
was charged, because the husband not unnaturally would not plead guilty 
to cruelty or desertion, and his adultery would not affect the object people 
had in trying to get a divorce; therefore, it was a very common thing for an 
undefended case to be a case of the wife’s adultery.”136 Thus, these fi ndings 
support Gail Savage’s conclusion that, while the Divorce Court itself was 
marked by gender bias, little such explicit bias can be found in the prosecu-
tion and conduct of Queen’s Proctor’s cases.137
One of the most striking aspects of the Queen’s Proctor’s focus on 
adultery is that it was at least nominally gender neutral. Unlike the substan-
tive law of divorce, which treated men and women differently with regard 
to adultery, the “clean hands” doctrine of the Queen’s Proctor held both to 
the same standard. This practice also departed from the common judicial 
pattern in the United States, in which the husband’s adultery, particularly 
with prostitutes or servants, would be treated as inconsequential.138 Practi-
cally speaking, of course, the nominally neutral “clean hands” doctrine was 
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superimposed on a situation in which women were doubly disadvantaged 
in pursuing divorces: fi rst, by the substantive law, and second, by the so-
cioeconomic realities that often compelled a deserted wife without a source 
of income to develop a new relationship outside of marriage. Victorian 
judges occasionally acknowledged this problem, but it was not until the 
Edwardian period that Divorce Court judges allowed it to weigh in their 
decision to grant a decree absolute despite evidence of adultery. Divorce 
Court judge Sir Bargrave Deane discussed this in his testimony before the 
Royal Commission:
There are certain cases . . . where women come into court and 
pray for a divorce on the ground that their husband has been 
guilty of cruelty and adultery, and they have sometimes admit-
ted that they themselves committed adultery, and pleaded ex-
tenuation, and sometimes it has been left to the King’s Proctor 
to fi nd out and bring it in on an Intervention. That is where the 
discretion of the Court comes in. If the petitioning woman has 
been guilty of adultery without excuse then we refuse relief, but 
if that woman has been driven into adultery by her husband—
many cases of that sort have been proved in court— driven on 
to the streets, put into such a state of penury and poverty that 
she has been obliged to go to the protection of some other man 
to be supported and to live, we give her the benefi t of our dis-
cretion, and give her a decree. But it is not so with men, be-
cause there is not the same temptation or compulsion exercised 
upon them. A man is never compelled to commit adultery, but 
women may be.139
The Ricketts case, in which judges had such different responses to 
the testimony of the parties, indicates the problems a separated wife faced. 
As we saw in the introduction, Harriet Ricketts petitioned for divorce on 
the basis of her husband William’s cruelty, adultery, and desertion. Wil-
liam then accused her of adultery with Silas Beasly, saying that she had 
represented herself as Beasly’s wife. Harriet responded that William had 
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repeatedly harassed her since their separation, coming to her work and ac-
cusing her of being no better than a prostitute. When she witnessed a hit-
and-run accident and had to give a statement to the police, Harriet said, 
she presented herself as Mrs. Beasly in order to hide from her husband.140 
One judge believed Harriet; a second did not, and her decree nisi was re-
scinded. But her testimony refl ects the vulnerability of separated wives and 
the inclination for them to seek the security of a second marital relation-
ship, even if illusory. Whether Harriet’s story was true or not, it nonethe-
less resonated closely enough with expectations to be taken seriously.
Why were judges eager to apply a symmetrical standard with regard 
to Queen’s Proctor’s interventions when they consented to an asymmetrical 
one with regard to divorce law? The answer may have to do with the equi-
table origins of the “clean hands” doctrine. Equity’s history as the protec-
tor of married women’s property rights, even in a limited fashion, may have 
infl uenced judges to view equitable remedies as open to men and women 
on an equal footing.141 Also, judges may have used the symmetry of the 
Queen’s Proctor’s intervention to assuage qualms resulting from the pat-
ent inequality of the substantive law of divorce. Signifi cant dissent among 
leaders of the bar had surrounded the asymmetry of divorce from its incep-
tion.142 As a consequence, having the highly public Queen’s Proctor inter-
vene in a more even-handed fashion may have helped ameliorate the issue 
for a time, until the reform of the substantive law of divorce in the twentieth 
century.
The question of the double standard in divorce blends into that of 
judicial discretion. But the dilemma of discretion was broader than just 
the inequality faced by women seeking divorce. Many cases, of course, 
never even reached a judge, as petitioners chose to withdraw their petitions 
rather than encounter the Queen’s Proctor in court. But among those who 
did go to trial, few would ever receive the benefi ts of the discretion allowed 
the Divorce Court judge under the statutory laws of divorce. While the 
investigative efforts of the Queen’s Proctor gave the judges a broad range of 
information to consider, and therefore the possibility of exercising discre-
tion to craft individually tailored outcomes, Victorian judges responded 
by seeking simplicity and avoiding discretion.143 The shift toward “proof ” 
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of adultery gave jurists a simple, apparently mechanistic application of law 
to facts. This allowed them to escape the painful and sometimes arbitrary-
seeming value judgments implicated in the evaluation of narratives. Vic-
torian judges vehemently rejected the suggestion that they should employ 
discretion in the Queen’s Proctor’s cases. In South v. South, petitioner’s 
counsel asked the court to exercise discretion and allow his client to be di-
vorced even though she admitted to committing adultery, because she had 
been married at age seventeen and deserted at eighteen:
The President asked whether counsel could refer to a single 
case in which the Court, on the petition of the wife, had dis-
solved her marriage, although it had been shown that she was 
guilty of adultery.
Mr. Sparham [petitioner’s counsel] replied that he was 
unable to refer to such a case, but he asked the Court to exer-
cise its discretion.
The President said that this was not a matter between the 
petitioner and the respondent. It was an intervention by the 
Queen’s Proctor.144
Similarly, in Bloice v. Bloice, the President doubted “whether the public 
had any interest in preventing the unhappy woman from getting a divorce 
from her worthless husband,” but he refused to grant her one nonetheless, 
saying it was the “duty of the Queen’s Proctor to act upon [the law], and 
therefore, whatever pity he might have for the woman in the circumstances, 
he must deal with the case upon the evidence as it stood.”145 By focusing on 
adultery, where guilt was apparently clear-cut, the Queen’s Proctor allowed 
the judges a means of avoiding the moral ambiguities and responsibilities of 
discretion, clothed in the rhetoric of public interest.146
The Victorian compromise that obscured the questions of gender 
equity and the proper scope of judges’ discretion under the mantle of the 
“clean hands” doctrine began to break down in the early twentieth century. 
Although popular novels are an uncertain measure of public sentiment, it 
is noteworthy that one of the Queen’s Proctor’s few literary appearances 
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occurred in an 1887 novel in which he was faulted for his failure to take 
action. In Rosa Campbell-Praed’s novel The Bond of Wedlock, the Queen’s 
Proctor does not intervene but is presented as speaking with the voice of 
the community nonetheless. Ariana Lomax, the novel’s heroine, is beauti-
ful and discontented with the limited fi nancial resources that her husband, 
Harvey Lomax, can command. Ariana’s father schemes with his gambling 
partner, Sir Leopold D’Acosta, to win Ariana a divorce so that she can 
marry Sir Leopold. Sir Leopold, clearly modeled in part on Benjamin Dis-
raeli, is a man-about-town, a romantic novelist, a member of Parliament, 
and an owner of an estate in Suffolk, a townhouse in London, and a polo 
ground. Traces of Jewish origin show in his visage, according to Campbell-
Praed.147 Ariana’s father makes a point of showing Sir Leopold bruises on 
Ariana’s arm, allegedly infl icted by Harvey, so that he will be able to testify 
to Harvey’s cruelty. The only remaining problem then is to induce Harvey 
to commit adultery. Sir Leopold pays a friend from the demimonde to se-
duce Harvey, while Ariana’s father turns amateur detective and spies on 
the two of them in a hotel in Folkestone, where they stopped on their way 
to Paris. With the necessary elements satisfi ed, Ariana braves the Divorce 
Court and receives a decree nisi.
After the decree, Harvey visits Ariana and attempts to persuade 
her to return to him, suggesting that Sir Leopold has paid her father to 
induce her to go through with the divorce. He asks Ariana whether she 
will marry Sir Leopold now, but Ariana refuses to answer. “I see,” Harvey 
responds. “You are wise not to answer questions. It would be a pity if the 
Queen’s Proctor were to intervene and spoil everything. Your father would 
be disappointed.”148 After a decent interval passes subsequent to the trial, 
the decree nisi is made fi nal, and it is announced that Ariana will marry Sir 
Leopold: “There was much talk then. Mothers with marriageable daugh-
ters were loud in their wailings that the great part of society should become 
the prize of a woman who had divorced her husband and was a mere no-
body. It was whispered that she and Sir Leopold had been in love with each 
other all along—that the Queen’s Proctor should have intervened—that 
Harvey Lomax had been paid.”149 Ariana goes ahead with her marriage, 
and Harvey commits suicide on the morning of the nuptials. Shortly after 
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their marriage, Sir Leopold loses interest in Ariana and begins an affair 
with Babette, the woman he hired to seduce Harvey. Also, Ariana’s father 
confesses that it had all been arranged to pay his gambling debts.150 The 
Queen’s Proctor remains passive on the sidelines, and community senti-
ment is disappointed as a result.
By the early twentieth century, however, critics of the King’s Proctor 
were far more likely to deplore his willingness to intervene. The 1909 Royal 
Commission also entertained several critics of the King’s Proctor. Freke 
Palmer, a solicitor, boldly called for the abolition of the offi ce: “[The King’s 
Proctor] accomplishes no good object. His only work is to endeavour to 
fi nd out that the successful party to a suit has been guilty of a matrimo-
nial offence, in order to permanently prevent the separation of two people, 
who, by the very nature of what has been proved, can never live together 
again, and who, by his intervention, are driven to lead irregular lives.”151 
Palmer was joined by George Henry Lewis, a solicitor who proposed ef-
fectively eliminating the King’s Proctor’s role by doing away with the six-
month waiting period.152 William Fairfax, head of the Divorce Law Reform 
Union, proposed substituting perjury prosecutions for the Queen’s Proc-
tor, saying that “two or three stiff sentences for perjury would do all the 
good the King’s Proctor could do in twenty years.”153 These critics were 
joined by the former Queen’s Proctor himself. In his memoirs, the Earl of 
Desart confessed “grave disquiet” that his interventions as Queen’s Proc-
tor did more harm than good by preventing incompatible couples from 
divorcing.154
These doubts about both the effectiveness of the Queen’s Proctor’s 
interventions and the wisdom of preventing divorce for those couples ap-
parently least capable of reconciliation continued to grow, contributing to 
the momentum behind changing the substantive law of divorce. In the mid-
1930s, collusive hotel divorces were held up to ridicule in Evelyn Waugh’s 
A Handful of Dust and A. P. Herbert’s Holy Deadlock.155 In successive leg-
islation in 1923 and 1937, Parliament changed many of the aspects of di-
vorce law that made the Queen’s Proctor’s intervention necessary.156 The 
changes ended the double standard that made divorce more diffi cult for 
wives to attain, leaving the prospect of collusion the only option open to 
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unhappy couples. Decades of criticism of the Queen’s Proctor’s denial of 
divorce to couples who had, for all practical purposes, ended their unions 
fi nally left their mark in the form of changed substantive law of divorce. 
As Gail Savage notes, “during the interwar period the King’s proctor be-
came a contemptible and pathetic fi gure, a lightning rod for pointed satire 
directed at the divorce law.”157 By singling out irreconcilable spouses who 
had formed new unions as a—if not the—primary focus of the Queen’s 
Proctor’s interventions, Augustus Stephenson’s attempt to make his offi ce’s 
activities more rapid and economical ultimately came to haunt his succes-
sors. Grafting an inquisitorial component onto the law of divorce, one of 
the most adventurous of Victorian experiments with developing engines 
for the production of truth had ended in public mockery.
You Can’t Have Too Many Facts, Or Can You?
The shift from competing narratives of collusion to factual evidence 
of adultery was both predicted and satirized by Anthony Trollope in his 
1868 novel He Knew He Was Right. Trollope, who had little sympathy 
with reforms in women’s legal status, condemned the use of detectives to 
“prove” adultery.158 He Knew He Was Right opens with the idyllic marriage 
of Emily and Louis Trevelyan, a young couple inexorably driven apart by 
Trevelyan’s suspicions. He attempts to forbid his young wife from seeing 
Colonel Osborne, a friend of her father’s. Insulted by the implication, Em-
ily in turn refuses to comply, demanding instead an apology from her hus-
band. Neither is willing to relent, and the two agree to live separately.
Trevelyan then resorts to a private detective, an ex-policeman named 
Bozzle, hiring him to keep watch on Emily, who has been sent to the coun-
tryside to live quietly with the mother of one of Trevelyan’s friends. Bozzle 
was “convinced that the lady whom he was employed to watch was—no 
better than she ought to be. That is the usual Bozzlian language for broken 
vows, secrecy, intrigue, dirt and adultery.”159 Bozzle explains his method 
to a disgusted Trevelyan: “Any gentleman acting in our way can’t be too 
particular,— can’t have too many facts. The smallest little,—tiddly things . . . 
do so often turn up trumps when you get your evidence into court.”160 Boz-
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zle then presents his employer with the fruits of his labors, informing him 
that Colonel Osborne “was let in at the front door by Sarah French, the 
housemaid, at 10:37 a.m., and was let out again by the same young woman 
at 11:41 a.m.”161 While the reader is aware that nothing more scandalous 
than stilted conversation occurred between Emily and the Colonel over 
those sixty-four minutes, it is enough to infl ame Trevelyan’s suspicions. 
Bozzle, meanwhile, is eager to oblige in the search for evidence: “ ‘If there’s 
billy-dous going between ’em we shall nobble ’em,’ said Bozzle. Trevelyan 
tore his hair in despair, but believed that there would be billy-dous.”162
Trevelyan succumbs over time to Bozzle’s partial view, becoming 
convinced that “no one but Bozzle would tell him facts,” and he “wanted 
facts, not advice. . . . Bozzle, either by fair means or foul, did get at the 
truth.”163 Trevelyan’s insistence on facts, rather than the advice of friends 
urging reconciliation, is a signpost marking his descent into monomania. 
He hires Bozzle to kidnap his own son, whom he then spirits off to a deso-
late hill-top villa in Tuscany. In Italy, Trevelyan’s insanity runs its course, 
stripping him of his reason, his Englishness (when Emily fi nds him, he has 
taken up wearing Italian peasant clothes), and his masculinity. Consumed 
by his madness, he at last consents to return to England as an emaciated 
invalid under Emily’s care. It is not a reconciliation, but merely an acknowl-
edgment that all that is left for Trevelyan is to await his own death, which 
shortly overtakes him.
As a caricature of a jealous spouse, Trollope’s portrait falls fl at; but as 
a caricature of the Queen’s Proctor, Trevelyan is uncomfortably accurate. 
Trevelyan’s unrelenting and disabling search for certain evidence of guilt 
leaves him incapable of understanding or communication. The Queen’s 
Proctor, as the offi ce developed under Stephenson, was motivated not by 
madness or jealousy, but economics and effi ciency. It nonetheless shared 
both Trevelyan’s crippling fear of delving into the complexities of compet-
ing narratives and his misguided faith in inquisitorial “facts” unmediated 
by explanation.
Legal scholars have also occasionally succumbed to the romance of 
facts. Scholars in this tradition have looked to continental criminal pro-
cedure, in which offi cers of the courts actively investigate cases, as an 
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 alternative to the common law’s reliance on party-controlled narratives.164 
The legal realist Jerome Frank, for example, eloquently expressed this anx-
iety about the consequences of adversarial fact-fi nding in his book Courts 
on Trial. Frank’s fact-skepticism—the idea that judicial outcomes depend 
on the specifi c facts of the case—led him to focus on the improvement of 
judicial fact-fi nding.165 He argued that “the just settlement of disputes de-
mands a legal system in which courts can and do strive tirelessly to get as 
close as is humanly possible to the actual facts.”166 The existing adversarial 
system, however, did not even approach this imperfect standard. Frank 
famously contrasted the “fi ght” theory of adversarial justice with “truth” 
theory, and found the former lacking: “Our present trial method is . . . the 
equivalent of throwing pepper in the eyes of a surgeon when he is perform-
ing an operation.”167 In Courts on Trial, Frank suggested a number of mea-
sures to bring truth and justice closer together. Among them, he advocated 
adoption of Queen’s Proctor– like investigators in civil cases: “Some few 
moves have been made in the right direction. In an English Divorce Court, 
an offi cial, the King’s Proctor, brings forth evidence, bearing on possible 
collusion, not offered by either contestant.”168 Writing in 1949, Frank was 
apparently unaware of (or uninterested in) moves to abolish the King’s 
Proctor in its country of origin.
This chapter has taken Frank’s suggestion seriously and used an 
in-depth study of this little-known experiment in English legal history to 
investigate the practical consequences of judicial attempts to introduce 
novel methods of producing truth in a context in which the usual reliance 
on cross-examination of party-controlled narratives seemed insuffi cient. 
Nonetheless, in the shift from untangling collusion to simply demonstrat-
ing adultery, the Queen’s Proctor preserved elements of narrative interpre-
tation. The Queen’s Proctor earnestly sought out facts capable of producing 
“irresistible inferences” of adultery in the minds of decision makers.169 In 
doing so, the Queen’s Proctor endeavored to have details evoke complete 
narratives, confi rming Robert Ferguson’s observation that “trials always 
function through a framework of storytelling.”170 Storytelling has its dan-
gers, however. The ways in which the Queen’s Proctor appealed to habits 
of interpretation during the Victorian era had real human consequences. 
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The Queen’s Proctor’s decisions left intact marriages in which the parties 
were clearly incapable of reconciliation. In particular, as we saw in the case 
of the Castles at the beginning of this chapter, the hunt for adultery by the 
petitioner meant that where estranged couples had found new partners, the 
Queen’s Proctor condemned all to a state of legal limbo.
The Queen’s Proctor also represents the ill-perceived dangers of try-
ing to adapt a common-law system to an inquisitorial model. While com-
mentators from Jerome Frank on have pointed to the fact that the common-
law trial develops “true” results only as a by-product of an adversarial or 
game-playing process,171 few have explored what the costs would be to 
adopt “truth” as a direct, rather than an indirect, goal. The history of the 
Queen’s Proctor, however, indicates that truth as a goal is likely to become 
simplifi ed into a test that is easily susceptible to what is commonly agreed 
upon to be proof, effacing the responsibility of judges while proclaiming its 
mechanistic simplicity. Grafting an investigative component onto an adver-
sarial system is likely to result in something neither fi sh nor fowl; neither 
fully investigatory, nor adequately responsive to the parties’ interests. Vic-
torian judges were unwilling to deal with the full range of possibilities pre-
sented by the Queen’s Proctor’s investigative capacities and instead sought 
to amalgamate the new element into the familiar formula of the bright-line 
rule. The Queen’s Proctor’s search for convincing evidence that would 
meet that bright-line test and coerce parties into withdrawing their peti-
tions came, over time, to resemble Louis Trevelyan’s monomania. Advice, 
discretion, and moral complexity were all neglected in the desperate search 
for conclusive facts.
Both the Queen’s Proctor’s efforts to represent the public’s interest 
in marriages and the Indian experiment with motivating community senti-
ment against lying and convicted liars were unsuccessful. Neither proved to 
be the engine of truth for which its proponents hoped. In both cases, chang-
ing aspects of the common-law trial—through use of either shame sanc-
tions or a third-party investigator—proved unable to manage a courtroom 
context thought to be dominated by willful perjury. Without a consensus 
on either the imposition of British rule in India or the substantive law of 
divorce, innovations at the level of institutions and procedure  addressed 
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symptoms but ignored the underlying problem, which derived from social 
and cultural contradictions that made jurists’ visions of objective coher-
ence impossible to realize in practice. Preconceptions about the difference 
between British and “native,” man and woman, upper class and lower class 
inevitably made their presence felt, shaping both substantive law and trial 
practice in subtle and not-so-subtle ways. In chapter 5, we look at a fi nal in-
stance of this revealing interaction between law reformers’ aspirations and 
the reality of social power: the debates that eventually led to the passage of 
the 1898 Criminal Evidence Act. These debates, as we will see, were infl u-
enced in surprising ways by the pursuit of adultery cases in Divorce Court 
and by the Queen’s Proctor.
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chapter  f ive
Adultery, Sex Offenses, and the 
Criminal Evidence Act of 1898
o n e  o f  t h e  m o r e  c u r i o u s  a s p e c t s   of nineteenth-century 
British legal history is the long delay between the reforms permitting testi-
mony from civil parties and those permitting it from criminal defendants. 
For much of the nineteenth century, Britain maintained a divided system, 
allowing the former testimony but not the latter. This time lag becomes 
less perplexing if considered in relation to the ongoing process of experi-
mentation with the production of truth in the courtroom described in the 
previous chapters. The efforts to control perjury can be seen, in part at 
least, as largely fruitless attempts to resolve the problem of deceitful testi-
mony in ways that could be used in the criminal courts. Despite this no-
table willingness to innovate, however, the gap remained until the passage 
of the Criminal Evidence Act of 1898, which allowed criminal defendants 
to testify. Given the mixed record of previous efforts to prevent witness 
deceit, jurists were understandably reluctant to allow testimony from those 
accused of criminal offenses—a group by defi nition strongly motivated to 
lie. The question, then, is what caused those jurists to change their minds. 
While the history of the 1898 act is complex, I argue that it can be seen in 
part as another in a long line of interactions between legal reason and social 
concerns: in this case, a revealing transformation in the nature of law re-
formers’ arguments for systemic coherence on the one hand, and a desire to 
protect the reputations of respectable defendants by giving them a chance 
to rebut scandalous accusations on the other.
The poster child for the silenced respectable defendant was Rev. 
Henry Hatch, an Anglican cleric, who also fi gured in chapter 1 in the account 
of the evolution of perjury prosecutions. Hatch’s career was ruined and his 
life disrupted by an accusation that he had sexually abused a  schoolgirl in 
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his care, Mary Eugenia Plummer, generally called Eugenia. She and her 
younger sister were boarding with Hatch, who was a schoolmaster. Euge-
nia alleged that Hatch had kissed her repeatedly, allowed her to share his 
bed, and molested her younger sister. Her accusation also blackened the 
reputation of Hatch’s wife, who could hardly have failed to notice the al-
leged abuse, since she was in an adjoining room at the time. After a criminal 
trial in which neither he nor his wife could testify, Hatch was convicted of 
indecent conduct. He then went on to make legal history in 1860 by pros-
ecuting Eugenia for perjury and winning a conviction. At her trial, both the 
Reverend Hatch and his wife Essie testifi ed against Eugenia. The spectacle 
of two contradictory convictions fueled widespread interest in the case.1
Hatch’s case was quickly seized upon as an example of the problems 
with a system of evidence that did not allow criminal defendants to testify. 
Shortly after the verdict against Eugenia Plummer, J. Pitt Taylor, the evi-
dence scholar and treatise author, wrote to the Times, calling it “one of the 
most extraordinary cases heard in an English court of justice” and holding 
it up as an example of the fl awed logic of the law of evidence.2 Pitt Taylor 
envisioned what he described as the natural mode of procedure dictated by 
common sense and contrasted it with the current system: “Let the jury hear 
what the husband and wife have to say. . . . Examine them separately, cross-
examine them astutely, and compare their statements with each other, and 
with the child’s.” But of course this could not occur. “O dear no,” Pitt Tay-
lor continued, “that will never do! They may state what is not true—they 
may mislead the weak jury. They must not be examined at all. The two best 
witnesses, next to the prosecutrix herself, are inadmissible to testify.”3 For 
Pitt Taylor, allowing testimony by the defendant (and his or her spouse) was 
the surest path toward veracity and protection of the innocent. He was not 
alone in that belief. For decades following the verdict, the Hatch case was a 
touchstone for reformers and a leading argument in the debates on both the 
Criminal Law Amendment Act and the Criminal Evidence Act. In 1876, it 
was referred to in the House of Commons as the “leading case” on the ineq-
uity of the exclusionary system of evidence.4 In 1891, the Lord Chancellor, 
later Lord Halsbury, who would also shepherd the 1898 Criminal Evidence 
Act through Parliament, refl ected on his experience as a young barrister 
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working on the Hatch case during his introduction of an earlier version. 
The Lord Chancellor called Hatch’s case “an illustration of the importance 
of such an alteration in the law as their lordships were dealing with to-night. 
If the clergyman had been able to give evidence at his own trial there would 
have been no necessity for the second performance.”5
Hatch’s case is important for us here because it had a special reso-
nance that helps explain the eventual passage of the Criminal Evidence Act: 
it stood out not just for the contradictory verdicts, but also as an example of 
the danger the courts posed for respectable defendants accused of actions 
particularly repugnant to Victorian society. Hatch, while not a wealthy 
man, was certainly respectable. He had attended Eton College and Cam-
bridge, had a position as chaplain at Wandsworth prison, was a teacher, 
and ran a household that included a governess and two other servants. His 
wife, Essie, also appears to have impressed journalists with her respectable 
behavior under trying circumstances. According to the Times, Mrs. Hatch 
“gave her evidence with very great calmness and self-possession.”6 Hatch’s 
case may have been extraordinary, but it was also a warning call to other re-
spectable men. The mid-Victorian era saw an increase in the possibility—
both real and perceived—that a man like Hatch might face the prospect of 
sitting in court, forbidden to speak, as he listened to accusations that he 
had engaged in scandalous conduct. This chapter explores that prospect 
in two scenarios—adultery accusations and sexual misconduct under the 
Criminal Law Amendment Act—and traces how the emotion associated 
with enabling respectable defendants to reply, coupled with a growing trust 
in the power of cross-examination to ensure witness veracity, worked to 
undermine solicitude for the nonrespectable defendant and paved the way 
for the admission of testimony on oath.
A Question of Timing
As we have already seen, it took fi fty years for the reform that abol-
ished testimonial incompetence for parties in civil cases to be extended to 
criminal defendants. Before the mid-nineteenth century, both were barred 
from testifying on oath out of a concern for the credibility of those with a 
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stake in the outcome of the case and a desire to avoid perjury. Testimonial 
incompetence for parties in civil cases began to unravel with the County 
Courts Act of 1846, which allowed testimony by parties in the new County 
Courts; this was followed shortly thereafter by the Evidence Amendment 
Act of 1851, which extended the privilege to parties in the superior courts.7 
In the United States, testimony by criminal defendants began as early as 
1864, in Maine; in Britain, by contrast, criminal defendants were not al-
lowed to testify on oath until 1898, when Parliament passed the Criminal 
Evidence Act. For those who look to Bentham’s infl uence as a starting point 
for reform, the wait is even longer: from the 1820s, when Bentham’s works 
were fi rst published in English, to 1898.
This delay was not for lack of bills in Parliament. The fi rst proposal 
to allow testimony by criminal defendants came as early as 1858 and was 
followed by many others over the next forty years. Bills to allow such tes-
timony were almost an annual feature of the parliamentary agenda. Legal 
historians such as Christopher Allen, David Bentley, and Keith Smith have 
detailed the reform efforts and different phases of parliamentary proposals 
over the course of the forty years between 1858 and 1898.8 Allen breaks this 
span into three periods. The fi rst, from 1858 through 1878, saw bills intro-
duced by private members of Parliament to remove the accused’s incompe-
tence. In Allen’s second period, from 1879 through 1883, the government 
initiated bills that would encompass the reform in a broader codifi cation 
of the criminal law. Finally, from 1884 until 1898, the government backed 
bills addressing testimonial incompetency as a separate measure. Despite 
fi fteen years of government support, the measure faced delay because of 
Irish opposition in Parliament; after being revised to exclude Ireland, a bill 
fi nally passed.9
Details of the bills changed from year to year. Some made the accused 
both competent and compellable; others made the accused only competent. 
Some envisioned shielding the defendant from cross-examination; others 
made no distinction between the defendant and any other witness in that 
regard. Members debated whether cross-examination to credit should be 
allowed and whether character and previous convictions should be admis-
sible into evidence. It is beyond the scope of this book to trace the outlines 
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of each proposal. What is striking, however, is the continuity of arguments 
marshaled in support of the reform over its long history. From the 1850s 
on, reformers relied on the ideas that allowing the testimony of criminal 
defendants would serve the discovery of truth, that it would help safeguard 
the innocent, and that it would remove problematic anomalies in the law of 
evidence.10
While many of the basic arguments for the change were in place by 
the 1850s, Allen also identifi es several broad developments that, over the 
course of the second half of the century, made revision of the law seem more 
acceptable. First, by century’s end, the danger of perjury had come to ap-
pear less pressing.11 In chapter 1, we explored how the experiment with 
criminal prosecution for false testimony in civil cases helped to take the 
sting out of the threat of perjury—and, indeed, made objections raised by 
opponents of the act seem less compelling than they had been before. By 
1898, the problem of perjury by defendants, as we will see below, scarcely 
merited a second thought at the Home Offi ce. Another change Allen has 
identifi ed is the growing emphasis placed on individual responsibility in the 
mid-nineteenth century. Allowing testimony by the accused dovetailed with 
the Victorian doctrine of personal character and responsibility by insisting 
on accountability and by treating the accused as a fully rational agent.12
A third shift Allen mentions is the normalization of change—the idea 
that the change was no change at all. Allen calls this “the image of continu-
ity.”13 After years of concern about the disruptive effect that allowing de-
fendant testimony would have on trial practice, reformers gradually came 
to argue that extending competency would involve “no essential change in 
the balance of power that had already been struck between judge, counsel, 
and accused in a criminal trial.”14 This view was refl ected in the increas-
ingly frequent use of arguments from anomaly by those who wanted to see 
change in the law of evidence. This strategy was a well-established one in 
the rhetoric of nineteenth-century English law reform. It implied that a pro-
posed change was not revolutionary but was instead merely a correction of 
lapses or a logical extension of the existing architecture of the system.
In the case of the Criminal Evidence Act, a series of incremen-
tal reforms eventually exerted a cumulative effect, making the defi nitive 
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 elimination of the exclusionary system of evidence seem less like the aban-
donment of a time-honored precedent than a mere extension of preexist-
ing structures to correct nagging irregularities. Each individual “anomaly” 
corrected seemed like the comparatively isolated rectifi cation of a particu-
lar problem at the time it was enacted, but the ultimate effect was to create 
a situation that supported fundamental change in the law of evidence. In 
the period leading up to 1898, the two most signifi cant of these specifi c 
reforms addressed testimony regarding adultery in the Divorce Court and 
allowed for testimony by those accused of certain types of sexual abuse. 
As we have seen, parties in the Divorce Court were not allowed to testify 
in cases  arising from adultery until 1869. The debate that led to the lifting 
of that ban showed the power of the argument from anomaly to motivate 
reforms that jurists had previously rejected out of a desire to avoid deceit 
by parties. In 1885, the Criminal Law Amendment Act (CLAA), which 
gave defendants the option of testifying when accused of a variety of sex-
ual offenses, created a new set of anomalies that bore some revealing simi-
larities to those addressed by the divorce reform of 1869. The CLAA was 
passed as part of a larger program of new sex crime laws and was intended 
to provide a safeguard against false accusation and blackmail. Once cer-
tain criminal offenses were covered by the CLAA, however, the position 
of those defendants charged under older laws, who were still prohibited 
from testifying, became anomalous. The need to eliminate this disparity 
was one of the strongest arguments for passage of the 1898 Criminal Evi-
dence Act.
Divorce trials and accusations of sexual offenses of the kind eventu-
ally covered by the CLAA, as we saw in the Hatch case, represented a re-
spectable gentleman’s worst nightmares. Even after the creation of the new 
Divorce Court in 1857, adultery remained the basis for all divorce suits. 
While the basis for divorce suits stayed the same, the gendered balance of 
power did not: for the fi rst time, more than a handful of husbands found 
themselves on the receiving end of divorce petitions. Perhaps even more 
disturbingly for Victorians, the evidence given in court (and also in the 
resulting proceedings of the Queen’s Proctor) was excruciatingly public, 
recounted at great length in an ever-enthusiastic daily press. The CLAA, 
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for its part, covered same-sex sexual conduct and sexual abuse of children, 
which were associated with false accusations, blackmail, and reputation-
ruining publicity if the case proceeded to court. In both of these situations, 
Parliament decided that the danger to respectable defendants outweighed 
the threat that innocent people unable to present their side of the story with 
eloquence or sincerity might be falsely convicted.
The roots of the Criminal Evidence Act, therefore, lay in the fear of 
scandal, and in particular, scandal made public in the context of a court-
room. While scandal itself exists throughout history, Victorians seem 
to have felt its threat with particular vehemence and perhaps as a result 
evinced a revealing fascination with its social effects. Certainly, a preoc-
cupation with the consequences of social stigma pervaded Victorian fi c-
tion, which, as John Kucich writes, was “structured obsessively around the 
very real power of lies” and the potentially damaging revelation of secrets.15 
From 1860 on, blackmail plots proliferated in popular sensation novels and 
works by George Eliot, William Thackeray, Charles Dickens, and Trol-
lope. Alexander Welsh, in his now-classic study of George Eliot, suggests 
that the use of blackmail plots was not merely an attempt by elite authors 
to pursue popularity but also a refl ection of widespread fears in mid-
 Victorian life.16 The fl ipside of secrecy was publicity, both in the press and 
in the courtroom. High-profi le cases were a staple of Victorian life; as Susie 
Steinbach points out, “Victorian culture was awash with law.” These cases, 
as Steinbach rightly indicates, provided an opportunity for Victorians to 
discuss the boundaries of political and economic power, marital conduct 
and marital breakdown, and male homosexuality.17 Scandal and ensuing 
court cases posed a keen danger to the powerful, respectable, and prosper-
ous. In order to meet this threat, Parliament gave respectable defendants 
like Hatch and accused adulterers the opportunity to refute the scandalous 
accusations leveled against them.
Adultery and the Divorce Court
Even in 1851, when the parties in civil cases were made competent 
witnesses, and again in 1853, when the privilege was extended to spouses, 
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two categories of cases were exempted: breach-of-promise suits and suits 
arising out of adultery.18 In both situations, the temptation to lie to pro-
tect one’s sexual honor was thought to be so strong that even those who 
shared the emerging consensus in favor of allowing party testimony took it 
for granted that the exceptions should be maintained. When a new Divorce 
Court was created in 1857, therefore, the exclusion of testimony regard-
ing adultery remained in place.19 Despite this element of continuity, as we 
will see, the introduction of the new Divorce Court had unexpected con-
sequences for party testimony. The motives for creating the court were in 
many ways not particularly revolutionary; the new institution was primar-
ily intended to address dissatisfaction with the complexity and expense of 
the previous procedure for obtaining a divorce, which created a situation 
in which very few could afford to sever their matrimonial bonds.20 While 
reformers stopped short of a commitment to gender equality before the law, 
inequities in outcome based on the status and wealth of petitioners increas-
ingly rankled in the mid-nineteenth century.21 Justice William Maule’s fa-
mous complaint about the expense of divorce procedure driving a hapless 
individual into bigamy may not have been representative, but it was widely 
believed to capture the heart of the problem.22 The Divorce Court was thus 
at most a compromise measure, allowing a simpler procedure while main-
taining most of the substance of the preexisting law.23
Adultery remained at the center of divorce proceedings because of the 
unchanged substance of the divorce law. Although a wife’s adultery could 
serve a husband as suffi cient grounds for divorce, Parliament stopped short 
of allowing wives to divorce their husbands for adultery alone. However, it 
remained a necessary part of a wife’s divorce petition: to obtain a divorce, 
she had to prove that her husband had committed adultery and an addi-
tional “aggravating” offense—such as incest, bigamy, rape, sodomy, bes-
tiality, cruelty, or desertion.24 This preserved the preexisting double stan-
dard with regard to grounds for divorce; it also ensured that both husbands 
and wives would be alleging adultery in their cases. Adultery, as we saw in 
the previous chapter, would remain a centerpiece of all divorce proceed-
ings, even though the “adultery exception” blocked parties from testifying 
in all suits arising out of it.
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Members of Parliament might have thought that the creation of the 
Divorce Court was a relatively modest change, but it led to what struck 
many as an alarming increase in the number of cases. These cases, in turn, 
brought with them a pair of unanticipated and, to Victorians, disturbing 
results: a boom in press coverage and an important change in the balance of 
power between husband and wife. While the mid-Victorian rate of divorce 
was low by modern standards, it was dramatically high in comparison with 
the handful of cases that made it through the gauntlet of the pre-1858 pro-
cedure. In the fi rst fi ve years of the court’s existence, it granted an average 
of 204 divorces per year; in its second fi ve years, that average increased to 
233 divorces.25 The effect of this steady stream of cases was amplifi ed by the 
publicity they received.
It had been hoped that publicity would deter couples, especially re-
spectable ones, from obtaining divorces.26 However, reformers had not an-
ticipated that the Divorce Court would give rise to a new form of entertain-
ment and become an enduring presence in the print media. Proceedings in 
the Divorce Court were public, unlike their parliamentary predecessors, 
and the doings of the new court rapidly became a popular spectacle. People 
fl ocked to the court to watch trials, and newspapers mined the cases for 
lurid details for their extensive stories. Parliament tried to legislate against 
newspapers’ use of evidence in the Divorce Court, but all such attempts 
failed.27 Major papers, like the Times, routinely covered Divorce Court 
proceedings, and new ones, such as the Divorce Court Reporter, emerged 
to recount the evidence presented in still greater detail. If the exhaustive 
coverage in the periodical press was not suffi cient, a determined reader 
could also purchase pamphlet accounts of particularly famous trials.28 The 
perception that Britain was awash in the newspaper stories generated by 
the Divorce Court reached into all circles of polite society. In 1868, Queen 
Victoria wrote the Lord Chancellor asking “whether no steps can be taken 
to prevent the present publicity of the proceedings before the new Divorce 
Court. These cases . . . fi ll now daily a large portion of the newspapers, 
and are of so scandalous a character that it makes it almost impossible for 
a paper to be trusted in the hands of a young lady or boy.”29 The Victorian 
feminist and anti–Contagious Diseases Act activist Josephine Butler felt 
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similarly. She commented about Divorce Court proceedings that “whatso-
ever things ye have spoken in darkness shall be heard in the light; and that 
which ye have spoken in the ear in closets shall be proclaimed upon the 
housetops.”30
Publicity was not the only surprise in the new Divorce Court. For the 
fi rst time, female petitioners made up nearly half the docket, an eventuality 
that likely came as a surprise to those who supported the court’s creation.31 
During its fi rst three years and four months, 200 women and 278 men re-
ceived divorces. This was a striking contrast to the history of divorce from 
its inception to 1857, during which only four female petitioners received 
parliamentary divorces; none of those had petitioned before 1801.32 In the 
years leading up to World War I, in contrast, wives received between 38 
and 46 percent of the divorces granted.33
With the new court, then, divorce was transformed from an embar-
rassment, conducted behind closed doors and almost always at the hus-
band’s behest, into a potentially very public humiliation that a wife could 
visit on a respectable husband. Although the new court expanded access to 
divorce beyond the narrow circle of those who could afford the expense of 
the old parliamentary process, most petitioners still tended to be from the 
respectable upper-middle class.34 The adultery exception meant that, like 
the Reverend Hatch, respectable men faced the prospect of having to sit 
silenced in proceedings arising from adultery, a tremendous public humili-
ation that the press would publicize in its every shameful detail.
Issues such as publicity and the scandals surrounding the Divorce 
Court quickly prompted Parliament to make efforts to reform its proce-
dures. The 1860 Queen’s Proctor legislation, discussed in chapter 4, at-
tempted to address the problem of collusive divorces. The problem of 
the silenced spouse prevented from responding to accusations of adultery 
came before Parliament several years later, in 1865. At that time, Sir Fitzroy 
Edward Kelly, Queen’s Counsel and former Solicitor General and Attorney 
General, cited the anomalies caused by the adultery exception as reason to 
eliminate it; by doing so, he and his allies began a debate that nearly led to 
the abolition of all testimonial exclusions and laid the foundation for future 
extensions of the right to testify.
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In his attack on the adultery exception, Kelly relied heavily on the 
viewpoint of James P. Wilde, a Divorce Court judge. Kelly read to the 
House of Commons a letter he had received from Wilde regarding the ef-
fect of the adultery exception on the Divorce Court. In it, Wilde wrote that 
the exception “works a great anomaly and a greater still injustice.”35 Wilde 
focused in particular on the way the exception deprived the accused of the 
power to respond, which in his estimation was “a great injustice, for as the 
law now stands, the sayings, writings and acts of the accused are all given in 
evidence against him, and he is obliged to stand by and hear them without 
the power of one word to explain them away.”36 He called this a “griev-
ous hardship to the individual and a great impediment to the discovery 
of truth.”37 To correct the wrong, Wilde supported an end to the adultery 
exception, with respondents made competent, but not compellable, to give 
evidence. Other members of Parliament agreed with Wilde in identifying 
the Divorce Court adultery exception as an anomaly. The Solicitor General 
stated that the government would not oppose the introduction of Kelly’s 
bill, calling the “proceedings in the Divorce Court . . . an anomaly which it 
might be desirable to correct.”38 Mr. M’Mahon took up the argument in his 
support for a further proposal to allow all defendants to testify, framing it as 
a protection for the wrongfully accused: “At present it frequently happened 
that a man was convicted because he was not allowed to give evidence on 
his behalf, or have the evidence of his wife taken.”39 Another member de-
cried the “gross scandal to public morals to which divorce cases gave rise” 
but concluded that their scandalousness was “an evil inherent in their very 
nature” and that the measure would not worsen the situation.40 Kelly’s 
more limited measure was combined with another private bill, introduced 
by Vincent Scully, which sought to make the accused a competent witness 
in all criminal cases. Although the Solicitor General had been willing to 
consider ending the exception for adultery cases, the government was not 
yet ready to allow all defendants to testify. The Attorney General prom-
ised further consideration of the question, but Parliament never returned 
to Kelly’s and Scully’s bills.41
Discontent with the adultery exception persisted, however. Four 
years later, Parliament returned to the topic with a bill introduced by 
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Mr. George Denman, son of Lord Thomas Denman and, like his father, an 
enthusiastic proponent of modernizing the law of evidence. As proposed, 
Denman’s bill would have done away with the exceptions for testimony 
regarding adultery and breach-of-promise cases, as well as allowing testi-
mony by those who would not take an oath. This became the Evidence 
Further Amendment Act (1869).42 According to its provisions, testimony 
by parties was permitted in breach-of-promise suits, but a plaintiff had to 
show some corroborating evidence in order to recover damages.43 In cases 
based on adultery, parties could give evidence, although they could not be 
asked whether they had committed adultery unless they had already given 
evidence to prove they had not done so.44 Denman framed this as a logical 
extension of the principle of allowing testimony by parties in civil proceed-
ings: both allowed testimony by parties with an interest in the outcome, 
“either morally or pecuniarily.”45
Just as later reformers of the exclusion in criminal law would do, Den-
man and his supporters based their arguments against the adultery excep-
tion on its anomalous results, calling it, in Denman’s words, a “monstrous 
anomaly amounting almost to iniquity.”46 Under the exception, the admis-
sibility of evidence depended on whether the case arose out of adultery. 
In a case for restitution of conjugal rights, a wife could testify regarding 
her husband’s adultery, but in a suit for divorce, the same testimony would 
not be admissible.47 In his speech before the House of Commons, Denman 
listed a series of recent cases in which the decision on testimony rested on 
the accident of which spouse had initiated the suit. Others agreed with him, 
calling the anomalies “remarkable” and “plainly fortuitous” because the ex-
ception predated the establishment of the Divorce Court.48 Divorce Court 
judge Wilde, now in the House of Lords as Lord Penzance, continued to 
refl ect on the potential harm to someone accused of adultery but unable 
to rebut the evidence: “Was there really any reason why a petitioner or a 
respondent should not be allowed to get into the witness-box, and by his 
or her explanation get rid of the suspicion which circumstances had raised 
against them? For want of this power, great injustice was often done.”49 
This time, the government agreed with the Attorney General, noting that 
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“on all grounds the case appeared to be made out for admitting the evi-
dence of parties to a suit for adultery.”50
In his endorsement of the reform, the Attorney General went so far as 
to invite his colleagues to “consider whether they would like to be placed in 
the position” of a man accused of adultery who “knew himself to be inno-
cent” but “was not allowed to be examined.”51 The Attorney General was 
not alone in imagining the principal benefi ciary of the reform as a respect-
able gentleman, not unlike himself. Historian Allen Horstman called the 
1869 law a “legislative effort to support Respectability . . . enacted so that 
Respectables could deny false allegations of adultery.”52 Denman himself 
made it clear that the parties he envisioned benefi ting from his bill were 
from the middle and upper classes, not typical lower-class defendants, as 
in criminal cases. Responding to members of Parliament who objected to 
allowing respondents to testify in Divorce Court because the proceedings 
there were of a quasi-criminal nature, Denman said that the analogy did not 
hold. He might see an argument against allowing criminal defendants (un-
like parties in divorce cases) to testify because “the prisoners were usually 
of a class so uneducated and so ignorant that, on examination and cross-
examination, they would be almost sure to commit themselves, and to in-
jure their own case, whether they were innocent or guilty.”53 Testimony, in 
his estimation, was a double-edged sword, best wielded by the educated 
and the intelligent.
The Criminal Law Amendment Act (1885)
The 1869 act corrected one set of anomalies, but the prohibition 
on testimony by criminal defendants remained in place. Ironically, what 
was needed to unseat the last prohibition was a new set of anomalies—a 
new disjuncture between the practice allowed to respectable defendants 
in some cases, but not in others. The CLAA would provide these anoma-
lies, laying the foundation for the eventual decision to allow criminal de-
fendants to testify on oath.54 The act raised the age of consent for chil-
dren to sixteen, specifi ed penalties for sexual offenses against women and 
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minors, strengthened measures against prostitution, and restated criminal 
sanctions against sexual conduct between men, as well as abuse of boys.55 
It became infamous for the so-called Labouchere Amendment outlawing 
acts of “gross indecency” between men, both in public and in private.56 
Although the Labouchere Amendment and the importance of the 1885 act 
in the history of criminalizing same-sex conduct has been called into ques-
tion, the CLAA represented an unheralded revolution in legal procedure.57 
Most critically for our story, the CLAA also contained a provision making 
the accused, and his or her spouse, competent witnesses in the trial of any 
offenses covered by the act.58 While other anomalies had been created by 
regulations passed between 1867 and 1885 allowing certain types of defen-
dants to testify, it was those created by the CLAA that were to garner the 
most attention, and also the most prosecutions.59 If charged under the act, 
the accused could speak on oath in response to charges involving prosti-
tution, brothel-keeping, sexual abuse of children, and sexual conduct be-
tween men.
Like the 1869 act, the CLAA took shape against a backdrop of highly 
public scandals. Allowing the respondent to speak in divorce cases did lit-
tle to stanch the fl ow of Victorian scandals and their extensive coverage in 
the press. As Michael Foldy notes in his history of the Oscar Wilde trials, 
by the mid-1880s, newspapers were already well-practiced in purveying 
the “sex scandal” story.60 Even before the act passed, defendants charged 
with the offenses it eventually covered had to fear extortion or damaging 
revelation of scandal through the press from a variety of actors, including 
private individuals, police offi cers, and even children. The scandals of the 
fi rst half of the 1880s, such as those provoked by W. T. Stead’s articles in 
the Pall Mall Gazette, “showed that the press, and even the government 
itself, was ultimately not above using the techniques of the blackmailer to 
disrupt public life and slander opponents.”61
Revelation and scandal, particularly for sexual offenses, were there-
fore very real dangers for respectable defendants— ones that could come 
from many different quarters. One of the most notable private extortionists 
of the period was George Osborn, convicted and sentenced to a life term 
of penal servitude for his crimes in 1886. Police described him as both a 
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“notorious sodomite” and an “associate of blackmailers.”62 The problem 
of extortion was not limited to private individuals, however; police could 
perpetrate it as well. Indeed, one change driving the mid-Victorian fear of 
blackmail was the increased (but still reluctant) involvement of the police in 
prosecuting sodomy and later gross indecency cases. Before the 1840s, of-
fi cial involvement in sodomy prosecution was uncommon, and most prose-
cutions, as H. G. Cocks has shown, appear to have been brought by private 
individuals.63 As the police force developed during the period after 1850, 
its involvement in these cases grew, as did worries about police  perjury.64 
Such perjury was considered to be cause for concern in a wide variety of 
offenses, even down to public drunkenness. As Stefan Petrow points out, 
in 1873, arrest of two “respectable” individuals, a barrister and an army 
offi cer, for public drunkenness touched off a controversy about the verac-
ity of testimony by police offi cers. It was feared that police offi cers would 
“back each other up with the most sweeping corroboration” if a defendant 
resisted the charges and insisted on his or her innocence.65 Testimony by 
police offi cers was also regarded with suspicion by members of Parliament. 
One member worried during the course of the debate on the CLAA that 
“if they put the right of search in the hands of the police . . . they might be 
putting an instrument in the hands of men who worked hard for extremely 
small salaries, and who were consequently, open to bribes.”66
Fear of blackmail and perjury was not limited to extortionate adult 
witnesses, but also extended to child witnesses in sexual assault cases. Lou-
ise Jackson has demonstrated how, in the period before the CLAA, child 
accusers in sexual abuse cases were frequently the target of suspicion. Most 
of the cases involved girls, but both boys and girls were viewed as potential 
liars. With girls, the object of the defense’s cross-examination was either to 
show sexual precocity or to suggest that a girl’s accusation had been learned 
by rote and was merely recited in court. Girls’ testimony had to tread a nar-
row path between knowledge and knowingness. Too much knowingness 
could open the door to accusations of sexual precocity, making the accuser 
a “little seductress or a minx” rather than a victim. For boys, meanwhile, 
accusers were portrayed as fi nancially scheming— delinquent, streetwise 
youth intent on extorting money from respectable gentlemen.67
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Certain types of child sexual abuse, in particular under-age prostitu-
tion, burst into public prominence in the 1880s. Laws against prostitution 
had been relatively laxly enforced during the fi rst half of the nineteenth 
century, but in the early 1880s, new anxieties changed the situation. In 
particular, newspapers and Parliament fueled concern that there was a 
systematic traffi c in young girls from Britain to Europe for the purpose of 
prostitution.68 In 1881 and 1882, a Select Committee in the House of Lords 
considered the evidence, focusing on alleged sale of girls to brothels in Bel-
gium, and also considered the broader question of juvenile prostitution in 
Britain. The committee discovered a system of paid agents who received 
a commission for each girl introduced but found little evidence that girls 
without “antecedent immoral lives” were involved. Once in Belgium, girls 
found themselves trapped by their unfamiliarity, knowing little of the local 
language or institutions that might help.69 With regard to child prostitu-
tion in England, the committee found that it was “increasing to an appall-
ing extent . . . especially in London.” The increase was attributed to what 
Victorians considered to be typical causes of immorality: overcrowding in 
dwellings, lack of parental and state supervision, and the inducement of 
pretty dresses and a bit of money.70 The committee recommended a num-
ber of measures to prevent under-age prostitution and to raise the age of 
consent for girls from thirteen to sixteen. No legislation, however, resulted 
from the 1882 recommendations. Bills passed by the House of Lords in 
1883 and 1884 failed to gain a hearing in the lower house.71 Parliament’s 
inactivity triggered a reaction from social reformers. A coalition of purity 
reformers sought to force the government to pass anti– child prostitution 
legislation, which would raise the age of consent and heighten penalties for 
brothel-keepers. W. T. Stead, as editor of the Pall Mall Gazette, garnered 
public attention with his series “The Maiden Tribute of Modern Baby-
lon,” which purported to demonstrate the dangers of white slavery. The 
series was followed by a Salvation Army petition, delivered to Parliament 
in a wagon, and in August 1885, a mass rally in favor of the bill attracted 
more than a quarter of a million people.72
As the bill was debated, one of the primary concerns for lawmakers 
was the prospect of creating a new and potent temptation for blackmail 
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and extortion. Sir Henry Holland warned that “nothing would be easier in 
these cases than to get the evidence of some woman, or even of a policeman, 
to corroborate the charge; and the unhappy man who was charged would 
either have to pay blackmail . . . or he would have to appear in Court.” For a 
man with a professional reputation to maintain, he continued, the mere fact 
of an accusation alone could prove devastating.73 William Harcourt noted 
the “considerable danger . . . of false charges being made for the purposes 
of extortion.”74 Liberal member Charles Hopwood echoed Holland’s con-
cern about the danger of extortion by means of false charges. Girls “steeped 
in depravity” between the ages of thirteen and sixteen, he asserted, would 
pose a great danger to both men and boys.75
Even younger children might make false charges. Hopwood invoked 
the Hatch-Plummer case of 1860, by now a hallowed classic in the annals 
of perjury, as a demonstration of the danger of false accusations even under 
the existing law of child sexual abuse, since the Plummer girls had accused 
the Reverend Hatch when they were eight and eleven years old.76 Hop-
wood also stressed that appearances could be deceiving: in the Hatch case 
“the young witnesses gave the most childlike and innocent answers, which, 
upon subsequent inquiry, were established, beyond doubt, to be a pack 
of falsehoods.”77 The youthful accusers in the Hatch case were also cited 
by contemporary commentators on the law, who noted that even children 
as young as eleven had been convicted of perjury in cases growing out of 
sexual abuse charges.78
The testimony of young witnesses accusing respectable adults gave 
even proponents of the new measure qualms. Members pondered whether 
the existing practice enabling the judge to question a child witness to de-
termine whether the child understood the nature of an oath would provide 
suffi cient protection against falsifi ed statements. Edward Clarke, a Con-
servative member of Parliament and leading barrister who would play a 
key role in both the scandalous Baccarat Case and the Oscar Wilde trial in 
the 1890s, doubted that requiring understanding would prevent fraudulent 
accusations. It was easy enough to coach a child to answer several typical 
questions, such as, “Do you know what will be done to you if you tell a lie?” 
Instead, Clarke suggested that cross-examination of child witnesses by 
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 legal representatives of the defendant would provide a much-needed safe-
guard.79 Clarke proposed an amendment that would allow for “the fullest 
opportunity of cross-examination by the prisoner or his advisers.”80 Others 
disagreed, wondering who “would dare to cross-examine [a] child?”81 The 
fi nal law not only placed no limit on cross-examination, it also included a 
proviso, in cases regarding abuse of girls younger than thirteen, rendering 
a witness too young to be sworn indictable for perjury nonetheless.82 A 
child who did not, in the opinion of the court, understand the nature of 
an oath might still provide testimony as long as the court decided that he 
or she was possessed of suffi cient intelligence and understood the duty of 
speaking the truth.83
Ensuring examination of immature witnesses and holding the threat 
of perjury prosecution over their heads was one safeguard envisioned in 
the law, but ultimately, the primary safeguard it accorded was a provision 
to allow the defendant to speak on oath. This measure originated with 
James Picton, radical member of Parliament for Leicester, who, after sev-
eral months of debate on the bill, proposed that the defendant or the wife 
of the person charged be considered a competent witness. In introducing 
his amendment, he commented that testimony on an accusation of sexual 
abuse was similar to cases of adultery and conspiracy—these were “espe-
cially offences on which such testimony ought to be allowed.”84 The At-
torney General, while not wholeheartedly embracing Picton’s proposal, 
agreed that “of all classes of cases that dealt with in this Bill, this was the 
one in which the defendant should be allowed to give evidence.”85
Not all members of Parliament were eager to tinker with allowing 
defendant’s testimony. Picton’s proposal was greeted with an array of by 
now familiar arguments against allowing criminal defendants to testify on 
oath and be cross-examined. Should the defendant be compellable? Would 
there be a presumption of guilt if the defendant did not take the stand? Sir 
William Harcourt objected to the dilemma that would result for criminal 
defendants: “there was no doubt that where an accused person was com-
petent to be a witness and was not called, it raised a presumption against 
him. . . . [I]f he were guilty he would not appeal and if they forced a guilty 
man into the witness-box, whether he liked it or not, they would be subject-
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ing him to the temptation to commit perjury, and thus rendering him liable 
to additional penalty attached to that offence.”86
As in adultery cases, the danger of encouraging perjury was balanced 
against, and ultimately outweighed by, the potential for exoneration. Even 
a critic like William Harcourt agreed that “a provision like this was of the 
greatest value to enable a man to prove his innocence.”87 The risk posed 
to respectable defendants who might otherwise be silenced was important 
enough that a major inroad had been made in the prohibition of defendant’s 
testimony. It was a new anomaly, and one that caused many observers at the 
time to look ahead to subsequent expansions. Treatise writers Frederick 
Mead and A. H. Bodkin, for example, called the CLAA a “somewhat bold 
experiment” and looked to the results to see whether the right should be 
extended to all criminal defendants.88
The importance Victorians accorded to exoneration can be seen in 
one of the more famous consequences of the CLAA: Oscar Wilde’s multiple 
trials and ultimate exile. In 1895, the Marquess of Queensberry left a note 
for Wilde at Wilde’s club, calling him a “posing Somdomite [sic].” In doing 
so, Queensberry invaded one of the privileged spaces of Victorian mascu-
linity—the all-male club—and made public a devastating accusation.89 Al-
though Wilde had been advised of the risks of proceeding with a prosecu-
tion, he nonetheless went forward with libel charges against Queensberry. 
Edward Carson, representing Queensberry, executed one of the century’s 
most devastating cross-examinations against Wilde. At the end of it, Carson 
received a note from Justice Richard Collins, saying, “I have never heard a 
more powerful speech nor a more searching crossXam.”90 The collapse of 
Wilde’s libel case against Queensberry was followed quickly by a decision 
to prosecute Wilde under the CLAA for acts of “gross indecency.”91 He 
was convicted, imprisoned, and subsequently left England for a life of self-
imposed exile in France. His story is well-known, but placed in its contem-
porary context, Wilde’s tragic error—the decision to respond to Queens-
berry’s accusation—seems less a matter of artistic temperament and more 
an example of the importance of refutation. Ironically, the CLAA under 
which Wilde was ultimately convicted also served as the institutional ex-
pression of the right to refutation.
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Those interested in the legislative results of the CLAA “experiment” 
did not have long to wait. Once opposition to evidence reform from Irish 
members of Parliament was overcome, or rather, simply avoided by means 
of excluding Ireland from the bill, the path was cleared for the CLAA’s 
anomalies to be generalized and transformed into the new normal in crimi-
nal law.92 And, once again, the anomalies of the current state of law would 
be personifi ed by the Reverend Henry Hatch. Nearly forty years after his 
trial, Hatch was still invoked in arguments supporting testimony by de-
fendants. In 1897, during a House of Commons debate on what would be-
come the Criminal Evidence Act, Edward Clarke retold Hatch’s story and 
argued that “standing alone, [the Hatch case] should be suffi cient to satisfy 
any Member of the House as to the absolute necessity of this alteration of 
the law.”93 Hatch’s story was clearly a familiar one. Clarke’s recitation of the 
multiple trials of the Reverend Hatch and his declaration that despite all 
the proceedings “the question of his guilt or innocence was never tried in 
a case in which all persons could be heard” was greeted with cheers in the 
House. Interestingly, perhaps out of his own concern for the reputation of 
a fellow respectable, Clarke did not identify Hatch by name. Instead, he re-
ferred to a “clergyman” who was “convicted of a shameful offence because 
his mouth and that of his wife were closed,” a shorthand that members 
readily understood. Hatch remained the symbol for respectability silenced 
in the face of scandal.94
Debate on the criminal evidence bill largely followed the outlines 
of debate in previous years. Earlier exceptions to the rule against testimo-
nial incompetence, such as admission of testimony regarding adultery in 
the Divorce Court after 1869 and the CLAA, were cited in support of the 
measure. “In the Divorce Court, where the issues were often as serious, 
painful, and disastrous as in the criminal Courts, the parties were available 
as witnesses in their own defence,” one member reminded the House.95 
The Attorney General began his lengthy argument for the bill with a list 
of anomalies, including the one created by the CLAA: “a man charged 
under the Criminal Law Amendment Act with a criminal assault could 
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give evidence, while a man charged with a common assault could not give 
evidence.”96 Other members of Parliament followed suit. Edward Clarke 
pointed to the difference in treatment between defendants accused of steal-
ing a woman’s purse and those accused of committing a sexual assault on 
a woman.97 After reporting on the debates, the Times concluded that “we 
have [an] exceptionally anomalous state of things” and that the “anomalies 
have vexed the souls of theorists.”98
Judges and supporters argued that the CLAA’s admission of testi-
mony by defendants was now an exception to be embraced. More than a 
decade’s experience with the CLAA had convinced most reformers, if not 
necessarily the most ardent letter writers in the Times, that extending com-
petence to the accused would be relatively unproblematic.99 Justice Henry 
Lopes, for example, recalled trying the very fi rst case brought under the 
CLAA, involving the abduction of a young girl. It worked “admirably,” 
in his recollection, and in 1897, he was happy to advocate extending the 
principle to other criminal cases.100 Lord Herschell, himself a previous 
Lord Chancellor, said that he was pleased by the operation of the CLAA.101 
Crucially, the CLAA allowed defendants to refute charges against them. 
Reformers and government offi cials supporting the bill argued that the fi rst 
instinct of innocent defendants was to speak in their own defense. A. C. 
Plowden assured the Times that “the average innocent man . . . would pre-
fer to fall under the fi re of cross-examination rather than wither in silence in 
the dock. The fi rst instinct of such a man would be to speak, to repel the 
accusation, to face his foes and challenge them in the proof.”102 Both cur-
rent and previous Lord Chancellors in 1898 framed the importance of the 
law in terms of allowing a defendant, generally referred to as “a man,” the 
right to tell his own story.103
Telling one’s own story, however, had profound class implications 
for the bill’s opponents. In the House of Commons, Mr. E. H. Pickers-
gill observed that any advantage to an innocent defendant would depend 
on his coolness and self-possession, which “were largely associated with 
education and therefore the Bill would give to the educated man an ad-
vantage over the uneducated man.”104 Uneducated men, even when in-
nocent, “had a great tendency to tell lies about comparatively immaterial 
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facts.”105 Pickersgill later amplifi ed his complaint, saying that the proposed 
measure would tend to “establish the most odious of all distinctions—a 
class distinction.”106 Others agreed, attempting to remind the House that 
it was also “legislating for the poor, the miserable, the ignorant, the con-
fused—almost the dumb, you may say—who are driven into a Criminal 
Court and have, probably for the fi rst time in their lives, to endeavour to 
string together a few sentences against more or less skilled opponents.”107 
John Morley tried, ineffectually, to persuade his fellow members that they 
were not making laws for themselves—“all of us are more or less educated 
persons, more or less able to take care of ourselves in cross-examination, 
but this is a change which will not affect, speaking generally, persons in our 
position but humble and ignorant persons.”108
Morley and Pickersgill, however, were very much in the minority in 
1898. In general, members of Parliament were much less sympathetic to 
poor defendants who might seal their fates with verbal blunders. In this 
indifference they were typical of their era. A willingness to take measures 
that would restrict the liberties of those who were habitually on the wrong 
side of the legal process, such as drunkards or the mentally disabled, united 
both Conservative social reformers and the socially activist New Liberals 
in the 1890s. New Liberalism saw an increased role for the state in further-
ing moral reform and policing the unruly “residuum” of the population.109 
Parliament’s collective shrug when confronted with the fate of poor defen-
dants coincided with a broader insistence on responsibility at the expense 
of liberty.
Few denied that the law had a potentially greater effect on poor defen-
dants. It was not just liberal members of Parliament who believed that poor 
defendants could make costly errors, and even commit perjury, in the pro-
cess of defending themselves. The Home Offi ce noted, in an 1897 memo, 
that “even innocent [defendants] at present are prone to believe in the vir-
tues of an alibi when the true defence is (e.g.) that the identifi cation is not 
satisfactory.”110 The poverty of many criminal defendants made the Home 
Offi ce uneasy, as shown in another 1897 memo, about the wisdom of equat-
ing civil and criminal proceedings. Civil proceedings were likely to take 
place between people suffi ciently well-to-do to engage counsel, whereas 
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most criminal defendants were unlikely to have the benefi t of counsel, ex-
cept perhaps at the trial itself. If criminal proceedings were evaluated as 
credibility contests between two sides, rather than as tests of the prosecu-
tion’s case, “the defendant, unless he happened to be a well-to-do man, 
would be likely to suffer great injustice.”111 Despite these qualms about 
the potential effect on poor defendants, the Home Offi ce supported the 
measure.
Indifference to poor defendants was motivated in part by anxiety re-
garding the fate of well-educated defendants. The other side of the class di-
vision was put forward in Parliament with striking frankness by Sir R. Reid. 
“Let us see what is sought to be prevented,” he began.
I will take the case of myself or any other gentleman. We are all 
liable to have false accusations brought against us. Suppose we 
happen to walk along the street, or into a railway carriage, or 
some other place in which there are only two or three others, 
apparently of a respectable character, who have formed a con-
spiracy to accuse us of an offence. It is possible that gentlemen 
who are wealthy are more exposed to that danger and more li-
able to be the object of such a conspiracy than others. I want to 
put it to any gentleman to just think what his position and feel-
ings would be when he was approaching his trial when he knew 
he would not be allowed to go into the witness box and give a 
solemn denial to the charge on oath; and not only so, but to give 
himself an opportunity of having his testimony corroborated by 
cross-examination.112
Members of Parliament were willing to see themselves in Hatch’s position, 
or the position of defendants facing charges under the CLAA. In a similar 
vein, “An Old Cross-Examiner” asked readers of the Times whether they 
would like to have the “old rule preserved if [they] had the bad luck to face 
a blackmailing or mistaken indictment, or a groundless suit in the Divorce 
Court?”113 A. C. Plowden stated fl atly in his letter to the Times that “there 
is no one of us who may not some fi ne day fi nd himself accused of some 
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hideous crime or another—the victim of a malicious set of circumstances 
all setting in the same direction.”114
Reid’s suggestion that his colleagues should contemplate the possi-
bility that they might fi nd themselves in the position of the unjustly accused 
defendant was by no means isolated. The Recorder of Gravesend wrote 
the Home Offi ce in support of allowing testimony on a similar measure in 
1891. It was, he wrote, the plight of a “gentleman” who had been placed in 
“extreme peril” as a result of a larceny accusation concocted by two pawn-
brokers that prompted him to share his feelings with the Home Offi ce.115 
The Recorder suggested extending the CLAA’s provisions for defense tes-
timony to all criminal charges, stating his belief that many innocent people 
had greatly benefi ted from the CLAA’s Section 20. George Pitt-Lewis also 
wrote to the Home Secretary in 1893 arguing that extending the right to 
testify to all criminal defendants would cut down on what he called “vexa-
tious prosecutions”: “Take, for instance a prosecution for rape. A girl, sup-
posed to be of good character is (after the usual course of events in such 
cases) surprised in fl agrante delicto with a man. Of course she prosecutes 
for rape. He is acquitted, after giving evidence, & then he indicts her for 
perjury.” Moreover, he hastened to add, this was no imaginary case; he had 
worked with similar ones.116 Harry Bodkin Poland reminded Times read-
ers in 1897 about the recent case of an Oxford undergraduate convicted for 
assault on the basis of what the student said was perjured testimony by a 
local policeman, to which he was unable to respond in court. Poland asked 
readers to imagine themselves in the shoes of the undergraduate, arguing, 
“I would ask any candid reader to say, [after reading the undergraduate’s 
letter to the Times] whether the law which excludes a defendant in such a 
case can be a just law.”117
The government did not entirely disregard the dilemma of poor de-
fendants, however, but the extent of that concern was strictly limited to 
innocent poor defendants. In preparation for the 1898 session, the govern-
ment made concerted efforts to refute long-time critic Herbert Stephen’s ar-
gument that the bill would result in the conviction of innocent defendants. 
Stephen, who worked on the Northern Circuit, claimed that “somewhere 
between fi ve and ten innocent prisoners are convicted each year through 
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giving their own evidence. The prisoners who can give evidence are be-
tween one-fourth and one-fi fth of the whole number at assizes.” Passing 
the bill, Stephen estimated, would result in thirty erroneous convictions 
on the Northern Circuit alone, and untold more on the eight other cir-
cuits.118 Kenneth Muir Mackenzie, the Lord Chancellor’s undersecretary, 
requested that the Home Offi ce research Stephen’s accusation, though his 
request belied his disbelief: “If there have been such cases, you probably 
let the poor things out: and you will have formed an opinion as to whether 
their conviction was due to their having given evidence.”119
The Home Offi ce concluded that no requests for pardon had been 
made on that basis: “the S. of S. cannot recall a single instance in which such 
a plea has been made a ground for advising a total or partial remission of 
sentence.” Going back to CLAA convictions in 1894 and 1895 (in order to 
ensure that there had been adequate time to fi le petitions), the Home Offi ce 
reported that in “no case did the prisoner allege that he had been injured 
by giving evidence himself.” Instead, the Home Offi ce singled out a case in 
which a prisoner had been invited to give evidence, refused because he felt 
confused, and then later regretted that decision.120 The memo concluded 
that Stephen’s statement was “baseless.”121 Another Home Offi ce memo 
noted that the percentage of acquittals was higher in CLAA cases (between 
31 and 50 percent) than in the ordinary run of cases heard at the assizes. 
Requests for pardons on the ground of innocence were more common in 
CLAA cases, but the Home Offi ce memo attributed that to the he said/she 
said nature of many rape cases, which made “shaky” convictions more likely. 
As with credibility contests in rape cases, more “shaky” convictions might 
result from giving the defendant the right to testify, but the memo found that 
potential danger would likely be “counterbalanced by the number of inno-
cent defendants who would be enabled to demonstrate their innocence.”122
Learning to Live with the Lie
Compared with the beginning of our story, when perjury prosecu-
tions were contemplated in all instances of false testimony, the landscape 
of legal thought looked quite different by 1898. Perjury, it was broadly 
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 acknowledged, would still happen in the courtroom. Women’s testimony, 
in particular, was expected to be unreliable. In that way, little had changed. 
But, crucially, legislators decided that eradicating or discouraging perjury 
would no longer be a government priority. Rather than structuring the law 
in order to avoid perjury, they were content to rely on cross-examination to 
expose it. In a measure of how sensitivity to the threat of perjury by defen-
dants had changed by the end of the century, the Home Offi ce dismissed 
the problem in an 1897 memo. Changing the law of evidence would be the 
cause of a “large amount of perjury,” the Home Offi ce acknowledged. But 
perjury by a prisoner “is perhaps not a very serious matter: if a man has 
committed a burglary it is not a very serious matter that he should also com-
mit perjury to escape the consequence of it.”123
The Home Offi ce memo in 1897 also expressed concern about the 
prospect of perjury committed by wives of male defendants. It combined 
a recognition of women’s economic dependence on their husbands with a 
sweeping disregard for married women’s truthfulness. Arguing that “it is 
a matter of common experience that women are able to believe in the in-
nocence of an accused friend or relative in the face of evidence suffi cient to 
convince any man,” the Home Offi ce noted the petitions “that come from 
women and especially prisoners’ wives are especially marked by a disincli-
nation to accept the logic of facts.” Moreover, such lying female relatives 
operated without social sanction (“the opinion of her own class would ap-
plaud rather than condemn her”) and without practical legal recourse (“the 
prosecution of a wife for evidence given on behalf of her husband would be 
so painful a business that it would probably be rare”). In the face of such 
“commonsense” knowledge about women, extending the right to testify 
to the male defendant’s spouse “deserved more discussion than it has yet 
received.”124 The Home Offi ce stopped short, however, of recommending 
any change to the proposed bill.
In 1898, another Home Offi ce memo worried that juries favor rape 
plaintiffs: “once a jury take to comparing the story a woman tells with the 
story a man tells, the man is likely to have but little chance.” Once again 
relying on popular “wisdom” rather than legal precedent, the memo fret-
ted that “it is common knowledge that women are more able to lie with 
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vraisemblance and conviction than men do: for instance the whole success 
of the ‘The Liars’ at the Criterion now arises from this.”125 “The Liars” 
was a comedy by Henry Arthur Jones that ran at the Criterion Theatre 
from 6 October 1897 until November 1898.126 A farce revolving around an 
apparent (but unconsummated) incidence of unfaithfulness and an uneaten 
French dinner, “The Liars” is a curious source for the Home Offi ce. It 
does, however, feature many jokes about women’s inability to tell the truth 
when a lie could do:
sir  c :  Let us go over the various possibilities of the case. There are 
only two.
lady  j :  What are they?
sir  c :  Possibility number one—get out of it by telling fi bs. Possibil-
ity number two—get out of it by telling the truth. Why not pos-
sibility two?
lady  j :  Oh, couldn’t!
.  .  . 
s ir  c :  On possibility number one, tell a fi b. I put that possibility fi rst 
out of natural deference and chivalry towards ladies. The objec-
tion I have to telling fi bs is that you get found out.
lady  j :  Oh, not always! I mean, if you arrange things not perhaps as 
they were, but as they ought to have been.
sir  c :  I see. In that way a lie becomes a sort of idealized and essential 
truth—
lady  j :  Yes. Yes—
sir  c :  I’m not a good hand at—idealizing.
lady  j :  Ah, but then you’re a man! No, I can’t tell the truth. Gilbert 
would never believe me.127
Skepticism about women’s testimony was alive and well in the Home Offi ce 
during the 1890s, but it played a comparatively minor role in the debate on 
the Criminal Evidence Act of 1898. Again, while some offi cials apparently 
believed that women were irrepressible liars, no one was motivated to al-
ter proposed legislation. One potential explanation for the Home Offi ce’s 
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willingness to overlook the issue was mentioned in a memo the previous 
year: the paucity of female criminal defendants. One memo noted that of 
the prisoners committed for trial in 1895, only one-seventh were women.128 
Women might often be liars, but they would make infrequent appearances 
in the dock.
The fi nal passage of the Criminal Evidence Act also represented a 
concluding episode in the history of reconciliation with cross-examination 
described in chapter 2. It is testament to the general level of comfort that 
had been achieved with cross-examination that the fi nal version of the bill 
was passed without an extensive limitation on it. In previous years, pro-
posed bills had restricted cross-examination with respect to character, but 
the fi nal version did not.129 Because the fear of perjury now concentrated 
on the hardened criminal, the extent of cross-examination became the bone 
of contention in the debate over allowing the sworn testimony of criminal 
defendants. In particular, opinions differed on whether defendants should 
be subject to cross-examination as to character and prior convictions. 
While some argued that allowing cross-examination as to prior convictions 
amounted to cruelty to defendants, others maintained that “we need not 
shed many tears over the habitual criminal.”130 Even Herbert Stephen, a 
steadfast opponent of the measure, rejected the idea that criminal defen-
dants be shielded from cross-examination as to past convictions.131
The Attorney General defended this omission of any form of protec-
tion from cross-examination, noting that he had asked many judges whether 
they thought cross-examination had done a disservice to defendants; all of 
them said it had not. Furthermore, “It seemed better to have one uniform 
and simple code of law; and, speaking for those Courts of which he had a 
long experience, he did not believe our Judges would ever allow the posi-
tion of a prisoner to be prejudiced or the license of counsel to go too far in 
the matter of examination or cross-examination of prisoners.”132 Edward 
Clarke went further, suggesting that an overreaching cross-examination 
would work in defendants’ favor by making it seem they were being treated 
unfairly.133 Edward Cox’s arguments in favor of the barrister’s probity and 
the ultimate wisdom of allowing the legal profession a central role in the 
production of truth in the courtroom had become common sense.
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In the end, a slight concession was made to critics of cross-
 examination. The version of the act that passed in 1898 contained a limited 
restriction: if defendants attacked the characters of prosecutors or their wit-
nesses, they could be cross-examined as to their own credit.134 This fell far 
short, however, of the previous demand that the characters of defendants 
be entirely off-limits in cross-examination. Practically speaking, defendants 
faced a tight constraint: either do nothing to discredit the witnesses on the 
other side, or face cross-examination as to their own credit.
In addition to Parliament’s unwillingness to limit cross-examination, 
we can also gauge the extent of cross-examination’s victory by its reception 
in the press. During the years before 1898, the Times had published a rash 
of letters criticizing the abuse of cross-examination and exploring alterna-
tives for its limitations such as Stephen’s Indian Evidence Act. If anyone 
knew the arguments against unlimited cross-examination, it was the editors 
of the Times. Nonetheless, the newspaper embraced Parliament’s decision 
to leave regulation of cross-examination to the consciences of counsel. In 
its leader in support of the new law, the Times opined that “we do not for 
a moment believe” that it might lead to abuse of cross-examination: “Not 
only the British spirit of fair play, but all the traditions of our Bench and Bar 
afford securities against such a danger more effective than any that could be 
put into an Act of Parliament.”135
The rise of cross-examination to its current status as main guarantor 
of truth, if not perhaps the greatest legal engine ever invented, had now 
received the imprimatur of Parliament. The license of counsel that had ap-
peared so ferocious in the person of Mr. Chaffanbrass now seemed a routine 
part of adversarial procedure. Out of the welter of experimentation during 
the Victorian period, cross-examination lasted the longest. Other potential 
engines of truth—including criminal prosecution, shame sanctions, and 
the inquisitorial pursuit of perjurers—lay by the wayside. With the exten-
sion of the right to testify to the criminal defendant, and the incorporation 
of cross-examination as the quid pro quo for that right, the modern Anglo-
American trial took the form we still recognize today.
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